Conclusions
30 Having considered the evidence, the submissions and undertaken a view I am satisfied this development application merits conditional consent.
31 The primary question for the Court concerns the relative weight to be given to the various planning controls. My assessment is that the controls in WLEP prevail in this case over the DWLEP because I do not consider the proposed controls are certain at this stage and in any case the savings clause 1.8A would apply. Therefore it is appropriate to assess the SEPP 1. In adopting this approach, I accept that the controls in DWLEP are matters for consideration and have assessed them in the overall merit consideration.
32 The threshold matter then is whether the SEPP 1 objection to the minimum 40 ha subdivision development standard should be allowed. In this regard, I note that Mr Lewis supports the SEPP1 and approval of the development.
33 Insofar as Mr Goth does not support the SEPP 1, he acknowledges that the development standard is inappropriate and needs to be revised, along with the underlying objects and purposes. As this development standard is under provisions of WLEP, he contends that the provisions relating to the minimum subdivision size under DWLEP are now highly relevant and should be relied upon.
34 However the basic facts are that the subject land has an area of 5.2 ha and this was created in DP 1321 in 1884. Nevertheless it is not in a neighbourhood with a minimum 40 ha rural character and it appears as an 'infill' lot, being surrounded by and adjacent to much smaller lots that were also created in this DP, as shown in Attachment 1.
35 Accordingly for the assessment of the SEPP 1, I have considered the evidence relative to the current 1(a1) zoning of the land in the context that both planners agree the development standard is inappropriate. I am then satisfied to rely on the evidence of Mr Lewis that the objective to protect the agricultural viability of rural holdings has very limited application here due to the relatively small size of the existing lot. In the absence of any other substantive evidence, I accept Mr Lewis' opinion that the agricultural potential is limited to the grazing of livestock.
36 However such livestock grazing, namely intensive livestock keeping establishments are permissible only with consent. I then accept the position of Mr Lewis that if an application is made for this use, there would likely be significant hurdles in satisfying other objectives for the zone, particularly to reduce the incidence of rural land use conflict likely to arise from potential impacts on the residents of the surrounding rural/residential lots. Therefore this use is unlikely to be viable.
37 In this regard, Mr Lewis then refers to the provisions of the DWLEP where "intensive livestock keeping establishments" are to be prohibited. Accordingly, this confirms his opinion that the subject land has little if any agricultural potential.
38 Whilst "Intensive horticulture" is also permitted under WLEP, I am inclined to rely on the evidence of Mr Lewis that the sloping topography is quite restrictive in achieving satisfactory 'horticulture' structures and activities without incurring soil erosion and runoff issues.
39 Against this, I have considered Mr Goth's opinion that any agricultural activity may need to be undertaken in conjunction with another mutually supporting use, such as a B&B. However no compelling evidence was presented.
40 In the circumstances of this matter, I am satisfied that the agricultural potential of this land is very limited and predominantly for livestock grazing and this is unlikely to be diminished as a result of the development. Furthermore, there was no substantive evidence to show that the site is a viable rural holding.
41 The next objective is to prevent inappropriate, premature and sporadic subdivisions. However it is apparent that the DWLEP does contemplate the subdivision of this land into 2 ha lots. Consequently there is a reasonable expectation that 2 lots could be created. Reference to the 'Wollondilly Vision 2025' shows the subject land is to be a significant part of the westward expansion the Douglas Park urban area.
42 Insofar as Mr Goth says the approval of the development would fragment the land and not enhance the future prospect of economic serving, I do not consider this should be given such weight as to reject the application. The future planning will allow at least 2 smaller lots with minimum areas of 2 ha. In my assessment, there was no compelling evidence to demonstrate that the proposed additional rural/residential lot would interfere with servicing or orderly development of the land.
43 The next relevant objective for the Zone 1(a1) land is to prevent, on the urban fringes, subdivision of land into small lots, which would prejudice future planning of additional urban areas. In this regard, I firstly do not consider the proposal is to create small lots. The proposed lots with a minimum area of 1.52 ha are so configured that future small lot subdivision would be possible, especially taking into account the 2 road frontage of this existing corner lot. Therefore this objective is not offended.
44 Turning then to the DWELP, I accept that this draft instrument is a matter to be considered. Accordingly it supports the subdivision of the subject land into lots with minimum areas of 2 ha, which Mr Goth acknowledges.
45 In order to assess any rational basis and sensitivity of the 2 ha standard, Mr Goth was cross-examined on his reliance on this council standard. But there was no compelling explanation presented for the basis of this 2 ha control. The only explanation is contained in the council officers email of 30 April 2009, which states:
"Yes the site is proposed RU4 Small Holdings with a minimum lot size of 2 hectares. The reason for this is that the area is substantially subdivided and the proposed zoning generally just reflects the subdivision pattern already on the ground and is located directly adjoining an urban area.
This is the general approach we have taken with the DLEP with the Department's agreement. This is the only allotment in that area which will get anything out of the rezoning - and then, should only get one additional allotment …"
46 Having reviewed the evidence before the Court, it appears to me that this basis is not well founded in the particular circumstances of this case. Reference to the immediate neighbourhood plan (Attachment 1) shows the infill location of the subject land surrounded by some 21 other established lots, all with areas of less than 1.4 ha. Accordingly, the 2 ha standard has no obvious reflection of the size of the existing subdivision pattern on the ground. In these circumstances, the relatively minor reduction in area to 1.53 ha - 1.84 ha is a marginally better reflection if that is the critical criteria.
47 Consequently, for my assessment of the SEPP 1, I have also considered the approach set out in the matter of Wehbe v Pittwater Council [2007] NSWLEC 827 where Preston CJ said:
Ways of establishing that compliance is unreasonable or unnecessary
42 An objection under SEPP 1 may be well founded and be consistent with the aims set out in clause 3 of the Policy in a variety of ways. The most commonly invoked way is to establish that compliance with the development standard is unreasonable or unnecessary because the objectives of the development standard are achieved notwithstanding non-compliance with the standard: see SCMP Properties Pty Limited v North Sydney Municipal Council (1983) 130 LGERA 351 at 379; Hooker-Rex Estates v Hornsby Shire Council, unreported, LEC No 10506 of 1982, 27 July 1983, Bignold J, pp 16, 18 and 20; Gergely & Pinter v Woollahra Municipal Council (1984) 52 LGRA 400 at 406-407, 412-413; Hooker Corporation Pty Limited v Hornsby Shire Council (1986) 130 LGRA 438 at 441; North Sydney Municipal Council v Parlby, unreported, LEC No 10613 of 1985, 13 November 1986, Stein J at p 5; Legal and General Life of Australia Ltd v North Sydney Municipal Council (1989) 68 LGRA 192 at 202; Leighton Properties Pty Ltd v North Sydney Council (1998) 98 LGERA 382 at 386; Fast Buck$ v Byron Shire Council (1999) 103 LGERA 94 at 97; City West Housing Pty Ltd v Sydney City Council (1999) 110 LGERA 262 at 282-283; Memel Holdings Pty Ltd v Pittwater Council (2000) 110 LGERA 217 at 220-221; Winten Property Group Ltd v North Sydney Council (2001) 130 LGERA 79 at 88[25] - 89[28] and Design 23 Pty Ltd v Sutherland Shire Council (2003) 125 LGERA 380 at 387 [20]-[21].
43 The rationale is that development standards are not ends in themselves but means of achieving ends. The ends are environmental or planning objectives. Compliance with a development standard is fixed as the usual means by which the relevant environmental or planning objective is able to be achieved. However, if the proposed development proffers an alternative means of achieving the objective, strict compliance with the standard would be unnecessary (it is achieved anyway) and unreasonable (no purpose would be served).
44 However, although this way is commonly invoked, it is not the only way to establish that compliance with a development standard is unreasonable or unnecessary: North Sydney Municipal Council v Parlby, unreported, LEC No 10613 of 1985, 13 November 1986, Stein J at p 5; Legal and General Life of Australia Ltd v North Sydney Municipal Council (1989) 68 LGRA 192 at 202; Fast Buck$ v Byron Shire Council (1999) 103 LGERA 94 at 97; City West Housing Pty Ltd v Sydney City Council (1999) 110 LGERA 262 at 282-283. Other ways are explained in the authorities.
45 A second way is to establish that the underlying objective or purpose is not relevant to the development with the consequence that compliance is unnecessary: SCMP Properties Pty Limited v North Sydney Municipal Council (1983) 130 LGERA 351 at 378-379; North Sydney Municipal Council v Parlby, unreported, LEC No 10613 of 1985, 13 November 1986, Stein J at p 5.
46 A third way is to establish that the underlying objective or purpose would be defeated or thwarted if compliance was required with the consequence that compliance is unreasonable: Hooker-Rex Estates v Hornsby Shire Council, unreported, LEC No 10506 of 1982, 27 July 1983, Bignold J at p 18.
47 A fourth way is to establish that the development standard has been virtually abandoned or destroyed by the Council's own actions in granting consents departing from the standard and hence compliance with the standard is unnecessary and unreasonable: North Shore Gas Co. Pty Ltd v North Sydney Municipal Council, unreported, LEC No 10185 of 1986, 15 September 1986, Stein J at pp 11-12; Legal and General Life of Australia Ltd v North Sydney Municipal Council (1989) 68 LGRA 192 at 202; City West Housing Pty Ltd v Sydney City Council (1999) 110 LGERA 262 at 282 [69]-283 [70].
48 Considering the agreed position of the planners that this development standard is inappropriate because of the historical subdivision approval and that this situation is under review in the DWLEP, I am satisfied that the flexibility allowed under SEPP 1 should be exercised.
49 In doing so, I note that the intent of the DWLEP is to significantly reduce the minimum subdivision lot size. Whilst the proposed lots don't comply with this control, no rational basis was established in my assessment. The only justification was the information in the staff email.
50 It seems to me that the more crucial and reliable evidence is that of the council's position for the appeal indicating that it supports the application and would approve it but for the concurrence of the DoP. In these circumstances where the draft LEP has not been finalised, it appears to me that the development will substantially achieve the objectives for the area. It also appears that the DWLEP provisions for this land are then somewhat uncertain and in these circumstances would not be given determining weight.
51 Therefore I then think that it is appropriate to apply the second way of assessing the SEPP 1 (para 45) as stated in Wehbe. The underlying objective of protecting the potential of viable rural holdings is significantly comprised by the existing lots sizes in this immediate neighbourhood. I rely firstly on the planners agreement that the standard is inappropriate. I am also satisfied that this objective has been compromised by the approval of rural/residential dwellings on the smaller lots, which in my opinion is likely to thwart any viable agricultural activity because of the likely adverse impacts on the amenity of the existing residents.
52 In the ultimate, the planners agreed that the land was suitable for a 2 - lot rural/residential subdivision and I am satisfied that the incremental change arising from the additional lot is generally consistent with the draft objectives and intent of the controls for this release area.
53 Therefore I am satisfied that the underlying objective or purpose for the zone 1(a1) (Rural "A1" Zone) is not relevant to the development with the consequence that compliance is unnecessary. In doing so, I am also satisfied the public interest considerations in Part 5 of the Act are well served and that the approval of this development is consistent with the economic and orderly development of the land.
Court orders
54 The Court orders that:
1 The appeal is upheld.
2 The SEPP 1 Objection to the minimum allotment size development standard in cl 12(2) (a) of the WLEP 1991 is allowed.
3 Development consent is granted to the 3 - lot subdivision of Lot 1 DP 1321 Durham Street, Douglas Park subject to the conditions in Annexure A.
4 The exhibits may be returned except for 2, 3, 4, 6, A and H.