Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force v Toleafoa [1999] NSWADTAP 9
Constantin v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2013] NSWADTAP 16
Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith [1999] Vic Rep 6, (1991) 1 VR 63
Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 2 ALD 60
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Catchwords
Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force v Toleafoa [1999] NSWADTAP 9Constantin v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2013] NSWADTAP 16Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith [1999] Vic Rep 6, (1991) 1 VR 63Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 2 ALD 60Green v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2014] NSWCATAD 59Hoffman v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Service [2003] NSWADT 89McDonald v Director-General of Social Security [1984] FCA 57, (1984) 1 FCR 354Mewburn v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2009] NSWADT 24Nakad v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2014] NSWCATAP 10Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd [1992] HCA 66, (1992) 110 ALR 449O'Sullivan v Farrer [1989] HCA 61, (1989) 168 CLR 210Smith v Commissioner of Police (2007) ADT 063448 unreportedWard v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Service [2000] NSWADT 28
Judgment (4 paragraphs)
[1]
The applicant's domestic circumstances - Sam Smith
It is not disputed that the applicant's elder son, Sam Smith, over a period of several years displayed violent and aggressive tendencies, including towards his parents, and was repeatedly found to be under the influence of prohibited drugs. The earliest incident related to a police attendance at the applicant's address in relation to allegations of cannabis being distributed from the premises. With the applicant's permission, police searched the house and found a bag containing 0.25 g of cannabis (which at the time they erroneously estimated at 2.5 g). Becoming aware that police were investigating the possibility that his son was the person involved, the applicant came forward to correct the incorrect estimate and said that the cannabis belonged to him, not to Sam, and that he had been using cannabis for many years. He was given a cannabis caution, but police suspected that he had made the admission in order to protect his son.
On 13 October 2016, Mrs Smith called police expressing concerns about Sam and his use of drugs at the family home, pointing out that there were firearms on the premises and that Sam might have a key to the cabinet. At that time the applicant was in hospital following his motorcycle accident. Senior Constable McLeod said that when police arrived they noted that Sam appeared drug-affected. They asked to see the firearms safe and any keys to open it. Sam showed police the safe, and pointed out that it was secured by a combination lock and said he did not know the combination. At that time police noted the two airguns in the cupboard that were leaning on the safe, and as they were unregistered, the two firearms charges were laid against Mr Paul Smith.
A domestic dispute between Sam and his father led to police attending again at the applicant's premises, on 21 January 2017. Senior Constable Feeney said they were told that there had been regular ongoing domestic disputes between Sam and other family members, and those disputes had escalated. During prior incidents Sam had assaulted family members, intimidated them and damaged property. When police spoke with Sam he was very aggressive and irritable and when asked about his mental condition said he would not voluntarily seek hospital help as the doctors he had seen were of no assistance. Out of concerns for the safety of family members, police impounded six registered firearms located at those premises at the time.
Police were called to the Tea Gardens, area where Sam's vehicle had broken down, on 31 October 2017 in response to concerns raised by members of the public about Sam's abusive conduct towards the applicant. His abusive behaviour continued in the presence of police, and as a result he was charged and made subject to a provisional apprehended violence order (AVO). Later that day Sam was charged and made subject to strict bail conditions protecting his father.
The applicant collected Sam on his release from custody and began driving home. On the way Sam became abusive towards his father and threatened self-harm. He reportedly smashed the rear vision mirror and while his father was driving pulled on the handbrake lever. When the car stopped, Sam ran up a nearby embankment and attempted to run into traffic. Later he returned to the vehicle and punched his father on the jaw. On arrival police handcuffed Sam for the protection of himself and his father, then conveyed him to the Mater Hospital where a specialist practitioner determined that he was not mentally disordered but was suffering from prohibited drug-related issues. Senior Constable Wylie explained that on 1 November 2017 Sam was made subject to a confirmed AVO, which was current until 31 October 2018 and listed the applicant as the person requiring protection.
The applicant did not dispute that narrative, but submitted that an argument Sam had with him early this year had proved to be a "watershed" and that Sam was now "a million miles" from where he was a year ago. They now get on well together. Mr Kent, manager of Delhuntie Youth Care, confirmed in June 2018 that Sam had been volunteering his time at their Bulahdelah Centre for six weeks, helping them to build their on-site accommodation so that they could do longer-term rehabilitation, respite care and crisis care. He had shown a strong work ethic and skills and had become a stronger, reliable young man. His excellence in the role given to him had led the centre to reward him by deciding to start paying him for his help (part exhibit A1).
His drug and alcohol counsellor at Hunter New England Local Health District, Mr Greg Aylward, outlined a comprehensive case plan that was developed to assist Sam, covering alcohol and drug education, relapse prevention, addiction and anger management skills (part exhibit A1). He was receiving regular counselling.
For his acute anxiety problem, which can give the impression that he is drug-affected when he is not, he is being treated by Dr Chris Marley. Dr Marley is not prescribing any medication for him but advises him that the best therapy for his condition is regular work, which he is now performing, being employed full-time by a plasterer as a carpenter.
That unchallenged evidence provides ample ground for concluding that Sam has indeed come back "from a dark place", as his father put it, and has made great progress in the course of 2018. There is, however, no expert psychological or psychiatric evidence about his present mental state, the possibilities of relapse and the likely course of his future conduct. In those circumstances, it seems too soon yet to find that his troubled period has permanently been brought to a close. A history of confrontation and violence is cause for concern that there would be an increased risk to public safety if firearms were available (Mewburn v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2009] NSWADT 24, [43]). Even though it is not disputed that Sam has never had access to firearms, some concerns must remain so long as he remains in residence at the family home where firearms are kept.
That conclusion does not, however, determine the issue under s 11(4). First, the power to revoke in s 24(2) is discretionary. Secondly, domestic circumstances require licence refusal, or activate the power to revoke, only if there is "reasonable cause to believe that the applicant may not personally exercise continuous and responsible control over firearms" by reason of those domestic circumstances.
In this case, the applicant has stressed that he would be more than willing to keep his firearms at the property of his brother, Mr Peter Smith, which is adjacent to his own, when they were not required to be available for such purposes as humanely destroying sick or injured stock or controlling wild dogs and other pests. Mr Peter Smith has the necessary licences as well as capacious and very secure safe storage facilities. The applicant has on more than one occasion stored firearms there with full police approval. The applicant would not regard such an arrangement as ideal, but he is anxious to avoid any repetition of the incidents where he was unable to obtain the assistance of persons with firearms and had to kill sick or injured cattle with a sledgehammer or a pickaxe because they were in extremis and the crows were starting to pick at their eyes.
Such an arrangement would ensure that Mr Paul Smith would be able personally to exercise continuous and responsible control over his firearms, notwithstanding that Sam was still residing at the family home. I therefore conclude that, subject to the firearms being kept in safe storage on Mr Peter Smith's property, the applicant's current domestic circumstances do not warrant exercising the discretion to revoke adversely to the applicant.
[2]
The public interest ground
As was pointed out above, the respondent did not submit that the applicant was not a fit and proper person to hold a firearms licence. His second ground for revoking the applicant's license, therefore, was that it was not in the public interest for the applicant to continue to hold it, within the meaning of ss 11(7), 24(2)(e) and cl 20. The phrase "public interest" is not defined in the Act.
In O'Sullivan v Farrer [1989] HCA 61; (1989) 168 CLR 210, [13], the High Court held that the "public interest" imported a discretionary value judgment to be made by reference to undefined factual matters, confined only in so far as the subject matter and the scope and purpose of the legislation might require. In Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Service v Toleafoa [1999] NSWADTAP 9, [25], which dealt with the revocation of a security licence, the Appeal Panel described the public interest ground in the relevant Act in the following terms:
[A]n inherently broad concept giving the [Commissioner] the ability to have regard to a wide variety of factors in choosing whether to exercise a discretion adversely to an individual. As the possibility of refusing an application on the ground of character is dealt with elsewhere in the same section, it is reasonable to infer that the Parliament intended that the public interest discretion operate in areas to which the character ground was not relevant or, possibly, in circumstances where an objection on character grounds would not be sufficient in its own right to warrant refusal.
The concept does include standards acknowledged to be for "the good order of society and for the well-being of its members": Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith [1991] Vic Rep 6; (1991) 1 VR 63. In Comalco Aluminium (Bell Bay) Ltd v O'Connor (1995) 131 ALR 657, 681, the High Court said:
The purpose of the reference to public interest is to ensure that private interests are not the only matters taken into account: to make clear that the interests of the whole community are matters for the Commissioner's consideration. The effect of the reference is to amplify the "scope and purpose" of the legislation.
The issue of public interest allows for matters going beyond the applicant's character to be taken into account. They include public protection, public safety and public confidence in the administration of the licensing system: Constantin v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2013] NSWADTAP 16, [33].
On the public interest issue, the respondent relies on four matters. The first is the incident involving the applicant's possession of two unregistered airguns. Even if inoperable, airguns are deemed by s 4 of the Act to be firearms and therefore require registration. While the fact that an airgun is incapable of discharging a slug is irrelevant to liability for unauthorized possession under s 7A, it has a bearing on the seriousness of the applicant's contravention, and that is material to the weight to be given to it in relation to the public interest question.
It is not disputed that police sighted, or had in their possession, the Daisy and the Crosman on a number of occasions, knowing them to be unregistered but taking no action until S/Const McLeod's visit on 14 October 2016:
Before the applicant's license was issued to him in April 2006, Const (probably Sgt) Schaefer inspected his firearms cabinet, saw the two airguns, agreed that they were non-functional and did not require registration;
After prolonged inhalation of toxic fumes in a confined space had caused the applicant to suffer delusions on 28 April 2006, his firearms were impounded and his licence was revoked, but was reinstated by the Administrative Decisions Tribunal on hearing the psychological evidence of Mr R F Peters. He was then able to collect his guns from Forster police station and was permitted to take the two airguns away without documentation as they were deemed to be "non guns". S/Const McLeod confirmed that the airguns had been returned to the applicant, but added that he was not aware of the circumstances.
On 6 December 2009, when he was moving his gun cabinet to a new location which had to be inspected by police, a constable known to the applicant only as Angela observed the airguns and apparently saw no reason to take further action.
In June 2013 his guns were removed when he had forgotten to renew his licence because he had not received a renewal notice. Constables Smith and Wylie impounded his firearms but left the airguns on the ground that they were not firearms.
In 2014 or 2015 police inspected his safe storage arrangements after there had been an attempted break-in. S/Const Wylie saw the airguns but took no action.
In the course of his visit to the property on 13 October 2016 following Mrs Smith's telephone call about Sam's drug usage, S/Const McLeod saw the two airguns and took the view that they were fully functional. From outward appearances as shown in the contemporaneous photographs (exhibit R1, pp 39-40) the Crosman showed no obvious signs of dilapidation, but in one of the pictures of the Daisy, its action lever appears to be disengaged. At all events, Mr Smith was at all times adamant that neither gun had been in working order for 38 years. He pressed police to test them to prove that they were inoperable but was informed that established procedures did not permit it. Further, four different police officers who sighted the guns on at least five occasions also took the view that they were inoperable, and on one occasion police returned them to the applicant while knowing them to be unregistered, as the internal review acknowledged (exhibit R1, p 169). I am satisfied that both airguns were inoperable at all relevant times, although, I repeat, that fact is irrelevant to liability.
The second matter on which the respondent relied on the public interest issue was the applicant's failure safely to store the unregistered airguns (exhibit R1, p 169). The relevant facts are largely the same as for the possession issue and point to the same conclusion. The evidence establishes that the applicant relied on mistaken law enforcement advice, though the mistake was rather understandable. Nevertheless, he remained personally responsible for informing himself correctly about his legal obligations. Ignorance of the Act's requirements is no excuse: Hoffman v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Service [2003] NSWADT 89, [27]. He now acknowledges that he should have disposed of the airguns at an early stage.
The reviewing officer (whose opinions were adopted by the respondent at the hearing) expressed concern at the applicant's argument that the two breaches lay at the lower end of the scale in terms of seriousness. The applicant pointed out that airguns were formerly sold at Toy World, mounted on a cardboard sheet, and that that the two inoperable guns in question had been kept in the grandchildren's toybox for 38 years. Nevertheless, the Act of New South Wales treats airguns as firearms, and that is the law that courts and tribunals apply.
It appears, however, that the Local Court saw the applicant's offences as lying towards the lower end of the scale of seriousness, as it did not record a conviction and imposed only a good behaviour bond for 12 months.
The third matter raised in connexion with the public interest was Sam Smith's record of drug abuse, and of violent, aggressive behaviour towards the applicant and others. Although the evidence shows that Sam has made great strides towards law-abiding normalcy this year, I have found that his possible future behaviour is still a matter of concern in relation to s 11(4). The same is true under the heading of public interest, although here again the problem could be solved by requiring the applicant to keep his firearms in Mr Peter Smith's safe storage in the adjacent property.
[3]
Orders
1. The decision under review is set aside.
2. The applicant's category ABC firearms licence is to be reissued to him subject to the condition that except when required for use on the applicant's property, his firearms should be kept in approved safe storage on the property of the applicant's brother Mr Peter Smith, or at such other location as the Commissioner shall approve.
[4]
I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.
Registrar
DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.
Decision last updated: 05 December 2018
Parties
Applicant/Plaintiff:
Smith
Respondent/Defendant:
Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force
Cases Cited (11)
Consideration
Under s 63 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (ADR Act), the tribunal's role is to determine whether, having regard to the underlying facts in the matter and the applicable law, that the Commissioner's decision is the correct and preferable one. The tribunal is to review the merits of the original decision and is required to consider the evidence available at that time, together with any other or later material, so as to affirm the original decision, vary it or set it aside: Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 2 ALD 60, 77.
The tribunal has jurisdiction to exercise any functions conferred or imposed on it by the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (No. 2) (s 30) and the Act, including the Commissioner's revocation of a licence or permit: s 75(1)(c). The tribunal is to make its own decision and there is no presumption that the Commissioner's decision is correct: McDonald v Director-General of Social Security [1984] FCA 57; (1984) 1 FCR 354, 357.
Clear guidance as to how the Act is to be administered generally is provided in the underlying principles of the legislation set out in s 3(1) of the Act, which declares that firearms possession and use is "conditional on the overriding need to ensure public safety". Consistently with that approach, s 11(4) relevantly states that a licence must not be issued if there is reasonable cause to believe that the applicant may not personally exercise continuous and responsible control over firearms because of the applicant's domestic circumstances, any previous attempt at self-harm or being of unsound mind.
Section 24(2)(a) provides that a licence may be revoked for any reason for which the licensee would be required to be refused a licence of the same kind, while s 24(2)(d) provides that a licence may be revoked for any other reason prescribed by the regulations. Clause 19(a) of the Firearms Regulation 2006 (now cl 20 of the Firearms Regulation 2017) provides that the Commissioner may revoke a licence if the Commissioner is satisfied that it is not in the public interest for the licensee to continue to hold the licence.
The standard of proof that applies in these proceedings is the civil standard, that is, the balance (preponderance) of probabilities. There is, however, no burden or onus of proof: Nakad v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2014] NSWCATAP 10, [28] - [34]. The civil standard applies even if the conduct in question may be criminal (Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd [1992] HCA 66; (1992) 110 ALR 449).
Under s 63 of the ADR Act, the tribunal's role is to determine whether, having regard to the underlying facts in the matter and the applicable law, that the Commissioner's decision is the correct and preferable one. The tribunal is to review the merits of the original decision and is required to consider the evidence available at that time, together with any other or later material, so as to affirm the original decision, vary it or set it aside: Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 2 ALD 60, 77.
The tribunal has jurisdiction to exercise any functions conferred or imposed on it by the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (No. 2) (s 30) and the Act, including the Commissioner's revocation of a licence or permit: s 75(1)(c). The tribunal is to make its own decision and there is no presumption that the Commissioner's decision is correct: McDonald v Director-General of Social Security [1984] FCA 57; (1984) 1 FCR 354, 357.
Clear guidance as to how the Act is to be administered generally is provided in the underlying principles of the legislation set out in s 3(1) of the Act, which declares that firearms possession and use is "conditional on the overriding need to ensure public safety". Consistently with that approach, s 11(3) states that a licence must not be issued unless the Commissioner is satisfied that the applicant is a fit and proper person and can be trusted to have possession of firearms without danger to public safety or to the peace. Section 11(5A) further provides that a licence must not be issued if the Commissioner is of the opinion, having regard to any criminal intelligence report or other criminal information held in relation to the person, that (a) the person is a risk to public safety and (b) the issuing of the licence would be contrary to the public interest. The Commissioner may also refuse to issue a licence if the Commissioner considers the issue of the licence would be contrary to the public interest: s 11(7).
Section 24(2)(a) provides that a licence may be revoked for any reason for which the licensee would be required to be refused a licence of the same kind, while s 24(2)(d) provides that a licence may be revoked for any other reason prescribed by the regulations. Clause 20 of the Firearms Regulation 2017 provides that the Commissioner may revoke a licence if the Commissioner is satisfied that it is not in the public interest for the licensee to continue to hold the licence.
As was noted above, the standard of proof that applies in these proceedings is the civil standard, that is, the balance (preponderance) of probabilities. There is no burden or onus of proof: Nakad v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2014] NSWCATAP 10, [28] - [34]. The civil standard applies even if the conduct in question may be criminal (Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd [1992] HCA 66; (1992) 110 ALR 449).
In opposing Mr Paul Smith's application to have his license reinstated, the respondent relies on the applicant's domestic circumstances within the meaning of s 11(4)(a), specifically the fact that his elder son, Sam Smith, a young man with a troubled past, is residing with him at the property, and on the public interest ground within the meaning of cl 20. It is not submitted that the applicant himself is "of unsound mind" within the meaning of s 11(4)(c), but the respondent does raise some mental health concerns in support of his public interest submissions pursuant to cl 20. Nor is it contended that the applicant himself is not "a fit and proper person" to have possession of firearms within the meaning of s 11(3)(a).
At the outset I should note that all the police witnesses averred that the applicant Paul Smith is an honest man who is truthful even when it is not in his interests to be so.
The fourth matter relied on in relation to public interest was described by the reviewing officer as "your conduct including the continued suggestion of mental health concerns, and a lengthy history of cannabis use".
The delusions and other apparently psychotic symptoms that the applicant experienced in April 2006 following prolonged exposure to toxic chemicals in a confined space were explained by the consultant psychologist, Mr RF Peters. The respondent presumably accepts that explanation, as that episode was not relied on by the internal review.
The internal review refers, however, to some other reports of self-harm incidents by the applicant. On 2 November 2017 he contacted the mental health facility that had assessed his son on the previous day. That call led the facility to contact police to check on his welfare. When police attended at the applicant's property, he explained that he had been erratic and apprehensive while making the telephone call as his son was in the house at the time and the applicant was making the call without his knowledge. Police reported that they held no concerns regarding his mental health on that day and that at no time before 2 November 2017 had any self-harm incidents been reported to them.
The applicant thus explained his apprehensive tone in his call to the mental health facility by his concern at Sam's possible reaction if he were to overhear the call. He also thought the mental health staff might have confused him with his son, whom they had assessed the previous day, as they were dealing with two men named Smith living at the same address.
Further, Dr Chris Marley's letter of 27 July 2018 states that the applicant has been his patient for 30 years and he has not been aware of any episodes of self-harm during that period.
The respondent also referred to the incidents in 2014 when the applicant complained to police about a number of incidents, including the shooting of a tame kangaroo in his yard, his finding of a full packet of cigarettes on the property and footprints not matching those of any of the residence, and his report that someone had been on his roof and drawn a picture of his normally concealed tattoo with his nickname on it on the skylight above his bathroom. When responding to the last-mentioned complaint, S/Const McLeod climbed onto the roof and did in fact observe some marks on the skylight, including the applicant's nickname.
Also relevant is the applicant's unchallenged evidence that of the four game cameras he had installed on the property, two were stolen and two were vandalized. Given the applicant's reputation for veracity, the probabilities are that these were real occurrences and not merely paranoid imaginings. Intrusions by ill-intentioned trespassers onto farming or grazing properties are a known phenomenon of life on the land
The internal review concluded on the mental health point that "without the benefit of expert advice from a treating psychologist or psychiatrist to the contrary, I cannot be satisfied that your ability to maintain continuous and responsible control over firearms is not impaired" (exhibit R1, p 170). Such expert advice is now before the tribunal, however.
The detailed consultant psychology report of Mr Michael Bazaley dated 26 April 2018 (exhibit A2) concluded that Mr Smith's mental state for depression, anxiety and stress reflected a normal person's mental state and would not affect his present state of mind in holding a firearms permit. His mental state was psychologically sound and he appeared to have a proper and fit understanding of the requirements of owning, using and storing firearms.
Also relevant is the repeatedly expressed view of police officers who know the applicant that he does not represent a danger to the safety of any person. He has no record of violence or threats of violence. Nor is there any report of his actually using firearms in an improper, unsafe or careless manner, or in such a manner as to suggest a risk of self-harm, and he has been using firearms since the age of five. I conclude that his mental state provides no cause for concern in relation to his ability to control firearms in a safe manner.
The respondent also refers to the applicant's history of cannabis use, though it is not clear whether that is intended to reflect on his mental state. At all events the applicant acknowledges that he "occasionally" used marijuana for "recreational" purposes for some 30 years, but says that he has not done so for about two years. He also admits to using a 20 percent mixture of cannabis with tobacco to control pain and spasms caused by his shoulder injury because he found that nothing else was effective. There is no evidence to suggest that these practices have impaired his mental state in such a way as to weaken his control over firearms, but when taken with his poor driving record, they suggest a casual attitude towards legal regulation and do not reflect well on him.
As against that is the fact that for a farmer or grazier in rural New South Wales, long arms are a practical necessity, including for the humane destruction of sick or injured stock and the control of wild dogs and other pests. The applicant's evidence included vivid descriptions of distressing incidents of that type caused by his current lack of access to firearms. As over two centuries of history have shown, without the availability of firearms on the land, New South Wales could scarcely have had a primary industry. That consideration weighs in the applicant's favour on the public interest issue.
In relation to the Act's emphasis on the overriding need to ensure public safety, reference is usually made to Ward v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Service [2000] NSWADT 28, [28], in which Hennessy DP said that in terms of public safety, "the Tribunal must be satisfied that there is virtually no risk", while acknowledging that the tribunal could never be totally satisfied that a person would not pose any risk to public safety. Indeed, Her Honour could not have been totally satisfied of that, as the applicant had been convicted of an offence of violence and had been the subject of an apprehended violence order. Some other cases to a similar effect are reviewed in Green v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2014] NSWCATAD 59, [72] - [79].
In Webb v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Service [2004] NSWADT 110, for example, Montgomery JM when considering the question of public safety stated that, "In determining this issue it is my view that it is necessary to adopt a balanced view of the risk, bearing in mind all the relevant circumstances. Only real and appreciable risk needs to be taken into account. Minimal, fanciful or theoretical risk can be excluded from consideration": [32].
Public safety is the primary focus of the public interest issue and of the Act generally. In light of all the evidence and the relevant authorities, I find that restoring the applicant's category ABC firearms licence, subject to the condition set out below, would not create a danger to public safety or be contrary to the public interest.