(b)That within 60 days of this order the husband pay to the wife a further sum of $70,000 together with interest calculated as and from 5 October 1994, at the rate provided by the Family Law Regulations."
3 Mrs Slater, in support of her application which resulted in the making of those orders, sought an order that Mr Slater transfer to her all his right, title and interest in the property known as "Wondarra" at Murrumbateman, in return for Mrs Slater paying to Mr Slater an amount equal to 40 per cent of the value of the "Wondarra" property at its 1973 condition and current value. It is extraordinary, if there had in fact been a judgment given by Connor J in respect of the settlement of property, that Mrs Slater would have made the application which she did and that there would be absolutely no reference to any such judgment by Connor J in the Full Court hearing of the Family Court and at the earlier hearing before Treyvaud J in 1994.
4 A primary matter bedevilling these proceedings is the view by Mrs Slater that there was on 28 July 1976 the reservation by Connor J of judgment in respect of the settlement of property. The order that his Honour made was simply:
"That the questions of settlement of property be reserved and that the petitioner's costs of an (sic) incidental to the proceedings up to and including today be taxed and be paid by the respondent."
5 That order is not a reservation of judgment: that order simply is a reserving of the questions of settlement of property. There is nothing to indicate that Connor J then or later made any judgment at all in respect of the settlement of property.
6 As to Mrs Slater's basis of her present appeal, it has to be recognised that the order of Higgins J of 29 November 1993, where he transferred the matter, being matrimonial cause 600/75, to the Family Court of Australia under the provisions of the cross-vesting laws, had the effect that the Supreme Court had then and has now, no jurisdiction in respect of the matters which Mrs Slater wishes to pursue.
7 The Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia on 27 June 1997 made it plain beyond argument that the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory no longer had any jurisdiction to entertain an application for property settlement, nor did it have jurisdiction to entertain applications for maintenance, and that Court made it plain, at least by necessary implication, that there was no power in the Supreme Court to punish for contempt of those orders.
8 The presiding judge, Gallop J, in his reasons for judgment said at paragraph 11:
"In my opinion, his Honour [Miles CJ] was correct in holding that the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory no longer had jurisdiction to entertain the application for property settlement."
And later in his judgment at paragraph 13:
"Mrs Slater has complained in a general way that the transfer of the proceedings to the Family Court has deprived her of justice. One can understand her saying that. She is plainly seriously aggrieved by the results that she obtained in the Family Court and in a frank answer to a question asked from the bench, she has said that by instituting these proceedings, what she wants is somehow to get the maintenance which has not been paid pursuant to the order that was made on pronouncement of the decree nisi on 28 July 1976, she wants the property, "Wandara", and she wants compensation for 'What she has been put through'."
O'Loughlin J said in his concurring judgment:
"…her entitlements to a property settlement have been concluded."
Drummond J, in an important passage in his judgment concurring with the judgment of Gallop J, said:
"…in my opinion the order of Higgins J of 29 November 1993 was effective to divest the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory of the entirety of the jurisdiction it had up to that point in relation to the matrimonial proceedings involving Mrs Slater, not merely the jurisdiction that it had in respect of her then pending application for property settlement.