EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
1 I have two matters before me, respectively numbers 31 and 32 of 2003 in which relief in the nature of Anton Piller relief is sought, primarily based upon a breach of s 135ANA of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). This is part of a new division, and counsel is unable to refer me to any previous case brought under this division.
2 I am satisfied that, on the evidence as it now stands, there is a strong case made of a breach of s 135ANA in each case of use and authorisation of use of a broadcast decoding device contrary to the section, and I have satisfied myself that each of the integers of this section are so satisfied. As the matter may have to be dealt with in due course by another judge, I do not propose to say any more than that at this stage of the case.
3 I am also satisfied, on the evidence, that the presence on each of the premises concerned of a broadcast decoding device is established, and I am further satisfied that, because of the history of the matter and the nature of the decoding device, namely, the set top box and SmartCard, any prior notice of these proceedings would leave open a very real risk of disposal or destruction of the evidence.
4 I have been somewhat troubled by the time it has taken to arrive at a position in which this application is made. I need not go through the chronology of the events. At the end of the day, in this kind of application, delay of itself would not be a barrier, provided that there is no suggestion that the applicant has deliberately delayed to disadvantage the respondent in some collateral fashion.
5 I have been concerned as to the currency of the evidence. In each case, the last observation was some weeks ago. However, counsel has persuaded me that it would be appropriate to infer that there has been no change of circumstances so far as is relevant during that period.
6 I have also been troubled by the fact that both premises are remote from Sydney and one is situated in Victoria and each is closer to Melbourne than it is to Sydney. It may be that if real issues develop in the course of execution of the orders or upon the return of the motion, consideration will need to be given as to whether there should be a change of venue to the Victorian Registry of the Court. Indeed, of course, that may arise in any stage of these cases. Although I do not place great emphasis upon the administrative convenience of the applicants, the locations are such that it is possible to deal with both matters in a co-ordinated fashion, and as one of the premises is within New South Wales, it does not seem to me to amount to an abuse of the process to include the other premises at the present stage.
7 What has been proposed, and what I have accepted, is that the answer to this problem is to permit applications to the Court to be made for the time being, including the appearance on the return of the motion, by telephone, provided that satisfactory arrangements can be made. If satisfactory arrangements cannot be made, then, as I say, the question of venue can be reconsidered.
8 I did somewhat limit the scope of the orders which were sought to precise pieces of equipment, as I have been conscious of the fact that the execution of these orders must, of necessity, be in effect in public, in a public bar of licensed premises. It is plainly undesirable that there be any greater interference with the conduct of business in that way unless absolutely necessary.
9 I should record that I have not at this stage formed any view as to whether it is appropriate that the decoding devices be utilised for any purpose other than for use as evidence in these particular cases. That is a matter which will need to be taken up either on the return of the motion or at some later time. I should also make clear that I have not had regard to the fact that there is a particular fight or boxing event, proposed in the near future as the basis for making these orders at this time. As I explained to counsel, there was adequate time to move more quickly if there had been a real consideration.
10 I am, however, satisfied that the nature of the breaches which have prima facie been established is such that the applicants suffer sufficient damage to make this remedy appropriate. Whilst, of course, any individual breach by an individual publican may, on one view, be seen as very minor, it is a breach which is in effect irreparable, and I think it is legitimate in considering the overall circumstances to recognise that breach by a user in this way must be seen as part of a wider picture.
11 For those reasons I have acceded to the applications which were made to me today.
I certify that the preceding eleven (11) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Gyles.