Sit v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs

Relevant legislative provisions 4 It is convenient to set out the legislative provision of central importance. It is said by the appellant to confer on her an absorbed person visa. Section 34(2) of the Act reads: A non-citizen in the migration zone who: (a) on 2 April 1984 was in Australia; and (b) before that date, had ceased to be an immigrant; and (c) on or after that date, has not left Australia, where left Australia has the meaning it had in this Act before 1 September 1994; and (d) immediately before 1 September 1994, was not a person to whom section 20 of this Act as in force then applied; is taken to have been granted an absorbed person visa on 1 September 1994. [Emphasis added]

The Tribunal's decision 5 The Tribunal found that the appellant met the requirements of subsections 34(2)(a), (c) and (d) of the Act. The primary issue before the Tribunal was whether the appellant satisfied subsection 34(2)(b) of the Act, namely, whether the appellant had ceased to be an immigrant prior to 2 April 1984. 6 The Tribunal concluded that the appellant had not ceased to be an immigrant, and in doing so, followed the approach of this Court in a number of similar cases: see, for example, Tjandra (aka Yek) v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Ethnic Affairs (1996) 138 ALR 511 and Boon Yin Chee v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Ethnic Affairs (Lockhart, Heerey & Sundberg JJ, 13 June 1997, unreported).

Issues before the primary Judge 7 Before the primary Judge, the appellant's counsel accepted that the previous authorities, specifically Boon Yin Chee (supra) must be followed. The primary Judge noted that Boon Yin Chee (supra), a decision of the Full Court, specifically approved three other decisions of this Court which dealt with the same legal issue. The Full Court in Boon Yin Chee (supra)held that a person who was a prohibited immigrant at 2 April 1984 could not have ceased to be an immigrant on or before that date and consequently could not satisfy s 34(2)(b) of the Act. 8 At the hearing, counsel for the appellant advanced an argument which he submitted had not been considered in the previous cases. The primary Judge said, at [6]: This argument depends on what is said to be the old common law rule that on the repeal of a statute that had itself altered the pre-existing law, the pre-existing law revived. Section 7(4) of the Act, which provided for a person ceasing to be a prohibited immigrant upon the expiration of a five-year period, was repealed with effect from 2 April 1984. Accordingly, so the argument goes, when the expression "ceased to be an immigrant" as it presently appears in s 34(2)(b) was first inserted in the Act by amendments made in 1992, the meaning of the expression was to be found, in the absence of some statutory definition, solely in the general law notion of absorption into the Australian community. 9 However, the primary Judge observed that this submission had been considered previously by Lindgren J in Tjandra (supra), who rejected this argument. The application was dismissed with costs.

Consideration of Issues in the appeal 10 Counsel for the appellant has submitted that having regard to the legislative history leading to the enactment of s 34, the expression "ceased to be an immigrant" raised for consideration the question of absorption, and the question of whether a person had "ceased to be an immigrant" did not turn on the legal status of that person under the Act as at 2 April 1984. The meaning of the expression "ceased to be an immigrant" in the context of s 34 was considered by the Full Court in Boon Yin Chee (supra). Counsel for the appellant accepted that he would need to satisfy us that a departure from the construction adopted by the Full Court in the earlier matter was warranted. However there are compelling reasons why a Full Court should follow a judgment of an earlier Full Court, particularly when issues of construction are involved. Those reasons were discussed by a Full Court in Telstra Corporation Limited v Treloar (2000) 102 FCR 592. Branson and Finkelstein JJ said (at [26] and following): Speaking generally, appellate courts accept that they should act with caution before reviewing an earlier decision: see, eg, Clutha Developments Pty Ltd v Barry (1989) 18 NSWLR 86 at 99-101. Courts have said it may be done if the earlier decision is 'manifestly wrong' or 'clearly erroneous', or if 'strong reasons' are shown, or if the 'maintenance [of the earlier authority] is contrary to the public interest': see the examples given by Aickin J in Queensland v Commonwealth (1977) 139 CLR 585 at 620ff; see also Transurban City Link Ltd v Allan (1999) 168 ALR 687 at 694. But, apart from suggesting caution, the cases provide little real guidance as to the circumstances in which it will be appropriate to review an earlier decision. The problem is very real when what is at issue is the construction of a statute. For one thing, statutory language is often ambiguous. Courts can struggle to determine the legislative intent. It is often impossible to discover any legislative intent. In many instances the generality of the statutory language is deliberate and allows the courts to develop a body of law to fill the gaps. This may lead to disagreement among judges about what the statute means. It would be sound policy that once that intent has been discerned by an appellate court then that should be the end of the matter. The view which we prefer is that unless an error in construction is patent, or has produced unintended and perhaps irrational consequences not foreseen by the court that created the precedent, the first decision should stand. See also the approach of the Full Court in Brooks v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2000) 173 ALR 235 at 253. 11 In our opinion, the appellant has not demonstrated that the conclusion of the Full Court in Boon Yin Chee (supra) was plainly wrong. Indeed it may well be that the submission now put by the appellant was considered and rejected by that Full Court. In that matter their Honours said that there was nothing in the legislative history that justified an interpretation to the effect that a person is to be entitled to an absorbed person visa if that person ceased to be an immigrant for that purpose at some time after 2 April 1984. However, whether or not the specific submission put in this appeal was considered and rejected in Boon Yin Chee (supra), we are not persuaded the ultimate conclusion of the Full Court was plainly wrong and that the appellant has met the threshold discussed in Telstra Corporation Limited v Treloar (supra), which would justify us reviewing that decision. 12 The appeal should be dismissed with costs.

I certify that the preceding 12 (twelve) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justices Moore, Tamberlin & Hely.

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr R B Wilson Solicitor for the Applicant Peter Leung Solicitors