Singh v Secretary, Department of Employment & Workplace Relations

SUBMISSIONS 23 Mr Singh's notice of appeal states that he appeals the whole of the decision of the learned trial judge given on 23 October 2006. Mr Singh's arguments may be summarised as set out below. 24 First, Mr Singh referred to a decision of the SSAT given on 13 May 2002, following its review of the decision made by the Centrelink ARO on 28 February 2002 concerning the calculation of Mr Singh's benefits. Mr Singh submitted that the SSAT should have instead reviewed the ARO's decision of 4 February 2002, that decision being that he or she had no jurisdiction to review Mr Singh's case in light of the fact that it had already been reviewed at levels higher than that of the ARO. Mr Singh argued, in his written submissions (at [54]), that the SSAT's decision of 13 May 2002 is: contrary to law because the decision of the ARO dated 4 February 2002 remained undecided in the previous proceedings between the original decision dated 4 November 1999 and the SSAT decision dated 13 May 2002. Therefore, the respondent's original decision dated 4 November 1999 never lawfully became subject to the determination of the tribunals and courts in the previous proceedings. 25 In other words, Mr Singh submitted, the Tribunal made an error of law in affirming the decision of the SSAT dated 13 May 2002 because the decision of the Tribunal dated 17 December 2002 did not affirm the ARO's original decision of 4 February 2002 of 'no jurisdiction', and subsequently that decision of 4 February 2002 was left undecided by the SSAT and onward throughout the proceedings. Therefore, it is said, the respondent cannot now argue that the original decision had been fully reviewed at each appropriate level. This is an argument that does not appear to have been raised before the learned trial judge or the Tribunal, or in any earlier proceedings. 26 Mr Singh's second argument was one he had raised before the SSAT at a hearing on 4 April 2002 (which hearing formed part of a separate tranche of proceedings brought by Mr Singh), and concerned the application of s 17 and s 1165 of the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) to a compensation payment of $80,000. Mr Singh's written submissions in this respect were detailed, and it will suffice for the purposes of this judgment to say that they were of the same nature as those which he has made in previous proceedings. 27 Mr Singh's third argument was that the insurer (which had granted indemnity following Mr Singh's work injury in 1991) and the respondent conspired to fraudulently overcharge Mr Singh a sum equal to the wife pension, and that the respondent lied to the Tribunal on 9 October 2002 so that the Tribunal was misled and the decision was obtained by fraud. As a result, he argued, the ensuing line of decisions of various tribunals and courts was invalid. 28 The respondent's brief written submissions stated in essence that this appeal should fail on either or both of two grounds. First, the respondent argued, the judgment of the learned trial judge at first instance is free from error. Secondly, it was submitted, Mr Singh is seeking to raise in these proceedings an issue which has previously been determined against him by the Tribunal, the Federal Magistrates Court, the Federal Court and the High Court, namely whether Mr Singh may retain the benefit of the sickness allowance, disability support pension or wife pension paid between 28 October 1991 and 26 October 1999, a period for which he later received compensation payments under s 93 of the Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vic). In other words, the respondent argued, this appeal is an attempt to claim entitlement to both benefits during the same period, which attempt has been rebutted on many occasions in various tribunals and courts.

CONCLUSIONS 29 To succeed Mr Singh must demonstrate an error of law in the decision of the learned trial judge. It was not suggested by Mr Singh that the Tribunal and the learned trial judge did not adopt the correct legal principles in determining applications under ss 42B(1)(a) and (b). Adopting the legal principles it did, the Tribunal was entitled to find, as a fact, that Mr Singh's application was vexatious because it had the purpose of annoying and irritating. On this basis alone the Tribunal was entitled to dismiss the application under s 42B(1)(a), and in view of its other conclusions which were open to it, was entitled to make an order under s 42B(1)(b). The appeal could be refused on this basis as no error of law can be demonstrated in the decision of the Tribunal, or in that of the learned trial judge. 30 However, in addition, as the learned trial judge indicated, the application of the principle enunciated in Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589 would preclude Mr Singh from seeking to re-litigate the matters sought to be agitated through this appeal. 31 The learned trial judge addressed the issue of the application of the Anshun principle to these proceedings at [41] to [43]. The need to address that principle arose before his Honour because Mr Singh raised his third argument referred to above relating to fraud, which had not been raised in previous proceedings, and thus did not come within the category of claims that had actually been litigated previously. The Anshun principle, as espoused by the High Court in the Anshun decision itself, is as follows: Where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time. 32 The Anshun principle can be applied to proceedings in the nature of judicial review of administrative action, insofar as it would avoid an abuse of process: Wong v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 242, at [34]. 33 Since 4 November 1999, the various tranches of applications, reviews, proceedings and appeals which have been instituted by Mr Singh, although they deal with various points of law and fact, including his relationship with his former wife, Ms Kaur, are all concerned ultimately with the same question: whether Mr Singh is entitled to $88,633.34 worth of social security payments which, following a decision by the County Court on 20 October 1999 and a subsequent decision by Centrelink, was repaid by the insurer to Centrelink. The majority of these applications, reviews, proceedings and appeals have been unsuccessful, with the Tribunal declaring Mr Singh's application for review of the SSAT's decision of 22 March 2006 to be frivolous and vexatious and ordering that he not make any further applications in respect of the same subject matter without leave of the Tribunal. 34 Mr Singh's submissions regarding fraud are not only without any evident substantiation, but come too late. The 'fraud' could have been raised in 2002. It was due to oversight that he did not raise the issue in 2002, as Mr Singh did not read the SSAT's reasons for decision given on 13 May 2002 asserting that he did not advise Centrelink of his periodic compensation payments, which assertion forms the basis of his allegations of fraud. Had he read them earlier, Mr Singh could, and should, have alleged fraud at the Tribunal hearing on 9 October 2002 concerning the application of s 17 and s 1165 of the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) to a compensation payment of $80,000. 35 As the learned trial judge correctly observed (at [42]): … Had Mr Singh read the 13 May 2002 reasons for decision, he would have seen the sentence to which he now objects. He could then, as part of ordinary merits review, have challenged the correctness of the assertion contained within it, and arguably gained some support for his broader challenge to the 4 November 1999 decision. His failure to read the reasons for decision, whether though "negligence, inadvertence or even accident" led to his not having raised the point at a time when something could have been done about it. He cannot now, years later, having failed at all stages to demonstrate relevant legal error, come back to the Tribunal, and thence to this Court, with a point that should have been raised long before this. 36 Accordingly, Mr Singh was barred, under the Anshun principle, from bringing new proceedings agitating this issue. On this basis, no error of law can be demonstrated in the decision of the learned trial judge. 37 We now turn to Mr Singh's other two arguments - first, concerning the unreviewed decision of 4 February 2002 and, second, in relation to the interpretation of s 17 and s 1165 of the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth). 38 The first argument should, under the Anshun principle, have been made as part of earlier proceedings, but has only now been raised before us by the appellant. In any event, the later decision of the ARO of 28 February 2002 effectively made irrelevant the earlier decision of 4 February 2002. The decision of the SSAT on 13 May 2002 effectively dealt with both decisions of the ARO. Further, it cannot now be contended that the Tribunal fell into error in making the orders under s 42B of the AAT Act, which were based upon the attempt by Mr Singh to re-agitate matters already decided to have no legal validity. Whether the decision of 4 February 2002 or 28 February 2002 be the operative decision requiring appeal makes no difference. The issues dealt with in earlier proceedings were those that were again sought by Mr Singh to be dealt with by the Tribunal, and it was upon that basis that the Tribunal made orders under s 42B of the AAT Act. We see no merit in this argument of Mr Singh. 39 As to the second argument, as we have indicated, the submissions before us were of the same nature of the submissions made in earlier proceedings. To the extent that there are any variations, there is nothing that could not have been raised in earlier proceedings, and they should not be allowed to be agitated again. 40 Therefore, the Tribunal was entitled to conclude that Mr Singh had exhausted his appeal mechanisms, and to make the orders under s 42B, as the learned trial judge found. 41 Accordingly, we do not find that there is any error in the learned trial judge's reasons. His Honour, in our view, was right to conclude that no error of law was made by the Tribunal in its decision of 3 July 2006. 42 Since the case was heard on 24 May 2007, Mr Singh (without leave) sought to place before the Court a further written submission dated 23 October 2007. In our view, as no leave was sought to file such a written submission, it cannot be relied upon for the purposes of this appeal. In any event, the written submission raised no new grounds or material, and was more in the nature of a clarification of issues raised by Mr Singh, which have been considered in the above reasons. 43 Accordingly, the appeal should be dismissed with costs. I certify that the preceding thirty-three (33) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justices Siopis and Middleton.

Associate: Dated: 20 November 2007 Counsel for the Appellant: Self-represented