11 A "judgment" is defined by s 3 to include any order for the payment of money.
12 Dealing with order 31, the amount of the judgment encompassed by that order is the sum of $2,487,703.09. Pursuant to s 101(1), unless the Court otherwise orders, interest is payable on that sum; not on a component of that sum being the principal amount of $1,242,762.
13 Subsection 101(6) does not prohibit the giving of interest on a judgment sum to the extent to which the judgment sum includes pre-judgment interest. The prohibition in s 100(6) is confined to the giving of interest on interest "payable under this section". The orders of 26 November 2008 do not provide for the giving of interest on post-judgment interest payable pursuant to s 101.
14 No order has been made otherwise than that interest be payable on so much of the judgment as is from time to time unpaid.
15 This appears to me to be the plain meaning of ss 100 and 101. I do not accept that that construction involves any unfairness to a judgment debtor. The remedy for a judgment debtor liable for a judgment debt which includes a component of interest, who wishes to avoid paying interest on interest, is to pay the judgment debt within 28 days.
16 This construction of s 101 accords with the observations of Branson J in Re Jackson; Conway v Conway [2000] FCA 1530 at [11] and [12].
17 This issue arose in the course of the valuation hearing. The context in which the issue then arose was as to the amount of the liabilities to be taken up in the balance sheet of Marsico and J & J O'Brien to reflect their liabilities under the judgments entered against them.
18 Mr Carter, who provided expert evidence read by the first to ninth defendants, differed from Ms Cartwright, who gave evidence for the plaintiffs, as to how that liability should be recorded, and whether it should include interest on the whole of the judgment sums or only on that part of the judgment sums which reflected a principal obligation.
19 During the course of argument it was accepted by counsel then appearing for the first to ninth defendants, that on the proper construction of s 101, interest under that section was payable on the whole of the amount of the judgment unless the Court otherwise ordered; and there has been no such contrary order.
20 In paragraph [139] of my reasons in Short v Crawley (No. 38) [2008] NSWSC 917, I noted that:
" Ultimately, there was no dispute that interest under s 101 of the Civil Procedure Act 2 005 (NSW), that is, interest after judgment, is payable on the amount for which judgment was entered even though that amount includes pre-judgment interest pursuant to s 100. "