Consideration
25 Extensive submissions were made by counsel for both parties as to the rationale upon which the relevant provisions of the State Act applied in this case. However notwithstanding the different routes taken by each party, the destination was the same. In identifying the terms and conditions of employment of relevant employees as regulated by the PSA, and in particular in relation to long service leave, Ch 2 Pt 3 - including s 43 and s 46 - apply. A similar conclusion was drawn by Gray ACJ in Shop Distributive and Allied Employees' Association v Woolworths Ltd [2006] 151 FCR 513 in relation to the incorporation of equivalent Victorian legislation into the agreement the subject of that dispute. I do not consider it necessary to dwell further on the issue of application of Ch 2 Pt 3 of the State Act in these circumstances - the necessity for the Court to interpret the relevant provisions of Ch 2 Pt 3 in relation to the operation of the PSA and the application of these provisions in determining the entitlement of relevant employees to long service leave are common ground.
26 The clear tension in these proceedings arises from the different terminology used in s 43 and s 46 of the State Act, and the resolution of those differences in determining the entitlement of relevant employees to the current rate of pay on long service leave.
27 The case put by the applicant is simple, namely that on the ordinary English literal meaning of s 43(2) of the State Act, when read in conjunction with the definition of "full pay", "full pay" for employees engaged under cll 6.3.3(c), 6.3.3(d) and 6.8 of the PSA must include payment of the amounts specified in each of those clauses in addition to the base rate of pay specified in cl 5.2.1 of the PSA. The rationale of this argument is that any lesser sum would not be payment in full for the time they are absent from work, and thus would not be "full pay" during their period of long service leave.
28 However s 46(1) of the State Act in prescribing the rates of pay for long service leave adverts to payment at the "ordinary rate", a term which does not appear in s 43. "Ordinary rate" is defined by Sch 5 of the State Act to mean "for an employee under an industrial instrument, federal award or federal agreement…the rate, instrument, award or agreement states is payable for ordinary time". "Ordinary time" is not defined in the State Act.
29 As I have already observed, a key plank of the respondent's case is that payment at the "ordinary rate" within s 46 means that relevant employees are entitled only to be paid long service leave at the ordinary weekly adult rates of pay specified in cl 5.2.1 of the PSA.
30 In my view however the respondent's case is not sustainable.
31 First, I consider that any employee who is engaged on terms and conditions specified in cll 6.3.3(c), 6.3.3(d) and 6.8 of the PSA is entitled during long service leave to payment of the sum prescribed in each of those clauses in addition to the base rate of pay specified in cl 5.2.1 for each ordinary hour of work. In my view this is the ordinary English literal meaning of the expression "full pay" in relation to those employees engaged under those clauses of the PSA. I agree with the submission of Mr Herbert that in relation to such employees any lesser sum would not be full payment for the time that they are absent from work, as contemplated by the definition of "full pay" in Sch 5 of the State Act. In so finding I respectfully echo comments of Layton J of the Industrial Court of South Australia in Glover v Tip Top Bakeries (1984) 8 IR 308 at 313 which comments, although made in the context of sick leave, nonetheless are applicable mutatis mutandis in this context:
For such an employee, it would seem quite anomalous if he was to be paid less than his usual entitlement by way of [long service] leave entitlement as though he worked on day work alone. If that were so, the award would effectively discriminate against shift workers in comparison with day workers in their respective entitlements to [long service] leave. The day workers would receive their usual pay whereas the shift workers would always receive less than their usual pay. Such an effect would in my opinion be inconsistent with the use of the word "full" in the expression "on full pay". (cf observations of Crawford J in Turfrey v Attorney General (Tas) (1992) 45 IR 349 at 352 and Hall P in Ussher v Pharlark Pty Ltd [2004] QIC 22)
32 Second, I do not find the definition of "Ordinary Time Earnings" in cl 1.5.12 of the PSA helpful in the context of this application. It appears that the expression is used only in relation to superannuation; further it is found in the PSA only in cl 5.5 which deals with superannuation. It has nothing to do with "ordinary rate" in relation to the entitlement of relevant employees to long service leave, and is irrelevant to this application.
33 Third, while I note the tension between s 43(2) and s 46 of the State Act:
· I do not consider that s 43 of the State Act is inconsistent with s 46 or that s 46 applies to the exclusion of s 43 in respect of entitlement to long service leave.
· I agree with Mr Herbert's submission that one employee's "ordinary time" may be quite different to that of another employee, depending on rostering and shift patterns arrangements.
· It is evident from a reading of the PSA as a whole that the "ordinary weekly adult rates of pay" as set out in cl 5.2.1 are in fact default rates of pay. The combined effect of cll 5.2.1 and 6.3.3(c) and (d) and 6.8 is to prescribe a different or enhanced ordinary rate of pay for employees working regular non-rotating afternoon shifts or night shifts or Sunday shifts, where such shifts are the ordinary hours of the relevant employee. As Mr Herbert submitted, this can be contrasted with the position of employees who work such shifts as overtime, and who are entitled to different rates of pay altogether.
· It therefore follows that the "ordinary rate" payable to non-rotating shift workers as dictated by the PSA is found in cl 6.3.3(c) and cl 6.3.3(d). Similarly, read in conjunction with the remainder of the PSA, the "ordinary rate" payable to workers whose ordinary hours include a Sunday shift is found in cl 6.8. These "ordinary rates" are invariably different to the "ordinary rate" payable to other employees whose conditions are also determined by the PSA.
· I consider that the concepts of "ordinary rate" in s 46(1) of the State Act and "full pay" for the purposes of s 43 can be reconciled by requiring that "full pay" in s 43 be taken to mean the rate which the industrial agreement prescribes as being payable in respect of each ordinary hour worked by the particular worker, which in relation to relevant employees means the sums in both cl 5.2.1 and cl 6.3.3(c) or cl 6.3.3(d) or cl 6.8 (as the case may be).
34 Finally, in the event that I am incorrect in my finding that the "ordinary rate" payable to relevant employees incorporates the sums specified in both cl 5.2 and cl 6.3.3(c) or cl 6.3.3(d) or cl 6.8 (as the case may be), it is clear that s 46(2) contemplates that the different or enhanced rates of the relevant employees are payable for long service leave. Even if the "ordinary rate" for such employees is that specified in cl 5.2.1, it is clear that relevant employees engaged under the terms of cl 6.3.3(c) or cl 6.3.3(d) or cl 6.8 are paid "a higher rate than the ordinary rate" for ordinary hours, as contemplated by s 46(2), and that accordingly such employees are entitled to that higher rate for the purposes of long service leave.
35 Accordingly, I consider that the applicant is entitled to the declaration it seeks.
I certify that the preceding thirty-five (35) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Collier.