Consideration
28In assessing an access application an agency is entitled to rely on the terms of the application. The agency is not required to guess what the applicant had intended.
29In my view, the terms of the access application are clear. The access application requested communications between the Minister and Metgasgo "regarding" the police response to protests on 7 January 2013. The expression ""regarding" is a broad one. The Macquarie Dictionary Online defines the word "regarding" as a preposition meaning:
"with regard to; respecting; concerning"
30The word "concerning" is defined as a preposition meaning
"relating to; regarding; about."
31In my view there is no reason to give the access application a narrow construction. By using the word "regarding" the Applicant has intended to express a wide connection between the "communications" and "the police response to protests at the Metgasgo facilities in northern NSW on 7 January 2013".
32The Application specifically referred the Respondent to the attached letter from Mr Provest to Mr Henderson. In my view that reference was to provide a context for the request and the two should have been read together.
33Further, in my view there is no reason to construe the access application as only requesting communications made after the protests on 7 January 2013. Any communications prior to 7 January 2013 that related to the proposed police response would be within the scope of the access application. Similarly, any communications after 7 January 2013 that commented on the police response, whether positively or negatively, would have been caught by the access application.
34I have considered the access application and each of the documents that Mr Prasad provided. In my view each of those documents falls within the scope of the access application. The fact that a document merely makes passing reference to the police response does not alter its character as a communication regarding the police response to the protests.
35There is no suggestion that there are public interest considerations against disclosure of any of the documents. It follows, in my view that the documents should have been provided in response to the access application.
36As noted above, the Applicant seeks a referral to the Minister under section 112 of the GIPA Act regarding the actions of Mr McGowan and Mr Scutella. The parties are in general agreement that the test for good faith under section 112 is a subjective one. See discussion in Saggers v Environment Protection Authority [2013] NSWADT 204.
37While I agree with that view, I also agree that the requirement for good faith cannot be satisfied unless there was a real attempt to answer the request for information at least by recourse to the available materials.
38It is clear from the evidence that neither Mr McGowan nor Mr Scutella gave serious consideration to the attached letter from Mr Provest to Mr Henderson. If they had done so it would have been apparent that the letter referred to "letters to the Minister for Police and Emergency Services" and it would have been equally apparent that, as a minimum, the Applicant was seeking those letters.
39It is not in dispute that the key word search that was undertaken revealed a number of documents. In my view it was incumbent upon the Respondent to read those documents to ascertain whether they fell within the scope of the access application.
40It seems that the documents were given no more than a cursory review by reference to the date 7 January 2013. If the date was not specifically mentioned the document was regarded as falling outside the scope of the access application. In my view, more was required. It is clear to me that had the documents been read carefully, in reference to the whole of the access application properly construed, then a different decision would have been reached.
41I note that on several occasions Mr Scutella referred to the fact that he was dealing with many issues unrelated to the access application. This may provide an explanation for the lack of attention given to the application.
42I agree with the Applicant that the GIPA Act does not allow an agency to simply turn a blind eye to the legislative requirements. It is clear from section 3 of the GIPA Act that the objects of the Act include encouraging the proactive public release of government information by agencies, and giving members of the public an enforceable right to access government information. Section 3(2)(b) states that it is the intention of Parliament that the discretions conferred by this Act be exercised, as far as possible, so as to facilitate and encourage, promptly and at the lowest reasonable cost, access to government information. Those objects cannot be met if an officer with responsibility in relation to the determination of an access application does not give careful consideration to the request and whether information falls within the scope of that request.
43Counsel for Mr McGowan has asked for the application to be dismissed in regard to Mr McGowan on the basis that the evidence shows that Mr Scutella made the determination in regard to the access application. Counsel for Mr Scutella submitted that there is no evidence to support a finding of subjective bad faith.
44In the circumstances of this matter, Mr Gallagher, Mr McGowan and Mr Scutella each had responsibility in relation to the determination of an access application. In my view, there was an obligation on each of them to perform their task in good faith. The obligation does not merely reside with the officer who makes the final determination.