The primary judge's decision
14 The primary judge noted that she was conscious of the limited role of the Court in reviewing the exercise of administrative decision-making powers, particularly in respect of a decision that involves the exercise of a wide discretionary power, such as s 501CA(4) of the Act (citing Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 17; (2022) 96 ALJR 497 at 509 [26]) (J[35]).
15 She also noted that both grounds of judicial review alleged a failure to engage in an "active intellectual process" in relation to representations relating to the effect of the non-revocation of the appellant's visa; and that as the decision of the plurality in Plaintiff M1/2021 makes plain, labels such as "active intellectual process" must be understood in their proper context and do not give rise to a kind of general warrant for the Court on review to scrutinise the procedural and substantive merits of the Minister's decision with a view to substituting the Court's own views for those of the administrative decision-maker. Her Honour also noted that a finding that a decision-maker did not apply an "active intellectual process" to a question that the decision-maker was required to consider should "not lightly be made and must be supported by clear evidence" (citing Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 107; (2017) 252 FCR 352 at 364 [48] (Griffiths, White and Bromwich JJ); and GBV18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 17; (2020) 274 FCR 202 at 220 [32(g)]) (Flick, Griffiths and Moshinsky JJ)) (J[36]).
16 The primary judge then summarised the submissions made by the appellant and in particular the appellant's submissions that:
(1) the Minister did not, as a matter of law, adequately consider the representations that the appellant had made (citing Carrascalao at 383 [131]) (J[37]);
(2) his grounds of review did not seek to attack the Minister's "weighing exercise". Rather, he contended that the Minister erred in failing, in substance, to actively engage with his representations, relying on Minister for Home Affairs v Omar [2019] FCAFC 188; (2019) 272 FCR 589 at 607 [38] to [39] (Allsop CJ, Bromberg, Robertson, Griffiths and Perry JJ) (J[38]);
(3) the requirement to set out the reasons for decision in s 501G(1)(e) of the Act is an important accountability mechanism: Omar at 602 [34(a)] (J[39]); and
(4) it was not sufficient for the Minister to "just recount" the risk of suicide and that the Minister was obliged to engage in some "reflection upon the whole consideration of the human consequences involved" (citing Hands v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 225; (2018) 267 FCR 628 at 630 [3] (Allsop CJ, with whom Markovic J agreed; Steward J agreeing in the result)) (J[40]).
17 Her Honour also noted that the appellant placed considerable reliance on the decision of Justice Perram in Ezegbe v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 216; (2019) 164 ALD 139. She noted in particular the appellant's submissions that:
(1) to engage with the representations made at the requisite level, the Minister's Reasons should have included a reflection that involved discussion and consideration of the feared harm eventuating (citing Ezegbe at [32] to [36]);
(2) on reading the Minister's decision, the reader should be able to discern whether the Minister accepted that the claimed risk exists (citing Ezegbe at [33]);
(3) the Minister's decision gave no indication as to whether the Minister accepted the representations made as to the risk of suicide by the appellant; and
(4) thus, the structure, tone and content of the Minister's decision, and the absence of any engagement in a factual assessment of whether the articulated risks of suicide were likely to eventuate, demonstrated that the Minister had failed to consider, in the relevant legal sense, the representations that the appellant had made (J[41]).
18 The primary judge then considered the first ground of judicial review. Although that ground does not inform the grounds of appeal, her Honour's reasoning concerning the appellant's reliance upon Ezegbe is relevant. At J[45], the primary judge stated:
As to Mr Shi's reliance on Ezegbe, the Court's finding of error in that case was made in a different context to the circumstances of this case. Ezegbe concerned an application for review of a decision to cancel a visa on character grounds. The applicant, Mr Ezegbe, applied to the Minister seeking revocation of the cancellation decision and made representations which included that he would be at risk of harm if returned to Nigeria. He contended that he would be targeted by both sides of the conflict concerning the right of the region of Biafra to autonomous self-rule. In resolving the application against the Minister, Perram J found that the Minister gave consideration to the consequences that would emerge from Mr Ezebge returning to Nigeria holding those fears and not the actual consequences of the fears held, or the actual harm that might likely eventuate on his return to Nigeria. That is, the Minister fell into error by failing to deal with aspects of the representations which were made to him and were not related to claims which might be made for a protection visa: see Ezegbe at [37] - [38] and the cases cited therein. It is this distinction between Ezegbe and the circumstances of the present application that must be appreciated. This is not a case where Mr Shi submits that the Minister considered a different harm, fear or consequence to the one put forward by him concerning the risk of harm to his half-sister, nor is it said that there was a failure of consideration in a total sense, but instead there is said to be, effectively, a constructive failure on the Minister's part arising from a lack of active intellectual engagement with particular aspects of the representations that were put forward on behalf of Mr Shi.
19 The primary judge then turned to the second ground of judicial review. As her Honour's reasoning on this ground of review is the subject of challenge in this appeal, it is appropriate to set out that reasoning in full:
Ground 2 - Mr Shi
47. Ground 2 is directed to Mr Shi's representation with respect to his risk of suicide if returned to China. Mr Shi submits that the Minister did not engage with this submission in the requisite way.
48. The Minister addressed this representation as part of his consideration of the extent of impediments Mr Shi would face if removed. The Minister accepted that Mr Shi suffers from stress and depression. The Minister quoted from a psychologist's report in which the psychologist concluded that removal would cause Mr Shi "immense psychological distress" which would put him "at considerable risk of suicide": R[24], extracted in full at [23] above. It was the psychologist's opinion that Mr Shi's ability to care for his family in Australia "had bolstered his very low self-esteem; whereas removing him from his family would lower his self-esteem further": R[24]. As part of his consideration, the Minister found that on removal it would be open to Mr Shi to locate himself in a bigger city in China where the standard of living may be higher and the opportunities may be greater: R[26]. He regarded Mr Shi's age, health, work experience and lack of cultural and language barriers as being favourable for him to find employment. While the Minister recognised the hardship to Mr Shi resulting from the absence of family and social support, a fair reading of the Minister's reasons reveals that the Minister was of the view that Mr Shi would likely find employment in a city in China and be able to keep in touch with his family by electronic and other means: R[26]. Both those matters are relevant in the context of what the psychologist says about the impact of removal on Mr Shi's mental health given that the psychologist opines that Mr Shi's ability to care for his family, prior to his incarceration, was important to his self-esteem.
49. As with ground 1, Mr Shi advances an argument in support of ground 2, that the Minister failed to "engage meaningfully" with Mr Shi's risk of suicide. Again, the reasons, read fairly and as a whole, demonstrate that the Minister did correctly identify and engage with the relevant representations made by Mr Shi. The Minister accepted that Mr Shi suffered stress and depression and quoted from the psychologist's report relied on by Mr Shi in relation to his risk of suicide.
50. The structure of R[26] indicates that the reference to Mr Shi being "young, physically healthy, without any cultural or language barriers" was an aspect of the Minister's consideration of Mr Shi's representation that the living standard in his mother's village is low, he is not close to his relatives in China and that he would have difficulty finding employment.
51. Rather than being a formulaic dismissal of the representation in respect of Mr Shi's risk of suicide if removed, the Minister's reasons demonstrate that the Minister regarded the absence of cultural and language barriers coupled with Mr Shi's work experience, as enabling him to establish himself in a bigger city, where the standard of living may be higher (with the result that he would not inevitably encounter the financial difficulty to the degree referred to in his representations). In the final sentence of R[26], the Minister returned to the issue of the hardship posed by his lack of family and social support, accepting that Mr Shi would encounter such hardship, but found that Mr Shi would be able to keep in touch by electronic and other means. The Minister referred to "a degree of hardship" in this sentence. Mr Shi's complaint is really a complaint about weight - that this factor warranted greater weight than the Minister was prepared to attribute to it. I interpolate to note that Mr Shi's submissions in support of ground 2 regarding the application of Ezegbe were not persuasive for the reasons set out at [45] above. As with ground 1, the fact that Mr Shi disagrees with the Minister's ultimate assessment of the degree of hardship that he may suffer upon removal does not establish an error of law. Ground 2 must also be dismissed.