The Procedural Confusion
24As noted at the outset, there was some unfortunate confusion as to what was actually being heard by the Appeal Panel on 11 August 2014.
25At the beginning of the hearing, it was the Appeal Panel's understanding and apparently that of the respondent that the hearing related to the substantive appeal. In contrast, the appellant understood that the hearing was limited to the questions of what further directions should be made for the preparation of the appeal and whether a stay should be granted. As a consequence, the appellant sought an adjournment of the hearing on the basis that it had not come prepared to argue the substantive appeal.
26The confusion arose out of the circumstances leading up to the listing on 11 August 2014. In its notice of appeal, the appellant had sought a stay of the orders requiring it to pay money.
27On 24 April 2014 the Appeal Panel, constituted by Mr S Westgarth, Deputy President, ordered as follows:
The appellant's request for a stay of the operation of the orders made on 26 February 2014 is refused. No basis for the request for the stay has been given other than the implicit basis that the appellant believes that the orders made were wrong. The respondent is entitled to the benefit of the orders already made until and unless the Appeal Panel makes orders upholding the appeal.
28The matter was listed for directions before Mr S Westgarth, Deputy President, on 6 May 2014 who made the following directions:
(1)The appellant is to file and serve submissions on or before 22 May 2014.
(2)The respondent is to file and serve submissions on or before 5 June 2014.
(3)The appellant is to file and serve a transcript of the hearing on 12 February 2014 on or before 22 May 2014.
(4)The submissions must include copies of the documents relied upon at the hearing on 12 February 2014.
29Two letters complaining about those directions, which had been made in the appellant's absence, were sent by email to the Registry by the appellant on 2 and 20 May 2014.
30The Appeal Panel, constituted by the President, Wright J, proceeded to list a further urgent telephone directions hearing for 26 June 2014 to address the concerns raised in the letters of 2 and 20 May. Notice of that telephone hearing was not issued, however, until 24 June 2014. At the appeal hearing, the appellant asserted that it did not receive that notification until less than 24 hours before the appointed date and were unable to attend. In their absence, Wright J directed that:
(1)The appellant's emails of 2 May 2014 and 20 May 2014 be treated as a fresh application for a stay and an application to vacate directions made on 6 May 2014 respectively.
(2)The appellant to file and serve any evidence and submissions on which it relies in relation to each of those applications on or before 17 July 2014.
(3)The respondent to file and serve any evidence or submissions on which it relies in relation to each of those applications on or before 31 July 2014.
(4)The applications be set down for hearing for two hours on Monday 11 August 2014.
31These directions indicate that what was proposed to be heard on 11 August 2014 were the applications for further directions and the application for a stay not the substantive appeal.
32Unfortunately, these directions were not brought to the attention of the Appeal Panel, as constituted on 11 August 2014, until the matter was raised by the appellant on that date.
33In these circumstances, the Appeal Panel might ordinarily have been minded to adjourn the proceedings. It decided not to do so, however, having regard to the unusual circumstances of this case and the duty on the Tribunal to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issue in proceedings under s 36 of the Act and the requirements of ss 36(4) and 38(4) of the Act.
34The Appeal Panel was aware and took into account when considering the appellant's application for an adjournment that the appellant had a very strong argument that there had been a breach of the obligation to afford procedural fairness as a result of the Tribunal's deciding the matter on a basis that had not been raised in or argued in the proceedings. Therefore, if the Appeal Panel decided to uphold the appellant's appeal after hearing from the respondent on 11 August 2014, the appellant would not be prejudiced by the refusal of an adjournment and, indeed, would save the time and expense involved in a further hearing.
35The Appeal Panel also took into account that it was not in dispute that the money payable under the first order made by the Tribunal below had already been paid by the appellant and, accordingly, there was no order in relation to which a stay would be appropriate or necessary.
36Finally, it took into account that the respondent had come prepared to argue the substantive appeal and accordingly the respondent would not be prejudiced if an adjournment were not granted.
37On this basis, the Appeal Panel determined that it should not adjourn the hearing but should proceed to hear the substantive appeal.
38After hearing full submissions for the respondent, the Appeal Panel was satisfied that it should allow the appellant's appeal and make the orders outlined above. If it had not been so satisfied, it could have granted the adjournment at that point. That course, however, was not necessary.
39By refusing the appellant's adjournment in the circumstances and upholding the appellant's appeal after receiving all the submissions that the respondent wished to make, the Appeal Panel believes that it achieved a result whereby the parties were saved the waste and expense of a further hearing, the appellant has not been prejudiced as its appeal has been upheld and all the orders below have been set aside, the respondent has not been prejudiced as it has had a full opportunity to put its case on the appeal and the real issue in the proceedings was determined justly, quickly and cheaply.
40It is unfortunate that such confusion arose in the first place and it cannot be attributed to any fault on the part of the parties.