Causation and Damages
53 Counsel for the appellant has submitted that, as the trial Judge thought it was unnecessary for Dr Shead to warn of the possibility of prolonged gastroparesis, it has not been established that any damage was caused by his failure to do so.
54 However, the trial Judge found:-
"In my view, it is more probable than not that if she had received proper warning … the surgery performed by Dr Shead would not have taken place at that time. Ms Hooley would not have undertaken the procedure of truncal vagotomy and antrectomy at the time she did. …
…
I find, more probably than not, that Ms Hooley would not, had Dr Shead fulfilled his duties, have undergone the operation when she did. It is not material to the question I must determine that she may have undergone it later after obtaining further opinion, whether at the hands of Dr Shead or of some other surgeon. By that time the circumstances would have been different from those pertaining at the time she was obliged to make the choice whether or not to proceed with the surgery."
55 Ms Hooley's evidence did not correlate well with the finding made by the trial Judge as to the nature of the warning that should have been given. Her evidence was as follows:-
"Q. If you had been told that there was a risk that you might have a complication called gastroparesis, what would you have done if that word had been used? First of all, perhaps I should ask you, did you at that time know what the word gastroparesis meant?
A. No, never heard of it.
Q. If the doctor had said to you: 'Well one of the possible complications in this surgery is gastroparesis', what would you have done?
A. I would have said: 'What's that?'
Q. Yes?
A. I would have asked him what the implications of it were in terms of how serious it was and I have thought long and hard about this. I'm quite certain that had I discovered how devastating this could be, I would never have, you know, gone through with that procedure then. I would have gone and got at least a second and probably a third opinion and I would also have asked each of those people what my options were, what other alternatives were available to me."
56 Although Ms Hooley did not give evidence directed specifically to the warning which his Honour considered should have been given, I am satisfied that the trial Judge was entitled to conclude, from the evidence which Ms Hooley gave and from the nature of the warning that his Honour thought should have been given, that, had Ms Hooley understood the devastating consequences that could have resulted in a number of ways from the operation, she would have chosen, at least, to obtain a second opinion on the matter. Had that been done, it is unlikely that the operation would have proceeded when it did. I am also of the opinion, as I have said, that his Honour was wrong in excluding the possibility of long-term chronic gastroparesis from the warning which should have been given. In the circumstances, Ms Hooley's evidence was sufficient.
57 That leads to a consideration of the judgments in Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232. The present facts are not identical with those considered in Chappel v Hart, for in that case the patient had given evidence that, had she been warned of the dangers, she would have delayed the surgery and had it performed by the most experienced surgeon in the field. There is no evidence in the present case that there was any surgeon more suitable to carry out the operation than Dr Shead and there was no criticism of the manner in which Dr Shead performed the operation, other than the issue as to whether a further gastroscopy should have been performed.
58 In a case such as the present, issues of causation and assessment of damages can give rise to difficult problems. However, the starting point is the finding of a duty of care which a medical practitioner has to the patient and a failure on the part of the medical practitioner to fulfil that duty by taking proper steps to protect the patient. Breach of the duty is treated as materially contributing to the physical injury suffered by the patient unless there is a sufficient reason for a contrary finding.
59 In Chappel v Hart, at p 239, Gaudron J said:-
"Where there is a duty to inform it is, of course, necessary for a plaintiff to give evidence as to what would or would not have happened if the information in question had been provided … If that evidence is to the effect that the injured person would have acted to avoid or minimise the risk of injury, it is to apply sophistry rather than common sense to say that, although the risk of physical injury which came about called the duty of care into existence, breach of that duty did not cause or contribute to that injury, but simply resulted in the loss of an opportunity to pursue a different course of action.
… And the physical injury having occurred, breach of the duty is treated as materially causing or contributing to that injury unless there is 'sufficient reason to the contrary' …"
60 At pp 247-248, McHugh J, dissenting on the facts of the case, said:-
"… the onus of proving that the failure to warn was causally connected with the plaintiff's harm lies on the plaintiff. However, once the plaintiff proves that the defendant breached a duty to warn of a risk and that the risk eventuated and caused harm to the plaintiff, the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of causal connection. An evidentiary onus then rests on the defendant to point to other evidence suggesting that no causal connection exists. Examples of such evidence are: evidence which indicates that the plaintiff would not have acted on the warning because of lack of choice or personal inclination; evidence that no alternative course of action would have eliminated or reduced the risk of injury. Once the defendant points to such evidence, the onus lies on the plaintiff to prove that in all the circumstances a causal connection existed between the failure to warn and the injury suffered by the plaintiff."
61 At p 257, Gummow J said:-
"In Mrs Hart's case, the very risk of which she should have been warned materialised. In his written submissions filed by leave after the hearing of the appeal, Dr Chappel conceded that, if the surgery had been performed at a different time, then '[i]n all likelihood' Mrs Hart 'would not have suffered the random chance of injury'. In addition, the particular risk involved had been the subject of a specific inquiry by Mrs Hart of the medical practitioner who then was engaged by her to perform the surgery. She was a person for whom the potential consequences of damage to her voice were more significant than the 'statistical' risk. Those additional factors combined with the satisfaction of the 'but for' test were sufficient to establish causation in this case.
Here, the injury to Mrs Hart occurred within an area of foreseeable risk. In the absence of evidence that the breach had no effect or that the injury would have occurred even if Dr Chappel had warned her of the risk of injury to the laryngeal nerve and of the consequent risk of partial or total voice loss, the breach of duty will be taken to have caused the injury …"
62 At p 278, Kirby J said:-
"Once Mrs Hart showed the breach and the damage which had immediately eventuated, an evidentiary onus lay upon Dr Chappel to displace the inference of causation which thereupon arose. He failed to do so. Nor, in my view, causation being established, did he prove that Mrs Hart would have been exposed to the same, or substantially the same, possibilities of like injury if she had postponed the procedure and had it done by someone more experienced, as was her right. On the contrary, the evidence demonstrated that the chances of her receiving such injury in any other operation were minuscule. For the reasons stated those chances would probably be even smaller in the hands of a surgeon with the experience and skill of Professor Benjamin."
63 I need not mention any passages from the dissenting reasons of Hayne J.
64 On the issue of damages, the majority of their Honours ruled that probabilities, not speculation, should be taken into account. At pp 241-242, Gaudron J said:-
"Once it is accepted, as in my view it must be, that the risk of injury would have been less if, as Mrs Hart deposed, she had retained the services of the most experienced surgeon in the field, the argument that, at best, Mrs Hart was entitled to nominal damages must be rejected. Rather, Mrs Hart is entitled to damages for the injuries suffered. In the calculation of those damages, however, the question arises whether there was a probability that Mrs Hart would have suffered harm of the kind that eventuated no matter when or by whom surgery was performed. If that was a probability, allowance should have been made for it ( Malec v J C Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 638 at 642-643, per Deane, Gaudron and McHugh JJ). However, neither the trial judge nor the Court of Appeal adverted to the question."
65 Gummow J said, at p 263:-
"In the present case, it would have been for Dr Chappel to show … that Mrs Hart's damages were to be reduced to reflect the possibility, being more than a speculation, that independently of his negligence Mrs Hart would have sustained at some later date the injuries of which she complained. That was not the way in which the case for the appellant was presented. Rather, the attempt was to show a lack of causation and to deny any liability."
66 At p 262, Gummow J also said:-
"In the present case, the obtaining of adequate advice as to the risks involved was a central concern of Mrs Hart in seeking and agreeing to undergo the surgical procedure in question. It would, in the circumstances of the case, be unjust to absolve the medical practitioner from legal responsibility for her injuries by allowing decisive weight to hypothetical and problematic considerations of what could have happened to Mrs Hart at the hands of some other practitioner at some unspecified later date and in conditions of great variability."
67 In Chappel v Hart, all Judges were in agreement that the case was not appropriately treated as one where the patient had simply lost the chance of having the operation performed by a more experienced surgeon, a contention which had been put forward on behalf of Dr Chappel.