Shave v Shave; Estate of Shave
[2011] NSWSC 1356
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Supreme Court of NSW
Decision date
2011-08-18
Before
White J, Hodgson J, Powell J
Catchwords
- BC9505168) Estate of Orre (Supreme Court of New South Wales, 19 December 1991, Powell J, unreported
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Catchwords
Judgment (1 paragraphs)
Judgment 1HIS HONOUR: These proceedings concern the filing, verification and passing of accounts. The deceased, Helen Manning Shave, died on 15 April 2008. By her will she appointed the first plaintiff, her daughter, Gillian Barbara Shave and her solicitor, David William Brown, to be the executors and trustees of her will. The principal beneficiaries were her daughter Gillian, and her son Charles. Clause 10 of the will provided: " I declare that any Executor or Trustee being a person engaged in any professional business may be so employed and shall be entitled to charge and be paid all usual and professional or other charges for any business or act done by him or his firm or his or their clerks or employees in connection with my Estate or the Trusts hereof and may in addition apply to the court for commission for his pains and trouble. " 2The estate was estimated to have a net value of $2,255,481.14. 3On 1 September 2009 Charles Shave filed a summons seeking an order that the defendants verify, file and pass their accounts in respect of the administration of the estate from 15 April 2008 to 30 June 2009. He sought an order that his costs of the summons be paid personally by the executors on the indemnity basis. 4On 9 December 2009 the executors filed their accounts for the period from 15 April 2008 to 31 October 2009. The statement of payments included three payments to David Brown & Partners Lawyers on 15 July and 29 August 2008 in amounts totalling $9,783.46. The accounts also listed outstanding accounts rendered by David Brown & Partners between 15 July 2008 and 26 May 2009. There were seven such accounts totalling $40,610.61. The three payments referred to above totalling $9,783.46 were deducted showing " Total Outstanding Billings - David Brown & Partners [$] 30,827.15 ". 5In addition the accounts set out various billings by other lawyers, namely, Legal Life Planning, Bartier Perry, and Morris Buckley CT Poole & Son and Mr Philip Hallen SC. The total amounts described as outstanding to those legal practitioners was $56,991.65. These legal practitioners were retained by Gillian Shave. 6Charles Shave, filed extensive objections to the accounts. He objected that David Brown & Partners had made professional charges for non-professional (executorial) work and had performed work after 5 December 2008, after Gillian Shave had revoked her instructions for David Brown & Partners to act as solicitors for the estate. He made other objections to specific charges. Charles Shave also objected to charges being borne by the estate that related to disputes between the estate and David Brown & Partners as to the bills of costs that had been rendered, in relation to a claim for commission made by David Brown and in relation to the asserted termination of retainer. He objected to the charging of legal costs in relation to disputes in which it was said Mr Brown was seeking to advance his personal interests, including by ensuring the continuation of his firm's retainer and in demanding payment of commission. 7Charles Shave also objected to the tax invoices for Legal Life Planning, Bartier Perry, Mr Hallen SC and Morris Buckley CT Poole & Son. These were costs said to have been incurred by Gillian Shave for which she sought reimbursement from the estate for legal expenses she had incurred. Charles Shave submitted that certain of those amounts should be disallowed as they related to matters of a personal nature for her and should not be borne by the estate. He also contended that Mr Brown and David Brown & Partners should indemnify the estate in relation to such costs. 8Gillian Shave filed an extensive affidavit in relation to her claim to be reimbursed for costs she described as costs incurred in defending the interests of the estate. She set out in detail evidence of the dispute between Mr Brown and her. 9It seems that the dispute between Mr Brown and Gillian and Charles Shave arose, at least in part, from Mr Brown's assertion of an entitlement to be paid at his firm's usual professional rates for executorial work and also his claim to a commission. He invoiced the estate for a commission of $5,000. There were subsequent disputes in relation to Gillian Shave's purported termination of the retainer of David Brown & Partners, the validity of which Mr Brown did not accept as he said that any such instructions had to be given by the executors jointly. There was a further dispute in relation to the non-implementation of a proposal agreed to by Gillian and Charles Shave for the realisation and distribution of certain of the estate assets. Instructions had been given for the sale of certain securities and Mr Brown purportedly revoked those instructions. Issues arise as to the consistency of the position taken. 10On 25 August 2010 Gillian Shave and Mr Brown filed a supplementary statement of account covering the period from 1 November 2009 to 30 June 2010. It referred to further outstanding accounts for legal costs. On 26 August 2010 Mr Brown filed submissions in relation to the disputes. 11It seems that on the application of Gillian Shave, five bills of David Brown & Partners dated 11 November 2008, two of 16 January 2009, 17 April 2009, and 26 May 2009 were referred for assessment on the practitioner/client basis. The costs assessor stated that in his assessment he had not allowed costs that related to executorial work. Costs for the first three bills, namely the bill of 11 November 2008 and the two bills of 16 January 2009, were assessed in the sum of $13,980.43. He ordered Mr Brown to pay the costs of the assessment. 12On 30 August 2010 Charles Shave made objections to the supplementary statement of accounts. He seeks costs of his objections on the indemnity basis. He alleges that Mr Brown's revocation of the instructions for the realisation of securities and failure to implement the agreement between him and his sister for the distribution of assets was a breach of trust. He also contends that costs on the indemnity basis should be ordered because of what he claims to be serious delinquency in the purported charging of costs to the estate. 13Charles Shave and Gillian Shave have also made submissions in relation to the right of Mr Brown to charge professional rates for executorial work and to claim commission. 14On 1 October 2010 the Registrar raised a number of observations and requisitions. He stated: " 1. As the objections seem to be mainly to costs only at this stage I will confine the requisitions to costs only at this stage (objection to commission may be dealt with at the commission hearing) and infer that there is no issue as to any other matter. ... 4. The power to moderate costs flows from s85(4) Probate Act and it follows that moderation is limited to costs actually charged in the accounts. Costs charged after the close of the accounts and future costs cannot be the subject of moderation. Initially I propose to informally assess the bills. If there is objection to such assessment the bills may then be formally moderated. " 15The solicitors for Charles Shave and Gillian Shave queried the Registrar's statement that moderation would be limited to costs actually " charged in the accounts ". Further requisitions were raised on 23 March 2011. The Registrar stated: " 4. Assessment or moderation of costs is limited to disbursements in the accounts and it follows therefore that only costs that have actually been paid (an essential characteristic of the process of vouching accounts is that the Registrar must be satisfied that the [disbursements] have actually been paid) may be the subject of assessment or moderation. As to costs that have been billed or invoiced but remain unpaid or if paid (but not out of the estate) remain to be recovered from the estate it seems to me that such costs may [be] the subject of assessment under Legal Profession Act (a modern version of the third party taxations that used to take place under s33 former Legal Practitioners Act) the purpose of the exercise being to determine the indemnity of executors out of the estate in respect of costs. Without in any way seeking to trespass on the assessor's territory, it is my recollection of having been a taxing officer of the court in third party taxations under the former legislation that issues such as whether work is professional or executorial and whether particular costs are recoverable out of the estate (eg where each of the executors has separately incurred costs) are issues that may be determined in such proceedings. I should add that only costs incurred as executor may be considered on moderation and if there are costs that are solicitor-client costs between the executors they cannot be the subject of moderation. It seems to be common ground that the only costs that have actually been paid are those at items, 40, 41 and 73. If such costs are part of the costs claimed in parts A and B referred to in the bill dated 11/11/10 the amounts paid would probably be allowed in full. Costs relating to the accounts and claim for commission must await any order of the court as to costs of the court proceedings. Costs as between the executors would not seem to be costs that should be considered on moderation but might be more appropriate to be considered as part of the costs of ... accounts proceedings, particularly as Mr Poole seeks costs against Mr Brown. I might add that the costs that are allowed on moderation are the costs that executors as executors are entitled to indemnity out of the estate. Personal costs of an executor such as recovery of costs or entitlements to commission (costs of commission are only recoverable pursuant to an order of the court, otherwise they are the costs of the executor because they are not for the benefit of the estate - see comment by Powell J in Estate of Instone (1993) NSWSC PD 23.8.93 re solicitor's costs in respect of any entitlement to commission item 74(a)) and are not costs that are allowable on moderation. 5. The upshot of the above is that it seems to me that, subject to any further submissions, I may proceed to consider passing the accounts and allowing commission. The proceedings may be relisted before the court to determine costs of the court proceedings including costs claimed by Mr Poole and other costs may be assessed separately. " 16In response the solicitors for Charles Shave submitted on 6 May 2011: " 4. We note your comments in relation to the assessment or moderation of costs being limited to disbursements in the accounts. In our submission, we do not agree that it follows that only costs that have actually been paid may be the subject of moderation (in this regard we refer you to section 86A of the Probate and Administration Act 1989). Objections have been made by our client to the payment of various legal fees to David Brown & Partners as well as other outstanding legal fees that have been charged or are proposed to be charged against the Estate all of which are identified in the Accounts and Supplementary First Accounts and copies of which legal fees are available. An amount of $9,783.46 has been paid from the Estate to David Brown & Partners in relation to bills of costs submitted by that firm (see Items 40, 41 and 73 of the Accounts). It is our client's submission that before the Court can reach a determination as to whether these payments to David Brown & Partners should be allowed in full you will at least have to conduct an informal moderation of all the bills of costs rendered by David Brown & Partners. It then follows that all other bills of costs proposed to be charged against the Estate should be informally moderated by the Court so that a determination can be made about the total amount of legal fees to be paid from the Estate. Our client further submits that, before dealing with any commission application, you will at least have to informally moderate the amounts to be allowed in respect of all the legal fees identified and listed in the Accounts and/or Supplementary First Accounts as any legal fees that are allowed potentially impact on the amount of any commission that may be awarded in respect of the periods covered by the Accounts and the Supplementary First Accounts. In order that the Estate be finalised, which it cannot be until the issue of legal fees is resolved, our client requests that there be at least an informal moderation of all the legal fees charged or proposed to be charged against the Estate to which our client has objected. 5. In our client's submission it will not be possible for you to consider passing the Accounts of this Estate until such time as all the legal fees being claimed out of the Estate in respect of the period of the Accounts and Supplementary First Accounts have been moderated and a determination has been made about the total amount of legal fees to be paid from the Estate in respect thereof. Our client reserves his objections to the Executors claims for commission until the Court has issued the Certificate of Correctness in relation to the Accounts and the Executors have served their affidavits in support of their applications for an award of commission. Our client also wishes to exercise his right to be heard in relation to all the objections lodged by him in relation to the Accounts and Supplementary First Accounts. " 17The Registrar responded on 18 May 2011. He noted the submission of the solicitors for Charles Shave, but commented that: " My only comment is that as a registrar I may only do what I have power to do and that is allow, wholly or in part, disbursements. And a disbursement is only a disbursement if it has actually been paid. I have noted 4 of Tress Cox's letter of 6/5/11; power under s 86A Probate Act is exercisable only by a judge so I cannot deal with the matters set out. Otherwise, consideration of the letter should await the executors' response to the requisitions. " 18On 13 July 2011 the parties forwarded to the court a form of consent order signed by the legal representatives for all of the parties. The order proposed reads: " By consent the court makes the following orders: