14 As for par 21A(a), its genesis is something that was said by Mr Sergeant in his report served on 21 October 2008. The council says that it has been taken out of context. In any event, the council submits that (a) if the amendment were allowed Mr Sergeant would have to be recalled; and (b) if it had known that the amendment would be sought, it probably would not have called Mr Sergeant or, alternatively, probably would not have read the paragraph containing the said statement, and probably would have called other expert evidence. The applicant submits that it is inherently unlikely that the council would have done what it now says it would have done, particularly in relation to not calling Mr Sergeant or not reading the relevant part of his evidence; and that if the latter course had been followed, then it would have been a simple matter for the applicant to have cross-examined the omitted material back in. There is force in the applicant's submissions concerning Mr Sergeant. Otherwise, however, I think there is force in the matters which the council has identified as being in the nature of prejudice.
15 As for par 21A(b), the council submits that it is prejudiced because it is impossible now to argue that the survey was objectively clear when it undertook cross-examination to different effect. The council says that it is likely that its cross-examination of the applicant's marketing expert Mr Elliott would have been very different in that it is likely that Mr Elliott's coding of survey results would have been accepted instead of being challenged in part on the basis that reasonable minds could differ as to classification of individual survey results. The applicant submits that (a) this should not be accepted given the pleadings in which the council denied the accuracy of the survey results alleged by the applicant which were based on Mr Elliott's analysis; (b) even if the council may have accepted Mr Elliott's coding, that does not necessarily mean that it would have been put to Mr Elliott that the survey results were capable of producing an objectively fair outcome; (c) the respondents have been on notice of this matter since service of the applicant's written outline last Friday; and (d) s 21A(b) is an objective matter which simply arises out of the nature of the survey.
16 As for par 21A(c), the applicant says that it simply raises an objective matter. The council, however, says that it would wish to call evidence from the company Market Facts (Qld) Pty Limited, its independent research company which conducted the telephone survey, as to why it worded the particular question in the way that is now complained of, and as to its opinion (or the opinion of its representative) as to its likely effect.
Conclusion
17 The proposed amendments raise a new issue of whether the paper survey was an ineffective mechanism for obtaining evidence of community support for the council's plan to increase rates. It invites disputation and evidence as to whether there was a better way of going about it. I accept that if the amendments were to be allowed, there would be prejudice to the respondents arising out of the lateness in seeking the amendment. If leave to amend had been sought in a timely way, it is likely that the council would have conducted its case differently by calling other or additional evidence and conducting its cross-examination differently. I am, however, doubtful, as I have earlier indicated, that the council would have gone so far as not to call Mr Sergeant. The marketing survey expert witnesses, Mr Elliott for the applicant and Mr Sergeant for the council, gave concurrent evidence in relation to the surveys and were cross-examined earlier this week before the application to amend was made. If the amendments were to be allowed, the respondents would have to be afforded the opportunity to call further evidence and have Mr Sergeant and Mr Elliott recalled for further questioning. To allow the amendments would disrupt and extend the further hearing of the case and adversely affect its timely disposal. I also consider that there has been insufficient explanation for the delay in moving for leave to amend until the fifth day of the hearing.
18 For these reasons, I am not persuaded that I should accede to the motion for leave to amend which, accordingly, I dismiss.