That is not to say that the steps taken, or not taken before termination may not in a given case be relevant to consideration of whether the state of affairs that was produced was harsh, unjust or unreasonable. Thus it has been said that a decision which is the product of unfair procedures may be arbitrary, irrational or unreasonable. But the question under (cl.11a) is whether, in all the circumstances the termination of employment disobeyed the injunction that it not be harsh, unjust or unreasonable. That is not answered by imposing a disjunction between procedure and substance. It is important that matters not be decided simply by looking at the first issue before there is seen to be any need to enter upon the second".
202 Brennan CJ, Dawson and Toohey JJ concluded at p43
"Save for the prescription of periods of notice cl 11 does not require the adoption of any particular procedure for the dismissal of any employee. However, it is clear that the use of an unfair procedure may result in a dismissal being harsh, unjust or unreasonable. For example, the failure to afford an employee the opportunity to explain apparent misconduct where there is an innocent explanation available would result in dismissal of the employee being in breach of cl 11(a)".
203 Byrne & Anor v Australian Airlines has often been relied on in Full Bench Decisions of this Commission including Wang v Crestell Industries Pty Ltd (1997) 73 IR 454; Rapp v Wauchope RSL Club (1998) 81 IR 116; Bigg & Anor v New South Wales Police Service (1998) 80 IR 434; Burke v McGirr (1998) 87 IR 54; Busways v Johnson (1994) 55 IR 255; and Antanakopoulos v State Bank (1999) 91 IR 385.
205 In Antonakopoulos v State Bank (1999) 91 IR 385 the Full Bench said at page.389
" We agree with the conclusion of Hill J. that procedural issues, that is failure to deal with the matter in a procedurally fair way, may in certain cases of themselves, constitute the basis for a determination that dismissal is harsh, unjust or unreasonable. A failure to adopt a procedure which constitutes a breach of 'an essential prerequisite to, or involve limitation on, the exercise of the employer's right to dismiss' or a failure to afford procedural fairness which causes a 'substantial and irrevocable prejudice to the employee' will often vitiate the decision of an employer and warrant, in itself, a deterioration that the dismissal was harsh, unreasonable or unjust (and hence, establish the basis for a remedy under the Act). Further a decision to dismiss made upon the basis of procedures which are unfair and where an innocent explanation is reasonably available will normally constitute a firm basis for a determination that a dismissal, so effected, is harsh, unreasonable or unjust."
206 The Full Bench also said at page 390:
While the findings of the Commission in Buckman focus on the issue of warnings, the observations apply also to broader tenets of procedural fairness contemplated in s88 and to matters such as those raised in these proceedings. We agree that there is no obligation in the Act to follow any particular procedure when effecting a dismissal. However a failure by an employer to adopt appropriate procedure when effecting a dismissal, or a failure to follow procedures prescribed in an industrial instrument, or in procedures laid down administratively by an employer, may be properly taken into account by the Commission as part of the consideration of an application brought under s.84"
207 As mentioned in the above passage, the Commission's statutory basis for considering procedural issues in unfair dismissal proceedings is found in s.88 of the Act, which provides as follows:
"In determining the applicant's claim, the Commission may, if appropriate take into account:
a) whether a reason for the dismissal was given to the applicant and, if the application sought but was refused reinstatement or re-employment with the employer, whether a reason was given for the refusal to reinstate or re-employ, and
b) if any such reason was given - its nature, whether it has a basis in fact, and whether the application was given an opportunity to make out a defence or give an explanation for his or her behaviour or to justify his or her reinstatement or re-employment, and
c) whether a warning of unsatisfactory performance was given before the dismissal, and
d) the nature of the duties of the applicant immediately before the dismissal and, if the application sought but was refused reinstatement or re-employment, the likely nature of those duties if the applicant were to be reinstated or re-employed, and
e) whether or not the applicant requested reinstatement or
re-employment with the employer, and
f) such other matters as the Commission considers relevant"
204 Turning to the expression "harsh, unjust or unreasonable', that expression was also considered in Byrne & Anor v Australian Airlines. In their joint judgment McHugh and Gummow J.J said at p72:
"It may be that the termination is harsh but not unjust or unreasonable, unjust but not harsh or unreasonable, or unreasonable but not harsh or unjust, In many cases the concepts will overlap. Thus the one termination of employment may be unjust because the employee was not guilty of the misconduct on which the employer acted, may be unreasonable because it was decided upon interferences which would not reasonably have been drawn from the material before the employer, and may be harsh in its consequences for the personal and economic situation of the employee or because it is disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct in respect of which then employer acted"
205 The principle was further discussed in Outboard World v Muir (1993) 51 IR 167 at 182 where the Full Bench said:
"First we deal with the argument for the appellant that the Commission erred by applying the wrong test in connection with the dismissal: 'unfair' rather than 'harsh, unreasonable or unjust' dismissal. We agree with Mr Reitano's submission in this respect that the reference by the Commissioner to "unfairness" did not represent any misunderstanding of the correct test but was merely the use of a shortened form of expression intended to embrace the three relevant words. Whilst we recognise that there may be a natural tendency (recognised in the use even by the advocate for the Company before the Commissioner of the term 'unfair") to use the shortened form, we consider that it is preferable that a member of the Commission utilise the precise words provided by s246, rather than the catch-all heading, particularly when expressing the basis for a finding that s dismissal is within one or more of the heads provided by the section. We take this view because, even though there may be some circularity in the full phrase "harsh, unreasonable or unjust", we detect scope for variation of meaning which may be critical to the determination of a particular matter as may be obscured by the use if the substitute term "unfair". Different but not wholly dissimilar words. "Unfair, "harsh" and "unconscionable", are used in s275, power of the Industrial Court to Declare Certain Contracts Void, of the 1991 Act. In relation to those words, then appearing in s88F of the 1940 Act, the Commission in Court Session (Perrignon, Cahill and Dey JJ) in A & M Thompson Pty Ltd v Total Australia Ltd (1980) AR (NSW) 399 at 431 (Cahill J delivering a different judgement) said:
"The duty of the Commission is to reach a conclusion on the issues of whether the subject transaction is "unfair", "harsh" or "unconscionable"