Sharma v R

Sequence 8/91 - Causing KB to take an intoxicating substance with intent to enable the commission of an indictable offence, namely sexual intercourse without consent

1. The applicant collected KB from her premises at 9:33pm on 24 May 2019. In the course of returning to the applicant's premises, KB mentioned that she was experiencing pain in her face. The applicant responded by telling her that: 1. he had strong painkillers which had cost him $25.00 each and had assisted him in dealing with knee pain; and 2. he was able to take up to 6 at a time before they upset his stomach, and that she should take 2 to begin with.
2. The applicant then opened the centre console of his vehicle, pulled out a white tablet box, and asked KB how many tablets she wanted. When KB asked what was in the tablets, the applicant told her that they had "Endone or something else" in them, and said that he would send a message to a friend later in the evening to obtain more precise information.
3. The applicant gave KB 2 of the tablets. Acting on what he had told her about their ingredients, KB took them. The applicant had in fact given KB Zolpidem (trade name Ambien), a non-benzodiazepine sedative and hypnotic which rapidly induces sleep.
4. When they arrived at the applicant's premises, KB sat down in the lounge room to watch television, whilst the applicant prepared a drink in the kitchen. By this time it was about 10:00pm. KB's memory began to fade due to the effects of the Zolpidem and by 10:30pm, KB had lost consciousness entirely.

Sequence 4/91 - Intentionally recording intimate images of KB without consent

1. Between 10:31pm on 24 May 2019 and 12:02am on 25 May 2019, the applicant took a series of photographs and videos of KB when she was unconscious on the couch. These included: 1. photographs of KB's bare breasts; 2. photographs of KB's bare buttocks, with the applicant's finger stroking her left buttock cheek; and 3. a photograph of the applicant's erect penis pressed up against KB's lips.

Sequences 2/91 and 3/91 - Sexual intercourse with KB without consent

1. During the evening of 24 May 2019 and the early hours of the morning of 25 May 2019, the applicant engaged in penile/vaginal and penile/anal intercourse with KB whilst she was unconscious or semi-unconscious and thus incapable of consenting, in the knowledge that she was so incapable. KB was able to recall the applicant removing his penis from her vagina and inserting it into her anus, at which point she said: Not that.
2. The applicant responded with words to the effect: Just a second.
3. The next thing KB could recall was being shaken awake by the applicant at 6:30am on 25 May whilst lying on his bed. She was completely clothed at the time with her clothing properly positioned. The applicant drove her home.
4. The Form 1 attached to sequence 3/91 detailed that the applicant had also engaged in penile/oral intercourse with KB whilst she was unconscious. As he was thrusting his erect penis in and out of KB's mouth, he said to her: Don't bite, don't bite, don't bite.

Events following the offending against KB

1. During 25 May 2019, KB began having flashbacks of what had occurred at the applicant's premises. As a consequence of these flashbacks, she conducted a Google search of the term "rape if they are unconscious" and found a picture that said: At what point does consensual sex become rape if a consenting partner becomes unconscious? Seriously.
2. KB sent a copy of this picture to the applicant, following which there was an exchange of messages between them: APPLICANT: I was out of it too, I don't know what you are talking about. KB: I don't do anal. APPLICANT: That would have been an accident.
3. KB had no further communication with the applicant following this exchange.
4. KB disclosed her concerns to her sister and a friend and then attended Liverpool Hospital where she was examined. Her urine sample was found to contain Zolpidem metabolites. Bearing in mind what the applicant later told police when arrested (as set out below) nothing detected in the sample was consistent with the presence of Valium. On the morning of 27 May, KB reported the incident to the police.

The applicant's arrest

1. Police arrested the applicant on 28 May 2019. The applicant spoke with police en route to the police station, in the course of which he said (inter alia) that: 1. he had given KB Valium tablets; 2. he had told her what they were, and that they operated as a relaxant; 3. KB had 2 tablets and he had 3 tablets; 4. he had not had a prescription for Valium, and had obtained 10 tablets in total from a friend, all of which had been consumed; 5. the Valium did not affect him to any real degree, nor did it affect KB; 6. KB was coherent and responsive during the sexual intercourse which had taken place; 7. he did not think about the consequences of mixing Valium with other medication which was been taken by KB at the time; 8. KB did not hesitate in choosing to take the tablets which were given to her, and was not forced to do so; and 9. he had photographed KB on the couch when they were watching a movie after they had consensual sexual intercourse.
2. After arriving at the police station, the applicant participated in a formal interview during which he told police that: 1. he had engaged in penile/oral, penile/vaginal and penile/anal intercourse with KB, all of which was consensual (other than the penile/anal intercourse which, he maintained, was both momentary and accidental); 2. on 24 May 2019, he and KB had first had sexual intercourse at about 10:00pm or 10:30pm, during which KB was awake and conscious; 3. KB had consented to the photographs which were taken; and 4. he had said to KB words to the effect "don't bite" when he had penile/oral intercourse with her.

Further investigations

1. Following the applicant's arrest, his car and home were searched. In the course of that search, police located 5.6g of Testosterone located in a vile marked "Sustanon 250" and two tablets of Oxymetholone. The applicant's possession of those substances constituted the basis of the two offences in the Certificate issued pursuant to s 166.
2. Police also seized a number of electronic storage devices. A Cellebrite download of the applicant's phone established a browsing history dating back to 2018 which included: 1. searches conducted on various pornography websites using the search terms "shopping upskirt", "sleeping", "voyeur", "wife spycam", "sleeping wife", "forced wife", "asleep", "neighbour voyeur", "sleep sex", "passed out wife", "drugged wife" and "sister sleeping"; 2. the viewing of pornographic footage with titles including "sleeping sister gets played with", "sleeping mum molested by daughter", "cum on passed out chubby milf on the couch", "passed out sleeping drunk bitch on the train showing her nice round candid ass", "naughty brother fucking sleeping step-sister", "wife sleeping facial", "using her drunk passed out pussy", "fucking her while on ambien - mature, sleepy sleep sleeping dormida passed out", "cum in her sleeping mouth"; and 3. multiple visits to the website voyeurcentre.com between August 2018 and May 2019.

Sequence 3/53 - Intentionally recording intimate images of MH without consent

1. When examining the applicant's phone following his arrest, police recovered videos and photographs of a second victim, MH, next door to whom the applicant had lived between 2016 and 2017. Those images had been taken by the applicant through the back door and window of her home on multiple dates between February and November 2017. The images variously captured MH in a state of undress, wearing only underwear, naked after having a shower, and masturbating on her lounge. A total of 16 photographs and 36 videos were taken of MH after 25 August 2017. 5 photographs and 8 videos amounted to intimate images. MH was unaware of the photographs and videos which had been taken, and did not consent to the applicant doing so.

Sequence 4/53 - Attempting to intentionally record intimate images of JM without consent

1. The applicant was employed by a major bank as a customer lending/service specialist, and on 6 September 2018 attended a training session conducted by a further victim to whom I shall refer as JM. The applicant was sitting to the immediate left of JM during the training session, in the course of which he surreptitiously recorded two videos of her underneath the table. In doing so, he pointed the camera towards JM's legs and crotch. JM was unaware of the videos which were taken, and did not consent to the applicant doing so.

FINDINGS OF THE SENTENCING JUDGE AS TO OBJECTIVE SERIOUSNESS

Sequence 8/91

1. The sentencing Judge found that [7] : 1. the applicant was aware that KB was taking pain medication, and had caused her to take Zolpidem without regard to possible contra indications; 2. the offending was planned and premeditated; 3. Zolpidem had the effect of rapidly inducing sleep; 4. the Zolpidem given to KB by the applicant rendered her unconscious, such that she was unable to resist the offending of having sexual intercourse without consent; 5. such offending was very serious; and 6. as a consequence of the prior consensual sexual relationship between the applicant and KB, the offending involved a breach of trust, albeit not one that fell within s 21A(2)(k) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW).
2. Her Honour concluded that the objective seriousness of the offending fell above the mid-range, albeit perhaps only slightly above.

Sequences 2/91 and 3/91

1. The sentencing Judge found that: [8] 1. in each case the offending was planned; 2. the form of sexual intercourse in each case (but particularly the forced anal intercourse in sequence 3/91) was a more serious form of intercourse than (for example) digital intercourse; and 3. in each case the applicant knew that KB did not consent, as opposed to being reckless as to that fact.
2. Her Honour also concluded that the offending in the Form 1 meant that a moderately heavier sentence was to be imposed in respect of the offending in sequence 3/91 in order to reflect the increased weight to be attributed to personal deterrence for that offending.
3. Her Honour found that the objective seriousness of the offending in each case fell at the mid-range.
4. I interpolate that although counsel for the applicant before this Court took no issue with any of the findings of the sentencing judge, her Honour's finding at 33 above tends against observations previously made by this Court that forms of forced sexual intercourse should not be graded or ranked in a hierarchy for the purposes of determining issues of objective of seriousness. [9]

Sequence 4/91

1. The sentencing Judge found that: [10] 1. the photographs taken by the applicant showed both KB's face and the fact that she was undressed; 2. one photograph depicted the applicant's penis pressed against KB's lips; and 3. the events must have been extremely humiliating and demeaning for KB.
2. Her Honour concluded that the objective seriousness of the offending fell above the mid-range.

Sequence 3/53

1. The sentencing Judge found that: [11] 1. the photographs pictured MH (inter alia) in intimate acts of an inherently private nature in the privacy of her own home; and 2. the offending was not isolated, and had continued over a period of 3 months.
2. Her Honour concluded that the objective seriousness of the offending fell above the mid-range.

Sequence 3/53

1. The sentencing Judge found that: [12] 1. the offending was an attempt as opposed to a completed offence; and 2. no intimate images were in fact produced.
2. Her Honour concluded that the objective seriousness of the offending fell below the mid-range.
3. In terms of the offending overall, her Honour concluded that general deterrence was a significant consideration, that the applicant's offending was to be denounced, and that it was necessary for any sentence to recognise the harm done by the applicant to all three of his victims. [13]

THE APPLICANT'S SUBJECTIVE CASE

1. It was common ground that the applicant had pleaded guilty to all of the offences at the first available opportunity and was entitled to a discount of 25%. [14] Her Honour accepted that the applicant was entitled to a "measure of leniency" on account of the fact that he had no prior convictions. [15]
2. Other non-contentious aspects of the applicant's subjective case were summarised by the sentencing Judge as follows: [16] [The applicant] was born and raised in Australia with loving parents in a deeply religious Hindu family. He has a son aged eight. He has a strong work history. He is a type 1 diabetic and requires daily insulin injections. In a lengthy letter to the court [the applicant] set out a number of things, including what was happening for him when he committed the offences involving [KB] - he said that as a result of a relationship breakdown he was stressed and resorted to taking anabolic steroids and sleeping tablets. His sex drive was uncontrollable and his mood was unstable. … [The applicant] also explained some difficulties that he has experienced whilst being in custody. Being in the custodial environment has been a shocking experience for him. He has had some difficulties controlling his diabetes and a one stage he suffered some violence. Since his incarceration [the applicant] has done some courses and he is working. He says that he has come to appreciate that he needs psychological assistance. He has gained benefit from participation in regular psychological sessions. [The applicant] claims that when he was a child he was sexually assaulted by a family friend. He claimed that the person who said she assaulted him introduced him to voyeurism and all or most types of pornography.
3. Her Honour found that the applicant was genuinely remorseful, and took that fact into account in mitigation. [17] Her Honour also found that the applicant had "reasonably good prospects of rehabilitation", although she considered that there was more work to be done" in that regard. [18]
4. Tendered in that the applicant's case on sentence was a report of Dr Sidorov, Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist. In addressing the applicant's psychiatric history, Dr Sidorov recorded [19] that the applicant had reported that he had been diagnosed with Bipolar Affective Disorder by a psychiatrist in Bathurst Correctional Centre 2 to 3 months prior to Dr Sidorov's examination on 19 April 2020. Dr Sidorov went on to express the following opinion: [20] Based on the account presented by [the applicant] and a review of associated documents, he meets the diagnostic criteria for Substance-Induced Mood Disorder as per DSM-5. This is based on [the applicant's] history of substance use including anabolic steroids and cocaine that coincides with a history of mood instability of both low and high periods of mood that has caused significant impairment to occupational, social, and other areas of his functioning as well is contributing to him coming into contact with the criminal justice system.
5. Having expressed the further opinion [21] that the applicant also met the criteria for a substance use disorder (anabolic steroids and cocaine), Dr Sidorov went on to say: [22] It is possible that [the applicant] has an underlying primary mood disorder such as a Bipolar-type disorder or a depressive illness, particularly considering his family history of mood disorders. If he does have an underlying primary mood disorder, he may experience a relapse in symptoms in the absence of substance use and if he were to stop taking his prescribed psychotropic medications.
6. When the matter first came before the Court for sentence, her Honour raised an issue concerning Dr Sidorov's diagnoses in the course of the applicant giving evidence. This caused the sentence proceedings to be adjourned for the purposes of giving those representing the applicant the opportunity to consider the issue raised by her Honour and obtain further evidence. On the resumption of the proceedings some months later, the applicant tendered a report of Thea Gumbert, Psychologist.
7. As to the applicant's Bipolar disorder, Ms Gumbert recorded the following history: [23] In February 2020, [the applicant] reports he was diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder by a Justice Health psychiatrist (Dr Sue Morgan) and prescribed Latuda (lurasidone), a mood stabilising medication, 80mg nocte. He reports this has been effective in managing his symptoms and he feels "a lot more level headed". He also sees a psychologist every two or three weeks, which he reports has been helpful.
8. Ms Gumbert went on to express the following opinion: [24] Based on his self-report, [the applicant] would meet DSM-5 diagnostic criteria for Bipolar Disorder which is characterised by a history of both manic and depressive episodes. It is my understanding that he was formally diagnosed by a Justice Health psychiatrist, however his custodial records were not available for review and so this cannot be verified. He reports having responded well to mood-stabilising medication, resulting in successful management of manic episodes, albeit some persisting depressive symptoms.
9. Ms Gumbert also expressed the opinion [25] that the applicant met the DSM-5 criteria for diagnosis of a voyeuristic disorder, and concurred with Dr Sidorov's diagnosis of a substance use disorder. [26] Ms Gumbert also "acknowledged" what she described as Dr Sidorov's "potentially additional" diagnosis of a substance induced mood disorder. [27]
10. Having reviewed the entirety of the expert evidence in detail [28] the sentencing Judge reached the following conclusion in relation to the applicant's psychological issues: [29] I have grave reservations about the veracity of [the applicant's] evidence as to symptoms of bipolar disorder. I do not accept it, even on the balance of probabilities. I am not convinced, even on balance, that if it existed at all it played any role in his offending. I do accept, on balance that his offending is best explained by voyeuristic tendencies for which he never sought treatment, and for which his moral culpability should not and will not be reduced. I accept that his libido would have increased by his use of steroids. That is not a mitigating factor.
11. Her Honour expressly addressed issues of accumulation, and the need to apply the principle of totality. [30] In terms of the offending in sequences 2/91, 3/91, 4/91 and 8/91, her Honour concluded [31] that a "fairly high degree of concurrency" was required, but recognised the necessity for some accumulation in order to reflect the separate and discrete criminality which was involved in those separate episodes of offending. In terms of the offending in sequences 3/53 and 4/53, her Honour concluded [32] that a greater degree of accumulation was appropriate.
12. Finally, her Honour made a finding [33] of special circumstances in favour of the applicant, adopting a ratio of 63%. The primary basis of that finding was that the applicant would require a longer period on parole in order to be able to successfully reintegrate into the community. [34]

Submissions of the applicant

1. Counsel for the applicant did not assert specific error on the part of the sentencing Judge in support of the proposition that the sentence was manifestly excessive. Counsel relied on two matters which, he submitted, were indicative of manifest excess.
2. The first stemmed from the sentencing judge's application of the 25% discount following the applicant's pleas of guilty, in respect of which counsel advanced two submissions. First, he submitted that the undiscounted aggregate sentence reflected a starting point of 14 years and 8 months imprisonment, and that this was indicative of a manifestly excessive sentence. Secondly, he submitted that the starting point for the indicative sentences imposed for the offending in each of sequences 3/91, 8/91 and 4/53 reflected that "the 25% discount was not properly applied by the sentencing judge". [35] Counsel submitted that in each case, the undiscounted sentence incorporated "figures that may seem unusual if the applicant had received the full benefit of the 25% discount" and that "even allowing for some rounding of the figures ….. this is suggestive that the 25% discount was not properly applied by the sentencing judge". [36]
3. Secondly, counsel relied on sentences imposed in other cases which, he submitted, demonstrated the manifest excess of the sentence which was imposed on the applicant. Those cases were Samadi v R; Djait v R, [37] Zahorsky v R, [38] Shi v R [39] and DL v R. [40]

Submissions of the Crown

1. As to the applicant's first complaint, the Crown submitted that any discount applied to reflect a plea of guilty is to be applied to the indicative sentence and not the aggregate sentence. It was submitted that the applicant's approach, involving as it did focussing upon the undiscounted aggregate sentence, was inconsistent with principle.
2. The Crown further submitted that the proposition that her Honour's application of the discount had yielded "unusual figures" in three particular instances overlooked the fact that the sentencing of an offender involves a process of instinctive synthesis.
3. Finally, the Crown addressed, in considerable detail, each of the cases relied upon by the applicant for comparative purposes. Having done so, the Crown submitted that each was distinguishable from the present case on various bases, to the point where none of them provided any support for the conclusion that the sentence was manifestly excessive.

CONSIDERATION

1. The ground of appeal which is relied upon requires the applicant to establish that the sentence imposed was unreasonable or plainly unjust. [41] Before addressing the specific matters relied upon by counsel for the applicant in support of such a conclusion, it is appropriate to make three general observations.
2. First, the entirety of the applicant's offending involved, in varying degrees, an intrusive interference upon the personal intimate integrity of the three victims. As the sentencing judge properly pointed out, the offending required the imposition of a stern sentence in order to ensure that effect was given to the principle of general deterrence, and also to ensure that predatory and exploitative behaviour of this kind. [42]
3. Secondly, the seriousness with which Parliament views the applicant's offending is reflected in the prescribed maximum penalties which operate as a sentencing guidepost or yardstick. [43] In particular, the offending in sequence 8/91 carries a maximum penalty of 25 years. Other than offences for which a maximum penalty of life imprisonment is prescribed, a maximum penalty of 25 years imprisonment is the highest available determinate sentence for which provision is made in the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). [44]
4. Thirdly, the applicant's subjective case was unremarkable. He was entitled to (and received) a discount of 25% to recognise his pleas of guilty which were entered at the first available opportunity. Her Honour made favourable findings as to his remorse and prospects of rehabilitation, and also reached what might be regarded as a generous finding of special circumstances, as a consequence of which the ratio between the total sentence and the non-parole period was reduced to one of 63%.
5. In terms of the specific matters relied upon by counsel for the applicant, the sentencing judge's application of the discount of 25% to each of the indicative sentences was entirely correct, and consistent with authority. [45] An approach to a complaint of manifest excess which involves considering the undiscounted aggregate sentence is contrary to principle. In adopting such an approach, counsel for the applicant relied on the judgment of Brereton JA in Chartres-Abbott. [46] In that case, his Honour acknowledged what he described as the "prevailing view" that a discount for a plea of guilty is to be applied to the indicative, rather than the aggregate, sentence. However, he expressed the view that it did not follow that, for the purpose of comparison with other cases, an approach which considered an undiscounted aggregate sentence was impermissible.
6. In this respect, Wilson J made the following observations in BB: [47] I do not understand Brereton JA to be contradicting the long and well-considered line of authority ….. as to the requirement for any discount on sentence to be applied to the indicative sentences in cases where an aggregate sentence is imposed. To the extent that his Honour found it useful in the matter there under appeal to determine a presumed starting point of sentence by increasing the aggregate sentence by the discount announced, the same approach is not helpful in this matter. Indeed, having regard to the obligation on a sentencing court to consider at least notionally questions of concurrency and accumulation in determining an aggregate sentence which properly reflects the overall criminality, it is difficult to see how it could be useful in many sentencing appeals, to aid in making comparison with other cases or otherwise.
7. It is not necessary to consider, much less attempt to resolve, any tension between the approach of Brereton JA and that adopted by Wilson J in BB, and in the authorities to which her Honour referred. It is sufficient to note that in the circumstances of the present case, and even if the approach adopted by counsel for the applicant were permissible, it is of no utility given the conclusions I have reached regarding the cases which were relied upon by the applicant for comparative purposes.
8. The submission that the starting point for the indicative sentences for the offending in sequences 3/91, 8/91 and 4/53 reflected the adoption of "unusual figures" which, in turn, reflected manifest excess, is without merit. Such a submission entirely overlooks the fact that sentencing an offender involves a process of instinctive synthesis and would, if accepted, have the effect of reducing the process of sentencing an offender to little more than a mathematical exercise.
9. As to the previous cases which were relied upon, it is important to emphasise the important concessions which were properly made by counsel for the applicant, [48] namely that: 1. the objective circumstances of the offending in each of those cases was different to those in the present case; 2. some of the sentences were imposed following a plea of guilty, and some were imposed following a trial; and 3. the personal circumstances of each of the offenders were distinguishable from those of the applicant.
10. Those concessions are significant given the principles which govern this Court when asked to undertake a comparative exercise of this nature. Those principles include the following.
11. First, whilst careful comparison of the outcome of a previous case may assist the Court, [49] it remains the case that the individual circumstances of each case must be examined. [50]
12. Secondly, such an exercise is to be undertaken with a degree of caution. [51]
13. Thirdly, whilst a history of sentencing can establish a range of sentences that have been imposed, that history does not establish that any such range is the correct one, nor does it establish the upper and lower limits of such range, or otherwise fix the boundaries within which future judges must, or even ought to, sentence. [52]
14. Fourthly, when considering past sentences, it is only by examination of the whole of the circumstances that have given rise to the sentence that unifying principles may be discerned. [53]
15. Finally, what is sought in sentencing is consistency in the application of principle, not numerical equivalence. [54]
16. I have considered each of the cases relied upon by the applicant. In light of the concessions made, I do not propose to engage in a lengthy analysis of them. The obvious distinctions which can be drawn between each of them and the circumstances of the present case, both objective and subjective, lead me to the view that they provide no support for the proposition that the sentence imposed on the applicant is manifestly excessive. I am fortified in that view by the following: 1. the offending in sequence 8/91, of itself, carried a maximum penalty of 25 years imprisonment; 2. the offending in sequences 2/91 and 3/91 each carried a maximum penalty of 14 years imprisonment with a standard non-parole of 7 years imprisonment; 3. a Form 1 offence was attached to the offending in sequence 3/19, which required the sentence imposed for that offending to be increased; 4. the sentencing judge properly recognised that in imposing sentence for the offending in sequences 2/91 and 3/91 (they being the counts of sexual intercourse without consent) it was necessary to recognise that such offending was entirely separate to the offending in sequence 8/91 of causing KB to take an intoxicating substance; [55] 5. the sentencing judge properly had regard to the fact that general deterrence had a significant role to play and that it was necessary that any sentence properly denounce the applicant's offending; and 6. the sentencing judge properly took into account the matters relied upon by the applicant in his subjective case in a way which (but for the application of the discount for the pleas of guilty) were not the subject of any complaint before this Court.
17. For all of these reasons, the ground of appeal has not been made out.

ORDERS

1. I propose the following orders: 1. Leave to appeal granted. 2. Appeal dismissed.

Endnotes

1. [2021] NSWCCA at 239 [23].
2. (1998) 194 CLR 610; [1998] HCA 57.
3. At [45].
4. [2014] NSWCCA 297 at [39].
5. Postiglione v The Queen (1997) 189 CLR 295 at 303 to 304; [1997] HCA 26; Kelly v R [2017] NSWCCA 256 at [30] and Clarke v R [2021] NSWCCA 248.
6. AB 62 - AB 67.
7. AB 31 - AB 33.
8. AB 32.
9. See for example Doe v R [2013] NSWCCA 248 at [54] per Bellew J, Hoeben CJ at CL and Johnson J agreeing; Lee v R [2016] NSWCCA 66 at [44] per McCallum J (as her Honour then was), Basten JA and Davies J agreeing.
10. AB 32.
11. AB 32 - AB 33.
12. AB 15.
13. AB 35.
14. AB 20.
15. AB 24.
16. AB 24 - 25.
17. AB 33.
18. AB 34.
19. AB 102.
20. AB 106 - 107.
21. AB 106 - 107.
22. AB 107.
23. AB 137 - AB 138.
24. AB 146.
25. AB 146.
26. AB 146.
27. AB 146.
28. Commencing at AB 28.
29. AB 30.
30. AB 35.
31. AB 35.
32. AB 35.
33. AB 35 - 36.
34. AB 36.
35. Applicant's written submissions at [22]-[23].
36. Applicant's written submissions at [22] - [23].
37. [2008] NSWCCA 330.
38. [2013] NSWCCA 268.
39. [2020] NSWCCA 250.
40. [2020] NSWCCA 164.
41. Dinsdale v The Queen [2000] 202 CLR 321; [2000] HCA 54 at 325; for a convenient summary of the principles see Vaiusu v R [2007] NSWCCA 71.
42. Greenwood v R [2014] NSWCCA 64 at [31] - [32]; Samadi v R; Djait v R [2008] NSWCCA 330 at [158].
43. Markarian v The Queen [2005] 228 CLR 357.
44. R v Reyes [2005] NSWCCA 218.
45. See for example BB v R [2021] NSWCCA 283 at [64]-[66] per Wilson J (Bathurst CJ and Wright J agreeing) and the authorities cited therein.
46. At [23].
47. At [68].
48. Applicant's written submissions at [26].
49. Moodie v R [2020] NSWCCA 160 at [83]; Smith v R [2020] NSWCCA 181 at [78]; [90]-[91].
50. Smith at [78].
51. Hili v The Queen; Jones v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520; [2010] HCA 45 at [53]-[55].
52. Hili at [55].
53. Hili at [55].
54. Hili at [18].
55. See Zahorsky v R [2013] NSWCCA 286 at [59].

Amendments 23 September 2022 - [6] first sentence - "...aggregate sentence included different sentences" amended to read "...aggregate sentence included different offences" DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 23 September 2022