IRT DECISION
8 The Tribunal summarised the criteria which must be satisfied under the Regulations before a Class 816 visa can be granted as follows:
"1. Age, not turned 45 before 1 November 1993, (816.72(1)(a)(ii)).
2. Qualifications/work experience/enrolment in accredited course (816.721(2)) or business interest (816.721(3)).
3. Refugee Application or class 435 or 443 entry permit on or before 1 November 1993 (816.721(4) or (6)).
4. Presence in Australia (816.722, 816.723).
5. Date of grant of visa prior to 12 March 1992 and arrival in Australia prior to 1 November 1993 (816.724) (subject to some exceptions).
6. Ability to communicate in English (816.732).
7. Public interest criteria (816.734).
Criteria 1 to 5 are to be satisfied at the time of application, while 6 and 7 are to be satisfied at the date of decision."
9 It summarised the criteria which must be satisfied under the Regulations before a Class 818 visa can be granted as follows:
"1. Age (818.721(1)(a)).
2. Academic/Skill (818.721(2), (3), (4) or (5)).
3. Applicant not received financial assistance from the Commonwealth or other government (818.722).
4. Date of grant of visa and arrival in Australia (818.723).
5. Presence in Australia (818.724).
6. Public interest criteria (818.732).
Criteria 1 to 5 are to be satisfied at the time of application, while 6 is to be assessed at time of decision."
10 In relation to the applicant's claim for a class 816 entry permit the Tribunal found that he did not meet Australian standards for a trade on 1 November 1993 because it did not accept that the applicant held an overseas trade qualification or had work experience, assessed as meeting Australian education or training standards for any of the trades relied upon as at 1 November 1993.
11 In relation to the applicant's claim for a class 818 entry permit the Tribunal found that the applicant did not meet any of the educational requirements set out in Part 818.721(2) through to 818.721(5).
GROUNDS OF REVIEW
12 In the written application, the applicant claimed relief under s 476(1)(e) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act"). Particulars of that claim, in summary, are that
(a) The Tribunal incorrectly claimed the applicant had only raised trade qualifications as a cook at the oral hearing and drew an adverse inference from this.
(b) The Tribunal failed to refer in its reasons to all of the affidavit material and the evidence provided by the applicant.
(c) The Tribunal allowed insufficient time to provide the further evidence it required and refused to hear the oral evidence of a particular witness, namely the applicant's mother.
(d) The Tribunal failed to accept the grounds on which the DTEC Trade certification, as an Indian cook, was granted.
13 At the hearing, the applicant sought to amend the application to allege procedural errors, under s 476(1)(a) relying on the same particulars. Leave was granted.
PROCEDURAL ERRORS
14 As the provisions indicate, the Tribunal in a case such as this is required to be satisfied that the applicant had, at the relevant time i.e. prior to 1 November 1993, either an overseas trade qualification or relevant work experience. In relation to Indian cooking, the trade ultimately relied on in this case, only the latter is relevant because the qualification relied on was acquired in 1998.
15 The Tribunal was required to consider material before it which was relevant to the applicant's work experience as an Indian Cook prior to 1 November 1993. The applicant's 1998 TAFE test result is not evidence of such work experience and failure to accept the grounds on which the DTEC Trade certification was granted, does not of itself amount to an error of law.
16 The applicant has argued the Tribunal had wrongly concluded that the application in so far as it relied on work experience as a cook, was only made at the hearing and subsequently the Tribunal drew an adverse inference from this fact. The reference to this matter in the reasons for decision is somewhat ambiguous and reveals a degree of scepticism, however no adverse inference was, in fact, made in relation to this issue. In light of this conclusion the respondent submission that, in any event, such an adverse inference was open to the Tribunal, had it cared to make it, because this claim, prepared by an expert migration agent, had been on foot for four years before this particular claim was made has no relevance.
17 The Tribunal did, however, express dissatisfaction with the evidence provided to it in relation to work experience as a cook. At the hearing the Tribunal asked for evidence from the employer or documentary evidence to support the applicant's claim. The applicant declined to provide evidence from his former employer who is resident in Australia because, the employer a Mr Singh was not aware of his current immigration status and he feared exposure. Consequently only a general affidavit from Mr Singh prepared for TAFE, to support the cookery qualification was provided to the Tribunal. This affidavit did not address the specific work experience. By letter dated 24 June 1998 (folio 52) the Tribunal sought further material in the following terms.
"The Tribunal seeks further evidence in relation to Mr Shandil's experience and training as a Cook prior to 1 November 1993. This evidence could include any or all of the following:
(1) Details of the restaurant where Mr Shandil worked for Mr Singh from 1983 - 1987 including letterhead, menus, employment records, accounting records, payment receipts or other relevant materials.
(2) Evidence of any training provided to Mr Shandil either by Mr Sing or anyone else.
This evidence if available and any further submissions you may wish to make should be provided within 14 days of the date of this letter. After 14 days the Tribunal will proceed to a decision."
18 This material was not provided within the specified time, or later (the decision not being made until September 1998). The applicant claims this required timetable amounted to procedural error because it was "unreasonable and impossible to perform what was required within the time permitted".
19 This submission is not sustainable on the facts of this case. The former employer was always available to give this evidence either in writing or orally. The applicant chose not to provide it in this way for personal reasons. In any event the time provided for alternative ways to provide the evidence was, in all the circumstances, reasonable.
20 The applicant further submits that the failure to hear oral evidence from the applicant's mother as a supplement to her affidavit evidence amounts to procedural error. The Tribunal preferred to take this evidence by means of a statutory declaration. It is noted that the applicant did not take advantage of the procedures provided by ss 361 and 362 of the Act in respect of calling witnesses. However, even if he had done so these provisions do not require the Tribunal to comply with any requests made to call witnesses there being no duty on the Tribunal to call oral evidence at all. Its failure to do so in this case does not in my view amount to an error of law.
21 Finally the applicant submits that the Tribunal did not accept the grounds on which the TAFE Craft Certificate in Indian Cooking was granted as determining the issue of work experience. The full application made to TAFE was not provided to the Tribunal. Only the statutory declarations by Mr Singh and Mr Naidu were provided and they were in general terms without details of actual work experience. The conclusions of the TAFE examiner are not binding on the Tribunal. It is required to come to its own conclusions as to the level of the applicant's work experience. Indeed the respondent submitted that merely accepting the TAFE Certificate without being aware of the whole basis for its grant, might, of itself, amount to legal error. I agree with that submission. The Tribunal is obliged to consider the merits of each individual case before it and must be satisfied that the criteria laid down in the regulations are fulfilled.
22 In Tanchiatco v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 77 FCR 298, Branson J said, when considering the proper construction of cl 816.721(2)(b)(ii) at 300:
"… The proper construction of cl 816.721(2)(b)(ii) is not easily identified. A literal construction of cl 816.721(b)(ii) would lead to the conclusion that the expression "that trade" refers to the trade to which the "overseas trade qualification" referred to in the opening words of subpar (ii) relates; there is no other mention of a trade in the subparagraph to which the word "that" can be seen to refer. Against this literal approach can be advanced arguments based on utility and apparent purpose. Such arguments might suggest, although it was not so suggested in this case, that ambiguity has crept into the subparagraph as a result of its contracted form. That is, that expressed in an expanded form, it would read:
(2)(b)(ii) A. held an overseas trade qualification that is assessed as meeting Australian education or training standards for that trade; or
B. had work experience [presumably whether in Australia or overseas or part in Australia and part overseas] that is assessed as meeting Australian education or training standards for that trade."
23 In such expanded form it is easier to construe the reference to "that trade", so far as the work experience aspect of the subparagraph is concerned, as meaning the trade in which the applicant had work relevant experience.
24 This approach was approved by the Full Court in Azarcon v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 145.
25 Applied in this case, it requires that the Tribunal first be satisfied as to the relevant work experience of this applicant. Only then would the question of whether this experience met Australian standards arise.
26 The Tribunal considered the material provided to it by the applicant, conducted a hearing and then gave a further opportunity to the applicant to provide additional material which would be evidence of the required work experience. The Tribunal concluded, as it was entitled to do, that it was not satisfied, on having considered all of the material actually provided to it, as to that issue. None of the matters raised as procedural errors have any substance. The relevant evidence of Mr Singh, the applicant's former employer, was not provided for reasons given by the applicant. The other evidence was not sufficient to convince the Tribunal as to the issue of work experience. There are, in my view, no demonstrated errors of procedure or law in the conduct of the case or the conclusions drawn.