//
© 2026 Zoe. All rights reserved.
Zoe is a legal information platform. Always consult the Federal Register of Legislation for authoritative text.
[2012] NSWSC 351
plaintiff. Bail granted.
No linked legislation citations have been extracted yet.
The Court accepted that the charges were serious and that several matters raised a real concern that Shalala might not appear if released. But he wanted to represent himself, and the judge found he could not prepare that defence in prison because he lacked workable access to the recordings and meaningful legal library facilities. In that particular situation, the judge granted bail. The judgment does not establish that inadequate prison facilities automatically require bail; it records the outcome on the evidence and statutory framework before Hulme J.
AI-generated legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Check the cited source, and for advice about your situation consult a qualified Australian lawyer.
2,149 words · generated 28/09/2026
In Shalala v R [2012] NSWSC 351, Hulme J considered Alec Shalala's application for bail. The judgment records that Shalala had been arrested on 8 December 2010 and charged with alleged amphetamine supplies occurring between 12 November and 6 December 2010. The charges included ongoing supply under s 25A of the and an aggregated charge of supplying a large commercial quantity, carrying a maximum penalty of life imprisonment (paragraph 1).
The prosecution evidence relied substantially on video and audio surveillance obtained during a controlled operation involving an undercover police operative and another person assisting police (paragraph 2). The judge described the evidence presented on the bail application as “at least very strong” (paragraph 3). Shalala nevertheless wished to contest the charges, including on the basis that the police conduct was improper or unauthorised under the Law Enforcement (Controlled Operations) Act 1997. He also wanted to review the recordings, which the Crown representative said amounted to something like ten DVDs (paragraph 5).
Shalala had decided to represent himself after becoming dissatisfied with a legal aid lawyer. Hulme J recognised that self-representation was a right, but emphasised that exercising it effectively required an opportunity to present a case and practical facilities to review the recordings and consult a legal library (paragraph 6).
The difficulty was access. Shalala described making repeated requests for computers and library access at several correctional centres. He said that computer access was limited and that, on at least one occasion, the DVDs could not be played on the supplied computer or the audio did not work (paragraphs 7-8). The Crown sought a response from Corrective Services, but the response was not an official answer to the specific complaints. It stated only that there was no indication Shalala had been denied computer access at any centre (paragraph 9). The judge also noted the history of transfers between gaols and court appearances, and that the committal proceedings remained far from complete (paragraph 11).
The Court granted bail. The result did not follow because the judge considered the charges or attendance risks minor. On the contrary, the judgment expressly identified serious reasons against release. The decisive circumstance was the finding that Shalala was effectively unable to prepare his case while in custody (paragraphs 19-22).
The Court addressed the statutory framework first. It said that the large-commercial-quantity charge fell within s 8A of the Crimes Act 1900 and that s 8A(2) required an accused person to satisfy the Court that bail should not be refused. The judge described the threshold, by reference to authorities not named in the judgment extract, as high (paragraph 13). He then summarised the relevant considerations under s 32 of the Bail Act 1978: the likelihood of appearing in court, the applicant's interests, and protection and welfare of the community (paragraph 14). The judgment also observed that the statutory provisions restricted which matters could be considered in assessing those topics (paragraph 15).
Several matters weighed against bail. The judge referred to a Western Australian arrest warrant, an intercepted conversation in which Shalala allegedly admitted leaving Queensland after being granted bail and not returning, and the incentive to abscond that might arise from the sentence if convicted of the most serious charge. Considering the permissible matters, Hulme J found an appreciable risk that Shalala would try to disappear (paragraph 16). Shalala pointed out that he had not failed to appear in New South Wales despite facing other charges there, and the judge recorded that submission (paragraph 17).
The seriousness of the charges also weighed against release in the community-protection assessment. The judge considered whether Shalala's criminal record added weight, but concluded that statutory restrictions prevented him from using the record for that purpose in the way suggested. He also declined to find that Shalala was likely to commit other offences during the limited period for which bail would operate (paragraph 18). These passages matter because they show the judge did not overlook the adverse circumstances. He treated them within the statutory limits as he understood them.
The countervailing consideration concerned Shalala's interests and his ability to prepare a defence. The judge found that he could not prepare while incarcerated because prison authorities had not provided equipment on which he could view or listen to the recorded evidence, and nothing suggested their approach would change (paragraph 19). He also found that there had been scant provision of significant library facilities. Although there was a library at the Metropolitan Remand and Reception Centre, staffing reductions meant access was practically unavailable unless an officer could be spared to supervise him (paragraphs 20-21).
The judge's conclusion was carefully expressed: the statutory threshold and the significance of the other relevant matters meant that, in the normal course, he would have unhesitatingly refused bail. But Shalala was entitled to prepare his case, and was effectively prevented from doing so in custody. Hulme J therefore said he felt “constrained” to grant bail (paragraph 22). The judgment's reasoning is thus tied to the combination of the applicable statutory framework, the specific evidence about access, and the effect of that access problem on preparation of this self-represented defence.
The judgment describes the legal framework applicable to the application in 2012. Its account is that s 8A(2) of the Crimes Act 1900 imposed a high threshold for bail on the large-commercial-quantity charge, while s 32 of the Bail Act 1978 set out the relevant bail considerations and restricted the matters that could be considered (paragraphs 13-15). It does not reproduce the full text of those provisions or identify the authorities said to establish the high threshold.
The decision applies that framework to the prison-access evidence before Hulme J. It does not announce a rule that every accused person denied particular equipment or library access must be released. Its reasoning is more specific: the judge found that this applicant was effectively unable to prepare his case while detained, that the facilities in question were important to the defence he wished to present, and that there was no indication the position would change (paragraphs 5-6, 19-22).
The judgment itself does not discuss amendments to bail legislation, later statutory regimes, or the continuing status of the provisions it cites. Accordingly, this analysis describes the law as the judgment stated it in 2012 and does not establish the law currently in force. The extract also contains no cited prior cases and no later cases. It therefore does not provide a basis for describing a broader “before and after” doctrinal shift or the decision's present precedential status.
At paragraph 6, Hulme J states that self-representation is a right, but that effective use of it requires an opportunity to present the case and facilities to review the DVDs and use a legal library. In plain English, the judgment distinguishes having the formal ability to appear without a lawyer from having practical means to prepare for that role.
At paragraph 19, the judge says it is “impossible to avoid the conclusion” that Shalala could not prepare his case in custody. The stated reason is the lack of a computer or other equipment to view or listen to the recorded evidence, together with the absence of any sign that Corrective Services' position would change. This is a factual finding based on the material before the Court, not a general statement about every prisoner's access arrangements.
At paragraph 21, the judgment explains why the existence of a library at the MRRC did not resolve the problem: staffing cutbacks made it practically inaccessible unless an officer could be spared to supervise Shalala. The practical availability of a facility, rather than its mere physical existence, was therefore relevant to the judge's assessment.
Paragraph 22 contains the core reasoning. The judge says that, in the normal course, the statutory threshold and the relevant adverse considerations would have led him to refuse bail. He then states that Shalala was entitled to prepare his case and was effectively prevented from doing so in custody, concluding that he felt constrained to grant bail. In plain English, the Court treated the inability to prepare as sufficiently important in the circumstances to alter the outcome despite serious concerns about release.
Finally, paragraph 23 addresses a possible consequence of release: the Crown had fairly advised the Court of the possibility that Shalala would be re-arrested under a Western Australian warrant. The judge said that a further bail application might then be necessary and that Shalala could request urgent referral to him. This passage concerns the anticipated procedural situation, rather than the principal reason for granting bail.
The judgment is most directly relevant to a fact pattern where an accused person seeks to represent themselves, important prosecution material is held in a format requiring specific equipment to review, and the person cannot obtain usable access to that material while detained. The connection is explicit in paragraphs 5-6 and 19: Shalala wanted to examine recordings central to the Crown case, and the judge found that the available arrangements did not allow him to do so.
The decision also involved repeated access requests, reported technical failures, difficulty obtaining library access and an official response that did not directly resolve the detailed complaints (paragraphs 7-10, 19-21). Those details formed the evidentiary context for the judge's finding. The judgment does not state that any one of them, taken alone, would necessarily have produced the same result.
Other important features were the ongoing committal proceedings, the apparent significance of the recordings to the prosecution case, the applicant's wish to challenge the legality of the controlled operation, and the judge's view that there was no indication the facilities position would change (paragraphs 5, 11, 19). The bail application also involved substantial opposing factors: a serious charge, a potential life maximum, an appreciable perceived risk of absconding and a relevant statutory threshold (paragraphs 1, 13, 16, 18, 22).
The judgment should therefore be read as a fact-sensitive decision about the interaction between bail and the practical ability to prepare a defence in custody. It does not say that prison access complaints automatically satisfy a bail threshold, nor that self-representation itself requires release. The judge's conclusion rested on his findings about the actual effect of the facilities problem and the statutory considerations applying to this application.
The supplied judgment text contains no citations to other decisions and provides no information about later judicial treatment. It would therefore be unsupported to say that a later court followed, applied, distinguished, approved or rejected Shalala v R. The judgment's citation list and reasons, as provided, do not establish its subsequent treatment.
For legal research purposes, the decision can be described from this source as a 2012 NSW Supreme Court bail ruling in which the applicant's inability to prepare a self-represented defence contributed decisively to the grant of bail despite adverse statutory and factual considerations. Whether later courts have treated that reasoning as binding, persuasive, limited to its facts, or overtaken by legislative change cannot be determined from the supplied material. This section does not imply that no later treatment exists; it records only the limits of the source provided here.
The judgment does not set out the full text of ss 8A and 32 or name the authorities underlying its statement that the bail threshold was high. The extract therefore leaves open precisely how those provisions were framed in full and what reasoning the unnamed authorities contributed (paragraphs 13-15).
The evidence about access was contested or at least incomplete. Shalala described specific problems and repeated requests, while the response from Corrective Services was informal and said there was no indication he had been denied computer access (paragraphs 7-10). The judge nevertheless made findings about the practical inability to prepare and the lack of significant library access (paragraphs 19-21). The judgment does not explain the operational details of each request, the equipment available at each centre, or what other possible arrangements had been considered.
The decision also does not state the bail conditions imposed, if any, or the full terms of the grant. Its final paragraph raises the possibility of re-arrest under a Western Australian warrant and a further application, but the extract does not report whether that occurred (paragraph 23).
Finally, the text does not address later legislative changes or later case law. Those questions would require sources beyond this judgment. A lawyer assessing the decision's present relevance would need to check the current statutory framework and subsequent authorities rather than assuming the 2012 provisions or analysis remain unchanged.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before you act on this, rely on it, or use any draft, get a qualified Australian lawyer to check it.
Judgment 1RS HULME J: Alec Shalala was arrested on 8 December 2010 on charges of supplying, on a number of occasions between 12 November and 6 December 2010, amphetamines. On two occasions, the amounts said to have been supplied were approximately 450 g. He has also been charged under s 25A of the Drugs (Misuse and Trafficking) Act 1985 with ongoing supply. The individual amounts supplied have been aggregated and the subject of a further charge of supplying a large commercial quantity of amphetamines. The maximum penalty prescribed for that offence is life imprisonment. 2The evidence against him was obtained in large part by video and audio surveillance in the course of a controlled operation involving a police undercover operative and another person who was assisting police at the time. 3The evidence against Mr Shalala, at least as presented to me during this application - and it includes extracts from the transcripts of statements by Mr Shalala apparently recorded on listening devices - is, if not compelling, at least very strong. Further evidence of his guilt is afforded by a statement he made and which is recorded on the transcript when this matter first came before me on 22 March last. That statement was as follows:- If I may say one more thing. The thing is, the person that supplied the drugs himself has been on bail from two weeks after his arrest and my co-accused has been on bail now for three months and I'm the only one left in here and I had the smallest part involved in this whole thing. 4Mr Shalala has an extensive criminal record which commenced in 1970 when he was but 17 and includes offences of robbery (for the first of which he was sentenced to 9 years penal servitude), the supply of a prohibited drug (for which he was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment) and a further offence of supply a prohibited drug (for which, in 1998, he was sentenced to 7 years imprisonment). 5Despite the strength of the Crown case, Mr Shalala desires to defend the charges against him. It seems clear that, at least in large part, he wishes to do so on the basis that the conduct of the police was improper and not authorised by or pursuant to the Law Enforcement (Controlled Operations) Act 1997. Nevertheless, he wishes also to review the content of the recordings upon which the Crown relies. Those recordings consist of, according to the representative of the Crown in these proceedings, something of the order of 10 DVDs or the like. Mr Shalala also desires to conduct his defence himself in consequence of dissatisfaction with a legal aid lawyer who appeared for him for a time. 6Appearing for himself is a right Mr Shalala has. However, to effectively exercise that right he has to have opportunity to present his case and opportunity and facilities with which to listen or view the content of the DVDs and which would seem to form a very large part, and perhaps the strongest part, of the evidence against him. He also wishes access to a legal library and clearly any defence based on impropriety of the police or actions which were in law unauthorised would need some access to such a library. 7On the evidence before me, Mr Shalala has made numerous requests of gaol authorities for access to computers and a library. He has also complained to two magistrates about being denied such access and it appears at least one of these has publicly endorsed Mr Shalala's request. Nevertheless, according to Mr Shalala, computers have been made available to him for only a very limited time and on at least one occasion, the format of the DVDs was inaccessible to the computer provided and another had no working audio. 8When Mr Shalala's application first came before me on 22 March last and it became apparent what his primary complaint was, I adjourned the proceedings inviting Mr Shalala to provide some specificity to the Crown as to his complaints in order that the Crown might obtain a response from Corrective Services. Mr Shalala provided specificity in a letter of 26 March 2012 which was forwarded on to Corrective Services. He specified that he had made four applications at the MRRC, three at Nowra, five at Parklea and two at Long Bay. 9Mr Stainer, appearing for the Crown on this application, provided a copy of that letter to Corrective Services, pursued the obtaining of a response and was assured on 4 and 11 April 2012 that one would be forthcoming. Ultimately, after four further calls to the Commissioner's office yesterday, a response was received in the following terms:- Unfortunately, Corrective Services NSW is unable to provide an official response to your letter in regards to inmate Shalala. At this point in time, I have been informally advised that there was no indication that the inmate had been denied computer access at any of the centres. 10In an earlier letter which Mr Shalala provided on 22 March 2012 during the hearing before me, he had made somewhat similar but more limited complaints. His complaints were endorsed by Corrective Services officers on that letter. 11Since Mr Shalala's arrest, he has been moved some nine times from one gaol to another. He has had court appearances either in person or via video link on 14 occasions prior to his bail application coming before me on 22 March. His committal proceedings are a long way from being finished. Certainly, one must accept that that latter situation is probably in part due to Mr Shalala's desire to challenge the controlled operation and to obtain from the police or other authorities documents which may provide a basis for this. 12Nevertheless, the result is entirely unsatisfactory. 13A charge of the supply of a large commercial quantity of drugs falls within s 8A of the Crimes Act 1900 and sub-section (2) of that section provides that a person so accused is not to be granted bail unless the person satisfies the Court that bail should not be refused. Authorities indicate that that imposes a high threshold. 14Otherwise, the matters to which I may have regard are stated exhaustively in s 32 of that Act and, so far as is presently relevant, may be summarised as follows:- (a) the probability of whether or not the person will appear in court; (b) the interests of the person; and (c) the protection and welfare of the community. 15The section requires that in making a judgment in relation to those topics, regard may be had to only specified matters, but I do not see it as necessary to detail those here. 16I am informed that a warrant for Mr Shalala's arrest has been issued in Western Australia. In an extract from one of the intercepted telephone conversations, Mr Shalala is recorded as admitting to a serious offence in Queensland many years ago, that he was there given bail, took off and never went back. The sentence he is likely to receive if convicted of the more serious of the charges against him is such as to provide an incentive to not appear if admitted to bail and, when one has regard to the totality of the permissible matters in that connection, one is forced to the conclusion that there is certainly an appreciable risk that Mr Shalala will seek to disappear. 17On the other hand, he makes the point that, despite numerous charges in New South Wales, some obviously rendering him liable to substantial penalties, he has not failed to appear in New South Wales. 18The seriousness of the offences charged, one of the matters which I am entitled to take into account in making a judgment as to the protection and welfare of the community, clearly argues against bail being granted. One is tempted to say that the applicant's record adds weight to that argument but the illogical restrictions contained in s 32(1)(c) and s 32(2) mean that I cannot take his record into account in this connection. I am not prepared to find, despite Mr Shalala's record, that in the limited time for which any bail will operate he is during that period "likely to commit" other offences. 19I turn to Mr Shalala's interests. On the evidence before me, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that Mr Shalala is unable to prepare his case while incarcerated and this because the Corrective Services authorities have not provided him with a computer or other equipment on which to see or listen to the recorded evidence and there is nothing to suggest that their stance will change. 20On the evidence before me, it seems also that there has been scant provision of any significant library facilities to Mr Shalala. 21The evidence indicates, although there is a library at the MRRC where Mr Shalala is currently incarcerated, because of cut backs to prison staff, that library is practically inaccessible unless a Corrective Services officer can be spared at any particular time to supervise Mr Shalala. 22The terms of s 8A of the Bail Act 1978 and the significance of the matters referred to in paragraphs (a) and (c) of s 32(1) of that Act 1978 are such that in the normal course I would unhesitatingly have refused Mr Shalala's application for bail. However, he is entitled to prepare his case. Given that he is effectively being prevented from doing so whilst in custody by the attitude of the Corrective Services, I feel constrained to give him bail. 23There is one further matter to which I should refer. The Crown fairly advised me of the fact or at leas possibility that, if admitted to bail, Mr Shalala will be re-arrested pursuant to a warrant from Western Australia. Should that occur, Mr Shalala will presumably need to make another bail application. Given the history of the matter, he should feel free to request that it be referred to me to be dealt with as a matter of urgency.
DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 30 April 2012
SHALALA
R
Bail granted.