Sellick v Australian Postal Corporation
[2009] FCAFC 146
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Federal Court of Australia (Full Court)
Decision date
2009-10-15
Before
Buchanan J, Bennett J, Foster JJ, McKerracher JJ, Kerracher JJ
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (11 paragraphs)
MANSFIELD & McKERRACHER JJ: 1 We have had the benefit of reading the reasons for judgment of Buchanan J in this matter. We adopt his Honour's recital of the issues and the relevant material, and respectfully agree with the conclusions which he has reached that the appeal should be dismissed with costs. 2 There are two matters upon which we wish to add some additional comments. They relate to the application in so far as it concerns the shoulder injury to the applicant. 3 The error of law asserted by the applicant was that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the AAT) erred in concluding, based upon the judgment of Bennett J in Australian Postal Corporation v Sellick (2008) 101 ALD 245, that it was confined to determining whether the applicant was entitled to compensation in respect of soft tissue injury to his shoulder. That was the decision of the AAT: see Sellick v Australian Postal Corporation [2009] AATA 158 at [31]. In effect, the AAT concluded that it could not give consideration to what Bennett J at [71] of her reasons referred to as the "additional conditions", namely aggravation of a degenerative condition of the spine, and chronic strain of interspinous ligament. As indicated, we agree with Buchanan J that the AAT properly concluded that it was confined to consider whether the soft tissue injury to the right shoulder of the applicant had resolved. Her Honour considered that the scope of the decision reviewable by the AAT in respect of pain in the right shoulder was so limited, applying Lees v Comcare (1999) 56 ALD 84. 4 Senior counsel for the applicant contended that the applicant was placed in a difficult position because, although the applicant argued that Bennett J had fallen into error in confining the nature of the reviewable decision in that way, he was unable to appeal from her Honour's decision because, despite that asserted error, he accepted that the orders made by her Honour were correctly made because the reasons for the decision of the AAT in its initial decision of 1 March 2007 were inadequate. 5 Whilst it is not necessary to decide that question on this application, we do not wish to be seen as acceding to that proposition. The decision of the Full Court in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Telstra Corporation Ltd (2009) 256 ALR 615 suggests to the contrary. The Full Court (Ryan, Jacobson and Foster JJ) entertained an appeal from orders made at first instance, notwithstanding that the appeals in that case did not seek to disturb either the operative declaration or the orders made. That was because the orders made left open the effect of conclusions which, had they been expressed in some declaratory form, would have been available to be appealed from, and in the result, could have been set aside or varied: see at 621-2, [23]-[24] and at 629, [64]-[66]. Their Honours followed and applied the observations of Burchett J in Baxter Healthcare Pty Ltd v Comptroller-General of Customs (1997) 72 FCR 467 and the cases to which his Honour there referred. In Australian Telecommunications Commission v Colpitts (1986) 12 FCR 395 at 402, Toohey J with whom Fisher J agreed reached a similar conclusion in circumstances when the essential part of the reasoning is "embedded in" the formal judgment of the Court as well as the Court's reasons or is "implicit in the judgment and providing the only basis upon which his Honour could" decline to remit the matter. 6 Secondly, we note that the respondent, by senior counsel, indicated to the Court that, in the event that the applicant makes a fresh claim or claims with respect to the "additional conditions" referred to above, the respondents will not take any point that the applicant has not given adequate or proper notice of such claims. 7 There is something to be said for the proposition that the notice of injury initially given by the applicant, namely "pain in the right shoulder" was, by the subsequent presentation of various medical certificates and medical reports, sufficient to have constituted a claim that the pain in his right shoulder flowed either from soft tissue injury in the shoulder, or from aggravation of a degenerative spinal condition, or from chronic sprained interspinous ligament, or from a combination of those conditions: see eg the remarks of Madgwick J in Abrahams v Comcare (2006) 93 ALD 147 at [18] and at [21], and in Telstra Corporation Ltd v Hannaford (2006) 151 FCR 253 at [57]. They were matters addressed in the first AAT decision. However, that is not what was decided by Bennett J in the decision referred to in [3] above, and the AAT was bound to give effect to her Honour's conclusions, in the absence of any appeal from her Honour's orders. I certify that the preceding seven (7) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justices Mansfield and McKerracher.