consideration
34 It is common ground that a pleading enables a party to state with clarity a case to be met and that parties should not engage in fishing expeditions by reference to documents held by the other side in order to discover a defence (or a cross-claim) in a proceeding against them.
35 There are numerous cases in which discovery has been rejected because it amounts to a fishing expedition understood in this way: Lyons v Kern Konstruction (Townsville) Pty Ltd (1983) 70 FLR 135 discusses some of them. Fitzgerald J in that case considered a number of authorities in which discovery was allowed prior to pleading or particularisation of a pleading. In that case his Honour considered that insofar as discovery related to the allegations under consideration they were nothing but a fishing expedition. The pleading baldly alleged the state of mind of the defendant. His Honour said it was nothing but a bare allegation and there were no particulars to support it. There was therefore no basis upon which discovery about state of mind should be permitted.
36 But, as Fitzgerald J observed at 151, each case must be decided on its merits and particular circumstances. The ultimate object is to mould the Court's procedure to do justice between the parties. There are those cases where a party in its pleading particularises as far as it can go but it can go no further. The Court in such circumstances may well take the view that discovery to enable further particularisation is not in the nature of a fishing expedition. However, as his Honour noted at 151, even if a fishing investigation is not what is intended, the proper balance of the competing considerations may still require the Court to refuse early discovery.
37 In Trade Practices Commission v CC (New South Wales) Pty Limited (1995) 58 FCR 426, Lindgren J, at 438, confirmed that the fishing prohibition is designed to prevent the use of discovery for the purpose of ascertaining whether a case exists, as distinct from the purpose of compelling the production of documents where there is already some evidence that a case exists. His Honour recited what Brennan J said in WA Pines Pty Ltd v Bannerman (1980) 41 FLR 175 at 181 to the effect that what is required is that sufficient is shown to ground a suspicion that the party applying for discovery has a good case proof of which is likely to be aided by discovery, acknowledging that the distinction between fishing and non-fishing cases may be difficult.
38 Nexus contends that the position it finds itself in is that it has given all the particulars it can at this point on the "defects" claim and that, consistent with "good practice and good sense" as to which see Keshi v Firefly Press (Australia) Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 440; (2008) 246 ALR 166 at [25] (McKerracher J), it should receive discovery before delivering further particulars.
39 As noted, drawing a distinction between a fishing and non-fishing case may be difficult on occasions to draw. This, in my judgment, is one of those occasions. In some cases, such as Silver v Dome Resources NL [2004] NSWSC 266 (Silver), a decision on which Nexus relies, discovery was not considered a fishing expedition in relation to the particulars of an alleged contract because there was some evidence that a contract existed. In light of that fact and because the relevant documents were in the possession and power of the responding party, disclosure was required.
40 Here, it is true to say, as Nexus does, that it alleges defects and has particularised some of the defects it wishes to rely on. But it fears there may be more "defects" and will only be able to say if there is if it is permitted to have access to all of the applicant's documents. Presently it has identified a range of issues in Mr Harrison's report, although it is not entirely clear that Nexus is contending that each of the 143 matters listed constitutes a "defect" in the relevant sense.
41 It seems to me, as a matter of judgment, that the discovery Nexus requires is very much a fishing expedition. It is currently aware of some issues it considers to be defects. However it now wishes to undertake a comprehensive search of the applicant's documents to see if any other "defects" can be found. It does not know if there are any others. There is nothing to suggest there are any. While it may be true to say that, if there are any other issues that fall within the category "defects" in the relevant sense, they will only be discovered in the documentation of the applicant, that, in my view, in the circumstances of this case, is not sufficient for me to be satisfied that what Nexus wants to undertake here, is anything but a fishing expedition. It is unlike the situation in Silver where there was some evidence a contract existed, and discovery was allowed to flesh out its details.
42 Further, even if one were more sympathetic to the view that additional discovery of the type required by Nexus is not intended to be a fishing expedition, I also take into account that Nexus, by its application, primarily requires the applicant to provide all of its materials electronically so that Nexus might search the applicant's database in order to discover information that might be helpful to it mounting its defects case. I do not consider that it is appropriate in any event to order such a broadly scoped discovery in a case such as the present, even if technically it may be achieved: cf Wimmera Industrial Minerals Pty Ltd v RGC Mineral Sands Ltd [1998] FCA 299 at 28 (Mansfield J). Discovery ought, in a case like this, be a much more targeted exercise than that. In this case the order sought by Nexus would give it broad access to numerous business documents of the applicant that are not relevant on any view. Indeed Nexus' proposal in this regard tends to emphasise that what it wishes to embark upon is indeed a fishing expedition.
43 Moreover I consider that the process of further discovery as envisaged by Nexus would be unduly complex, lengthy and expensive. In that regard I accept, broadly speaking, the affidavit evidence put on by the applicant as to complexity and cost and time that would be involved in the processes that would be required on its side to provide broad discovery of all materials that might fall into the category of "defects", short of handing over its electronic database to Nexus. Leaving aside the characterisation by the applicant itself as to what or is not a possible defect for the purpose of Nexus' pleading, the sheer physical demands of the discovery required suggests to me that this is not a case where the Court should facilitate the required discovery as a matter of course in the circumstances of this case. While it may be true, as Nexus contends, that the applicant is financially well resourced and able to complete a lengthy, complex and expensive discovery, in my judgment, given the history and progress of this particular proceeding, such a discovery is not appropriate and indeed may lead to a delay in the proceeding going to trial.
44 The position is that Nexus has been provided with relevant technical documents. At an earlier stage I considered there was practical sense in the applicant giving this additional discovery to Nexus in the real expectation that it would assist in a practical way to identify any further "defects" that Nexus wished to particularise. It plainly has assisted in that regard, given Mr Harrison's report. In my judgment, the level of disclosure so far made on behalf of the applicant is sufficient for Nexus now to particularise the defects upon which it wishes to rely in advancing the [70] allegations.
45 There is an old saying that something is "Not worth the candle". This is sometimes suggested to mean that something is "worthless". However, it usually means something more subtle than that, namely, that while something may, on one view, be worthwhile, the trouble or effort in trying to realise it makes it not so. At this stage I do not think that the discovery requested by Nexus is worth the candle. In this regard, my judgment is ultimately informed by the overarching purpose of the civil practice and procedure provisions of this Court, as expressed in s 37M(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), which is to facilitate the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible. The overarching purpose includes the objectives spelt out in s 37M(2), which include the:
just determination of all proceedings before the Court;
efficient use of the judicial and administrative resources available for the purposes of the Court;
efficient disposal of the Court's overall case load;
disposal of all proceedings in a timely manner;
resolution of disputes at a cost that is proportionate to the importance and complexity of the matters in dispute.
46 While what is in dispute in this proceeding is a very large sum of money, and on one view that might justify a court requiring the parties or one of them to incur great expenses in the prosecution or defence of the proceeding, I consider that the objectives just listed require a more practical assessment to be made as to what is required by way of further discovery at this point to ensure the proceeding advances to a relatively early trial on the material issues.
47 In that regard, Nexus should complete its particularisation of its plea in [70] of its defence so that the applicant can complete discovery according to the discovery plan having regard to that particularisation of the pleading.
48 In these circumstances, I would refuse Nexus' interlocutory application filed 1 February 2013, and make orders in terms of the applicant's interlocutory application filed 20 December 2012, but amended so far as the time frames are concerned.
49 I will also order a further directions hearing to follow the discovery, with a view to programming the proceeding to a fixed trial date.