The proper construction of s 1073A
22 The Secretary maintains that s 1073A(2) is temporally agnostic. He maintains that it applies if the three prerequisites listed in sub-s (1) are satisfied. Insofar as they are (in the case of any given person), the Secretary submits that it is sub-s (2) that applies to effect the deeming process to which the section is directed. That subsection makes no reference to any point or points in time in respect of which that process should or should not apply.
23 Insofar as it reasoned otherwise, the Secretary submits, the AAT wrongly construed the provisions upon which the Age Pension Application turned; and that error was an error of law that this court ought to correct on appeal by granting the relief for which he moves.
24 The respondents maintain that the AAT's construction of s 1073A and its interaction with the rest of the SS Act (particularly s 1064 and "Pension Rate Calculator A" for which it provides) was correct. They submit that, by its terms, the provision applies only in respect of people who are in receipt of a social security pension or a social security benefit; and that, at the time that they made their Age Pension Application, they were not in that category.
25 In support of that central contention, the respondents were concerned to impress upon the court that the SS Act is "beneficial legislation"; and, applying the ratio of authorities such as IW v City of Perth (1997) 191 CLR 1, ought to be construed in a way that is consistent with maximising access to the kinds of benefit for which they applied.
26 Both sides sought to attribute to the opposing construction outcomes that were described as absurd or unjust. The Secretary, for example, noted that the effect of the AAT Decision is that pension recipients whose entitlements are cancelled following the application of s 1073A of the SS Act are able to escape that consequence by simply (and, if they're so minded, immediately) lodging a fresh application.
27 The respondents countered by noting that, on the construction that the Secretary prefers, they would have to forego what they would otherwise have been entitled to receive had they simply not been receiving pensions at the time that the Back-pay Amounts were paid. Their exclusion from receipt of nine months' worth of age pension would, they said, occasion a significant injustice.
28 The court's task presently is to determine whether the AAT Decision accords with what s 1073A of the SS Act envisages upon its proper construction. Doing so involves reading the terms of the statute in a way that is consistent with how the legislature should be presumed to have intended that they would apply: Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, 381-2 [69]-[70] (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ). Recently, in Qube Ports Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry and Maritime Employees Union [2024] FCAFC 132, [72]-[73] (Rangiah, Wheelahan and Snaden JJ), that familiar task of statutory construction was described as follows:
72 The modern approach to statutory construction acknowledges that the task involves ascertaining the legal meaning of a provision by reference to "its text, while at the same time regard is … had to its context and purpose": ENT19 v Minister for Home Affairs [2023] HCA 18; 410 ALR 1 at [86] (Gordon, Edelman, Steward and Gleeson JJ). And, as the High Court has stated, that legal meaning will "[o]rdinarily … correspond with the grammatical meaning of the provision" in question -
[b]ut not always. The context of the words, the consequences of a literal or grammatical construction, the purpose of the statute or the canons of construction may require the words of a legislative provision to be read in a way that does not correspond with the literal or grammatical meaning.
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; 194 CLR 355 at [78] (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ).
73 Just as the task of construction requires more than sitting with the words of the Act in one hand and a dictionary in the other, so it requires more than matching up statutory text against pronouncements made in books on grammar or English usage: see Cunard SS Co Ltd v Mellon (1922) 284 F 890 at 894 (Judge Learned Hand), cited in Weiss v The Queen [2005] HCA 81; 224 CLR 300 at [10] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ), Re Refugee Tribunal; Ex parte Aala [2000] HCA 57; 204 CLR 82 at [25] (Gaudron and Gummow JJ), and APLA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner (NSW) [2005] HCA 44; 224 CLR 322 at [423] (Hayne J).
29 Where a statutory provision admits of more than one construction, the court must prefer the one that aligns best with the statute's purpose or object: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 15AA. Similarly, constructions that avoid results that might fairly be described as irrational or unjust are to be preferred over ones that do not: Legal Services Board v Gillespie-Jones (2013) 249 CLR 493, 509 [48] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ).
30 Presently, there is little about the objects or purposes of the SS Act that is uncertain. It exists to establish a social security system within which identified classes of people can qualify for periodic, taxpayer-funded welfare payments, including in the form of the age pension. The statute erects various criteria that govern the circumstances in (and the extent to) which a person might so qualify; and amongst them are the income thresholds that bear upon if or to what extent an age pension might be payable to any given applicant.
31 The purpose that underlies s 1073A of the SS Act is similarly apparent. It serves, in certain circumstances, to deem the times at (or the periods over) which employment income is taken to have been received. Its obvious purpose is to ensure that the receipt of employment income is brought to bear upon the amounts to which recipients of a social security pension or a social security benefit are entitled; and that that occurs regardless of how far it is beyond the period in respect of which they are payable that the amounts are, in fact, paid.
32 I accept that the construction of s 1073A of the SS Act that the Secretary advances is correct. It is consistent with the terms in which the provision is framed and their context within the broader scheme of the SS Act. The deeming function (or process of "attribution", as the respondents were careful to describe it) to which the section is directed is a function of s 1073A(2). It deems employment income that is received by certain pension recipients to be referrable to periods other than those in respect of which they were actually paid. It operates with that effect if the conditions listed in s 1073A(1) are satisfied; in other words, from the point that a person who is receiving (relevantly) an age pension receives employment income. Employment income so received is deemed to have been received in the way that sub-s (2) provides. The section does not identify any point or points in time to which that artificial deeming process is limited.
33 Insofar as concerns a pension application that is made later in time (that is to say, after employment income is received in the circumstances that s 1073A(1) of the SS Act contemplates), there is no reason to read s 1073A(2) as ceasing to apply or applying with modified effect. That is not what s 1073A says; and nor is it consistent with the apparent object of the provision or its place within the broader statutory context. To construe the provision as the AAT construed it is to permit - precisely as has occurred here - the all-but-immediate circumvention of the very consequences that the provision is plainly intended to accommodate (including, as in this case, the processes pursuant to which the respondents' prior age pension entitlement was reduced to nil and, ultimately, cancelled). Such a construction would mean (as it has in this matter so far) that a cancellation brought about by reason of a recipient's deemed receipt of employment income could be immediately set at naught simply by the making of a fresh pension application.
34 That is an absurd outcome that the legislature cannot reasonably be presumed to have intended.
35 There is further reason to reject it. Before me, it was accepted that s 1073A did not mandate the cancellation of - or, by its application, lead to a circumstance in which there was no option other than to cancel - the respondents' existing age pension entitlement. An alternative option was, I was told, for the Secretary to suspend it pursuant to s 80 of the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth). Had that occurred, there could be no suggestion that the suspension did not properly foreclose upon the respondents' receiving their age pension for the full 12-month "assessment period" that s 1073A of the SS Act established in respect of the Back-pay Amounts. That would be so because (as I should hope is already apparent) there was no question that those amounts were sufficient to take the respondents beyond the income threshold at which age pension entitlements are reduced to nil.
36 It is the case, as the respondents were at pains to point out, that, had they not been in receipt of the age pension at the point that the Back-pay Amounts were received, there would be no question that their Age Pension Application should proceed as the AAT has determined. In that universe, s 1073A would have no application, there would be no deeming as to when the Back-pay Amounts were received and those amounts would not qualify as employment income upon which the outcome of the application might turn. Thus, a couple that had received the same Back-pay Amounts at the same time as the respondents (or the first respondent) - and that applied at the same time as they did for the same pension entitlement in circumstances that were otherwise identical - would, nonetheless, be treated to a different outcome.
37 Accepting that hypothetical proposition, it remains clear all the same, from the provision's text and context, that that is what was intended. Section 1073A(2) applies so as to deem the time or times at which employment income is received if the conditions outlined in s 1073A(1) are met. There is no question, presently, that those criteria were met.
38 Nothing in the text of s 1073A or the broader statutory context within which it appears suggests that s 1073A(2) is temporally limited such that a "person is taken to have received the employment income over a period" only insofar as concerns an ongoing entitlement to an existing pension and not insofar as concerns a fresh application made at some later time. The section contemplates simply that a person will be "taken" to have received certain income as identified. It does not identify any time or limitations as to when the person will be so taken.
39 Having construed the relevant provisions of the SS Act differently, it follows that the AAT Decision was a product of legal error. That decision should (and will) be set aside and the Review Application should be remitted for redetermination upon the correct statutory interpretation. The Secretary does not seek an order for his costs in this appeal and, accordingly, none shall be made.
40 There is a minor complication. Since the commencement of this appeal, the AAT has ceased to be. It was recently succeeded by the Administrative Review Tribunal (the "ART"). It appears to me that, by operation of item 25 of sch 16 to the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 (Cth), it is open to the court to remit the Review Application to the ART, much as it would previously have remitted it to the AAT. In the absence of confirmation from the parties, I should prefer not to assume that that is so; and, accordingly, will invite them to confer and, ideally, agree upon whatever form of order they consider is appropriate to give effect to these reasons. In the absence of agreement, I will invite further submission limited to that very narrow issue.
I certify that the preceding forty (40) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Snaden.