CONSIDERATION
11 The Order requires the second defendant, which is a body corporate, to give information in this proceeding. Thus, s 187 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) applies: s 187(1)(a). The effect of s 187(2) of the Evidence Act is that the second defendant is not entitled to fail to comply with the requirement to give the information on the ground that giving that information might tend to incriminate the second defendant.
12 The second defendant, correctly, makes no claim of privilege against self-incrimination. However, the first defendant does.
13 In Meneses v Directed Electronics OE Pty Ltd [2019] FCAFC 190; (2019) FCR 638 at 663-664, the Full Court (Moshinsky, Wheelahan and Abraham JJ) stated at [95]-[96]:
95. The decision of Lindgren J in Microsoft v CX Computer was cited by Gordon J in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Mining Projects Group Ltd (No 2) [2008] FCA 951, who formulated the following propositions at [7]:
(1) a corporate defendant … may be required to provide documents and information which may tend to incriminate its officers: Trade Practices Commission v Abbco Iceworks Pty Ltd (1994) 52 FCR 96 at 116;
(2) a corporate defendant cannot invoke privilege on the grounds that an order or requirement to produce documents or information might tend to incriminate a natural person, such as a director: Microsoft Corporation v CX Computer Pty Ltd (2002) 116 FCR 372 at [32]-[33] (per Lindgren J) and ASIC v Mining Projects Group Ltd [2007] FCA 1620 at [5];
(3) a natural person cannot complain that a corporate defendant's compliance with an order or requirement to produce documents or information might tend to incriminate him or her: Microsoft Corporation v CX Computer Pty Ltd (2002) 116 FCR 372 at [32]-[33] (per Lindgren J) and ASIC v Mining Projects Group Ltd [2007] FCA 1620 at [5];
(4) the relevant enquiry is whether an order directed to the corporate defendant will require that a natural person tend to incriminate himself or herself: Microsoft Corporation v CX Computer Pty Ltd (2002) 116 FCR 372 at [32]-[33] (per Lindgren J) and ASIC v Mining Projects Group Ltd [2007] FCA 1620 at [5]…;
(5) a corporate defendant cannot refuse to comply with a direction for the filing of evidence on the basis that its evidence may incriminate other natural person defendants or expose them to a penalty: Chief Executive Officer of Customs v Camile Trading Pty Ltd (2004) 58 ATR 163 at 170. However, a corporate defendant will not breach such a direction if it fails to file a statement or an affidavit from a witness where that witness claims privilege: ACCC v J McPhee & Son (Australia) Pty Ltd (1997) 77 FCR 217 at 220 and ACCC v Eurong Beach Resort Ltd [2005] FCA 1134 at [10], [12] and [13]. That is to say, compliance is not required if the only source of the information is the director defendants and they are entitled to remain silent (Emphasis added): ASIC v Mining Projects Group Ltd [2007] FCA 1620 at [5]. If the corporate defendant has other sources of information available from which it can comply with the direction, then it must do so.
96. We respectfully agree with the above propositions. …
14 Thus, it is necessary to consider whether the effect of the Order, which is addressed to the second defendant, is such that compliance is only possible if the first defendant is exposed to the risk of self-incrimination. This gives rise to two questions: first, is the first defendant the only source of the information; and secondly, if so, might the provision of the information expose the first defendant to such a risk.
15 The evidence concerning the first question establishes that:
(1) the first defendant is, and during the relevant period was, the sole member and the sole director of the second defendant;
(2) Ms Craven is instructed by the first defendant that during the relevant period:
(a) the second defendant did not employ anyone; and
(b) the first defendant was responsible for all transfers out of the bank account.
16 I am not satisfied, on the basis of this evidence, that no-one other than the first defendant could provide the requisite information on behalf of the second defendant.
17 Evidence that the first defendant is and was the sole member and director of the second defendant during the relevant period is insufficient as it does not exclude the possibility that the second defendant could comply with the Order by the filing and service of an affidavit from another person such as an employee of the second defendant; an agent of the second defendant (for example, an accountant or lawyer retained by the second defendant); a second director or an officer of the second defendant appointed by the first defendant (which he is capable of doing as the sole member of the second defendant); a bank officer; or a receiver appointed to the second defendant for this purpose (see Meneses at [153] and the authorities there cited). That the Order could be satisfied by an affidavit from someone other than the first defendant was expressly contemplated by paragraph (3) of Annexure B to the Order, which is set out at [7] above.
18 The evidence of Ms Craven that she is instructed by the first defendant that the second defendant did not employ anyone during the relevant period does not address the present position and in any event leaves open the possibility that persons other than employees may be in a position to provide the information sought.
19 It follows that I am not satisfied that the effect of the Order is to require the first defendant to make the requisite affidavit. It is thus unnecessary to consider whether the first defendant, had he been required to provide an affidavit, would have had a viable objection to making that affidavit based upon a claim of privilege against self-incrimination.