The position as it presents itself to my mind works out in this way: - The appellants start their case by showing that Rebecca Shade bought and paid for the land, and that the respondent Pauly, into whose name it was transferred by Markell, the vendor to the testatrix, gave no consideration for it. This, on well established principles, raises primâ facie a resulting trust for Rebecca Shade, and, if nothing more appeared, that would have to be so determined (see In re Scottish Equitable Life Assurance Society[8]). But something more does appear: Rebecca Shade was her mother, and the doctrine of presumed advancement is invoked in her behalf. On the balance of authority as it at present stands, that single circumstance is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of resulting trust. No doubt, when all the circumstances are before the Court, the intention of the purchaser to make or not to make the holder of the title trustee is to be determined as a question of fact. But the burden of proof (see Sugden on Vendors and Purchasers, 14th ed., p. 704) may also seriously affect the conclusion, and the burden of proof may shift. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the steps. The case of a father having an obligation in conscience to provide for a child, either unadvanced or treated as unadvanced, is different from the case of a mother dealing with a daughter, and particularly where the daughter is married and in fairly good circumstances (Bennet v. Bennet[9]). In the first case the facts are in themselves sufficient to rebut the presumption of resulting trust; in the second, according to Bennet v. Bennet, they are not. That case, drawing a distinction between father and mother, has not, so far as I am aware, been judicially doubted (see Re Orme; Evans v. Maxwell[10], and Preston v. Greene[11]). Some text-writers doubt it, while others do not. It is unnecessary now to consider its correctness, and I assume it is right. If it ever comes to be questioned, it may be that the solution will be found in the circumstance that the "presumption" there spoken of is an inference which the Courts of equity in practice drew from the mere fact of the purchaser being the father, and the head of the family, under the primary moral obligation to provide for the children of the marriage, and in that respect differing from the mother. In case of his death the inference called a presumption as to the mother might well be different from that where the father was still alive.