Schneider v Hoechst Schering Agrevo Pty Ltd
[2000] FCA 154
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Federal Court of Australia
Decision date
2000-03-29
Before
Mathews J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (39 paragraphs)
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 1 This case is about damaged wheat crops. In 1996, a number of wheat crops in the Walgett/Coonamble area of north-western New South Wales showed signs of severe stress. The yield was adversely affected at harvest. Indeed, in a few cases, harvest was not attempted as it would have been uneconomical. A common feature in relation to many of these crops was that they had been sprayed with a chemical herbicide called Puma S. One of the farmers, Mr Schneider, commenced a representative proceeding against the manufacturers of Puma S, Hoechst Schering Agrevo Pty Ltd ('Hoechst') on behalf of all affected farmers. He also commenced proceedings against IAMA Limited ('IAMA') from whom he had purchased the Puma S.
The Nature of the Proceedings 2 The proceedings are not without their complexity. Mr Schneider's representative action against Hoechst was brought on behalf of all wheat-growers in the north-west of New South Wales who claim losses arising out of the application of Puma S to their crops. There are ten identified members of this class, and an unspecified number of wheat-growers who remain unidentified. A number of heads of negligence were raised against Hoechst. In addition, it was claimed that Hoechst had engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct in contravention of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ('the Trade Practices Act'). The proceedings against IAMA were said to be brought on behalf of a sub-group of the represented parties, namely those who had purchased Puma S from IAMA. These proceedings are based on negligence, breach of contract, breach of implied conditions under ss 70 & 71 of the Trade Practices Act and ss 18 & 19 of the Sale of Goods Act 1924 (NSW) ('the Sale of Goods Act'), breach of an implied warranty under s 74 of the Trade Practices Act, and engaging in misleading or deceptive conduct contrary to s 52 of the Trade Practices Act and s 42 of the Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW) ('the Fair Trading Act'). 3 The matter does not end there. Both Hoechst and IAMA have filed cross-claims against each other in the proceedings commenced by Mr Schneider. IAMA has alleged that Hoechst made negligent misrepresentations as to the suitability of Puma S for its declared use, and that it contravened s 52 of the Trade Practices Act. Hoechst claims that IAMA was in breach of an implied term of the agreement between them whereby it was to provide agronomic advice to Mr Schneider and other purchasers of Puma S. 4 Six further proceedings were commenced by individual wheat-growers, being some of the represented parties in the proceedings brought by Mr Schneider against Hoechst. All of these individual proceedings were brought against the companies or organisations from which the growers had purchased Puma S. The statements of claim in all of these cases were based on the same causes of action as were raised by Mr Schneider in his action against IAMA. In each of these proceedings, the respondent distributor cross-claimed against Hoechst, which in turn cross-claimed against the distributor, again raising the same issues as those which had been raised in the Schneider case. 5 Before the matter came to hearing, the cross-claims between the distributors and Hoechst had been settled in three of the seven proceedings, namely those commenced by Messrs Schneider, Masman and Edwards. In each of those cases, Mr Harrison of Senior Counsel and Mr McNally appeared on behalf of both the manufacturer, Hoechst, and the relevant distributor. Notices of discontinuance of Hoechst's cross-claims were later filed in those proceedings. In the four remaining cases, the cross-actions between Hoechst and the distributors remained on foot, and the distributors were separately represented. Three of these cases, those commenced by Messrs Fester, Todd and Lyons, involved the same distributor, Ag-N-Vet Services Pty Ltd ('Ag-N-Vet') which was represented at the hearing by Mr Insall. In the case commenced by Mr Chapman, the distributor was represented by Mr Ryan of Senior Counsel. 6 Between the end of the hearing and the delivery of judgment, the three cases involving Ag-N-Vet, namely the actions commenced by Messrs Fester, Todd and Lyons, were settled. Accordingly, no orders will be made in relation to these cases. The fact that they have been settled does not affect the issues to be discussed in this judgment, as each of the applicants in the settled actions was a represented party in the Schneider proceeding against Hoechst. 7 All proceedings were, by consent, heard together. Indeed, given the nature of the issues involved, it would have been unthinkable to conduct separate hearings in relation to any of them. However, no application had been made before the hearing to consolidate the proceedings. As a result, the evidence adduced in some cases was not admissible in others. This caused a number of evidential and logistic difficulties during the hearing. The problems came to a head during the evidence of the plaintiff's principal expert, Professor Kennedy, who had based his overall findings upon the statements of all wheat-growers who had furnished statements in the combined proceedings. Both Mr Ryan and Mr Insall urged that these findings were not admissible against their clients as many of the statements which Professor Kennedy had used as a basis for his opinions had not been, and could not have been, tendered in evidence against them. This proposition was so manifestly correct that Mr Moore, who appeared with Mr Rowe for all the applicants, sought an order consolidating the proceedings so that all evidence could be admissible in all proceedings, thus circumventing these evidential difficulties. But by this time the hearing was well into its second week, and although an order of consolidation might well have been appropriate before the commencement of the hearing, it would have caused significant prejudice and inconvenience at that late stage. Accordingly, the application was rejected. The result is that some of the evidence in the case is available for use in some only of the proceedings. In particular, certain evidence tendered against Hoechst is inadmissible against the distributors, and much of the evidence relating to discussions between applicants and the distributors is inadmissible against Hoechst. 8 This situation gave rise to numerous well-based objections during the course of the hearing. It threatened to cause something of a logistic nightmare during the writing of this judgment, because of the constraints it imposed upon the use of certain pieces of evidence. Fortunately, these difficulties have turned out to be more apparent than real. They have not in any way affected the outcome of these proceedings. 9 Three weeks were set aside for the hearing of this matter. At the outset, Mr Rowe, on behalf of the applicants, suggested that the issues of liability and quantum might be split, and that the primary hearing should be restricted to matters relevant to liability. The respondents successfully objected to this course, and the hearing thus proceeded on all issues. However, on the last day of evidence, which was well into the third week of the hearing, several difficulties arose in relation to the foreshadowed evidence of a witness whom Hoechst proposed to call on the issue of damages. It was acknowledged that some time would be needed to rectify these problems. The only way to accommodate to this situation was to defer further evidence and submissions on the issue of damages until a later date. Accordingly, all final submissions were restricted to the question of liability. It was agreed that, should the applicants succeed on this issue, the proceedings would need to be reconvened at a later date in order to deal with damages. As it transpires, this course will not be necessary.