Proposed Particulars of Mitigation of Damages
3 Paragraph 14 of the proposed Further Amended Defence is as follows:
Further and in the alternative, if (which is denied) the Applicant suffered any damage as a result of the publication of the Segment and/or any of the imputations pleaded in paragraphs 8.1 - 8.5 or 8.11 - 8.12 of the Statement of Claim, then the Respondents will rely upon the following facts and matters in mitigation of such damage:
(c) the circumstances in which it is proved that the Segment was published; and
(d) the background context to the Segment, being the facts, matters and circumstances particularised below.
4 Under the subheading "Particulars of Background Facts", the following particulars are given:
(1) The applicant is a citizen of the United States of America (US) and is an economist and financial commentator in that jurisdiction. He has courted public and media attention through various media including by authoring and causing to be published several books on the topics of economics and finance, by creating financial related content that he has sought to publish to the world at large on each of his YouTube and Podcast channels entitled "The Peter Schiff Show" (TPSS), and through his use of Twitter under the handle of "@PeterSchiff".
(2) Between at least 2015 and 2022, the applicant has deliberately sought for himself a reputation as someone who has a strong opposition to both the payment of income tax and the invasion of financial privacy by publishing content on those topics through TPSS and on Twitter, and on other podcasts that have a wide audience. At trial, the respondents will rely on the content published by the applicant set out in "Annexure A". [Annexure A lists 35 publications.]
(3) On about 11 September 2021, the applicant published an episode of the TPSS entitled: "Episode 730: Government Is Consistent; It Always Lies". The sense and substance of that episode was that anti-privacy laws were used to enforce tax compliance and that those laws were unconstitutional. The applicant said in that episode that he: "would rather a few people get away with cheating on their taxes than the entire country have to surrender their constitutional rights (sic)". In the premises, it should be inferred that the applicant was, at all material times, so opposed to anti-privacy laws that he was, at least, indifferent to some persons escaping accountability for cheating the tax office out of revenue, including by illegal tax evasion means.
(4) On about 23 February 2011, the applicant founded the Euro Pacific Bank Ltd (the bank). The bank was incorporated, and initially domiciled, in St Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG).
(5) At all material times since the incorporation of the bank, the applicant was a director of the bank and a shareholder with a controlling interest in the bank.
(6) Since its incorporation, the applicant has represented to the world at large that he:
(a) founded the bank;
(b) owned the bank;
(c) held a controlling interest in the bank;
(d) controlled and "ran" the bank; and
(e) made decisions regarding the bank's operations.
Those representations were made during Episode 70 of TPSS entitled: "Frontline Perspective on the Government's War on Liberty", first published on 8 April 2015, and during Episode 542 of TPSS entitled: "Financial Conditions Are Rapidly Deteriorating", first published on 7 March 2020.
(7) Shortly after the bank was incorporated and, by no later than 2012, the applicant's name and image were used in the bank's promotional and marketing material. It is to be inferred from the foregoing that the applicant consented to the use of his name and image being used as the public face of the bank. It is to be further inferred that the applicant, at least, implicitly approved the content of the bank's promotional and marketing material.
(8) At the time of the bank's incorporation, SVG had a reputation as a tax haven because of its lenient financial regulation and strong privacy laws. Those laws relevantly included the International Banks Act 2004, and the Exchange of Information Act 2008. By reason of those laws, there was no obligation on a financial institution in SVG to report, amongst other things, tax evasion and money laundering.
(9) The applicant knew that SVG was a tax haven which had lenient financial regulation and strong privacy laws and, for that reason, incorporated the bank in that jurisdiction. The fact of the applicant's knowledge is evidenced by the statements that he made to the world at large (particulars of which are set out in Annexure A) that specifically include:
(a) on 8 April 2015 during episode 70 of TPSS entitled: "Frontline Perspective on the Government's War on Liberty";
(b) on 7 December 2019, during episode 518 of TPSS entitled: "Another Trumped up Jobs Report";
(c) on 7 March 2020, during episode 542 of TPSS entitled:"Financial Conditions Are Rapidly Deteriorating";
(d) on 6 September 2021, on the applicant's YouTube channel entitled: "Vlad TV" during an interview entitled "Peter Schiff on His Dad Dying in Prison Over Not Paying Taxes (Part 1)"; and
(e) in an interview conducted by Nick Giambruno published on a date presently unknown in "International Man" and republished on the 'Mike's Money Talks' website (Giambruno Interview).
(10) Further, it is to be concluded from the applicant's statements during the Giambruno Interview that the applicant founded and incorporated the bank in SVG with an objective to provide privacy for the bank's customers, and to avoid the imposition of onerous US rules and regulations for the vetting of, and the disclosure of information about, its customers. One of the ways the applicant achieved those objectives was by the bank enforcing a policy to reject US customers, which policy is addressed below at (11)(b).
(11) Between at least 2012 and 2017, the bank promoted on its website (www.europacbank.com), and in marketing material (including in electronic and/or print flyers), that it provided banking services to prospective customers, that it had been founded by the applicant, and that it provided a number of key benefits, including:
(a) that it was one of the most private and secure banks in the world for customers to do business and protect assets by reason of the favourable banking regulations and strong privacy laws in SVG;
(b) that the bank furthered the safety and security of customers by its policy to refuse any US citizen or resident as a customer (US Citizen Policy);
(c) the ease at which customers could open an account with the bank. Specifically, the bank promoted that prospective customers could an open an account by completing a registration form in under one minute and without sending physical copies of any supporting documents. Customers could expect the bank to open an account the same day of the application.
(12) It is to be inferred from the applicant's control of the bank, the public statements made by the applicant, and from the use of the applicant's name and image in the bank's promotional and marketing material (each of which has been set out above) that the applicant knew and approved of the promotion of the bank in the manner described in (11) above.
(13) Further in the premises of (12), it is to be inferred from the matters in (5) above that the applicant designed, or at least approved of the adoption by the bank of, the US Citizen Policy to ensure that the bank was able to provide the strictest privacy for its customers by avoiding the extra territorial obligations imposed by US legislation such as the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act 2010, and the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act and Regulations.
(14) By 15 July 2014, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development had approved a "common reporting standard" which provided for the collection and exchange of financial account information concerning foreign tax residents (CRS). The objects of the CRS include to act as a deterrent of tax evasion, and to reduce international tax evasion. By 25 August 2016, SVG had subscribed to the CRS when it became a signatory to the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters.
(15) About two months after SVG had subscribed to the CRS, and no later than October 2016, a subsidiary of the bank, Euro Pacific Intl. Bank, LLC, had been granted a licence by the Office of the Commissioner of Financial Institutions (OCFI) in Puerto Rico to operate as an international bank.
(16) Puerto Rico is as an unincorporated territory of the US and was, at all material times, notorious to regulators and those in the financial services community as a tax haven and as a territory with a relatively lenient framework of laws and regulations governing financial institutions by global standards. Puerto Rico is not, and has never been, subject to the disclosure requirements of the CRS. Whilst the US has signed the CRS, it has not ratified or enacted laws to bring the CRS into force. Since at least 2016, non-United States financial institutions based in Puerto Rico have been exempted from compliance with legislation in force in the United States of America requiring the collection and reporting of information, but only in respect of non-US citizens or residents and non-US transactions. By 13 February 2019, the Delegated Regulation of the European Commission had identified Puerto Rico as a high-risk third world country with strategic deficiencies. Further, between at least 2015 to the present, Puerto Rico has been consistently identified in news reporting as a tax haven.
(17) By about 20 December 2016, the CRS had been adopted into SVG domestic law. Around the time of its adoption, and by no later than January 2017, the bank requested the OCFI in Puerto Rico to transfer to it the licence granted to Euro Pacific Intl. Bank, LLC. At about the same time, the applicant applied to the OCFI for the bank to be converted to a Puerto Rico domestic corporation.
(18) By about 9 February 2017, the bank had become domiciled in Puerto Rico, had changed its name to "Euro Pacific Intl Bank", and had commenced operations as an international financial entity after it was authorised to do so by the OCFI. The applicant, at all material times, remained a director and controlling shareholder of the bank, but additionally became its Chairman.
(19) From February 2017, the bank continued to promote itself, on its website and in a Financial Institution Presentation dated 6 September 2020, as a bank that provided products and services to non-US citizens, residents and entities, and as a bank that did not report financial account information of its customers. On and from 20 October 2017, the bank represented on its website that it had redomiciled its operations from SVG to Puerto Rico and that customers of the bank would not be subjected to the reporting requirements under the CRS for the reason that Puerto Rico is a US territory and the United States had not implemented the CRS. From at least 7 March 2019, the bank promoted on its website that it used encryption software to protect client sensitive material and that customers could communicate with the bank using encrypted email and private internal virtual messaging.
(20) In fact, the bank rejected, and the applicant knew it rejected, US citizens, residents and entities as customers consistent with its US Citizen Policy. The applicant's knowledge arises from at least his participation in the business of the bank as its Chairman and as a controlling shareholder, and from statements that he made to the world at large in, at least, the Giambruno Interview.
(21) It is be inferred from the foregoing that the applicant was instrumental, or alternatively was involved, in causing the bank to be relocated to Puerto Rico and that a reason for that relocation, and for the continued enforcement of the US Citizen Policy, was to avoid the imposition of reporting obligations under the CRS, and to avoid the extra territorial obligations imposed by US legislation, in order to help customers maintain privacy over their financial account information.
(22) Since the establishment of the bank in SVG, and following its relocation to Puerto Rico, one of the ways in which a prospective customer could open an account with the bank was by the voluntary completion of the bank's registration form and the provision of basic supporting documentation. At all material times, the bank represented that this process took less than one minute as set out above at 11(c). Another way in which a customer could open an account was by using the services of a third party referral agent to open an account remotely.
(23) Whatever way was used by the prospective customer, the process by which an account could be opened with the bank was simple, quick and involved minimal vetting of the prospective customer. That process had been sanctioned by the applicant, given the matters referred to in (5) above, and sought to make the bank as attractive as possible to prospective customers. In particular, the bank did not seek to satisfy itself that prospective customers had complied with their domestic and/or international taxation obligations, including by failing to conduct enquiries with any relevant authorities.
(24) Given the promotion of secrecy and privacy as key attributes of the bank, it was inevitable that the bank, in fact, attracted customers who wished to maintain their privacy and avoid the disclosure of their account information to third parties. Those customers would have included legitimate and law-abiding customers who wanted to open an account and use the bank in good faith. However, those customers would also have included customers that sought to use the bank to evade paying their taxes unlawfully, engage in money laundering and/or fraud (Bad Actors).
(25) The bank's minimal vetting procedures were wholly inadequate to prevent those Bad Actors from opening accounts with the bank.
(26) It should be inferred from:
(a) the location of the bank in SVG, and later the domicile of the bank in Puerto Rico so as to avoid the operation of the CRS;
(b) the implementation of the US Citizen Policy and, in fact, the rejection of US citizens, residents and entities as customers of the bank, so as to avoid the extra territorial disclosure obligations imposed by US legislation;
(c) the inadequate customer vetting procedures adopted by the bank which were sanctioned by the applicant;
(d) the applicant's publicly expressed opinions on taxation; and
(e) the applicant's publicly expressed strong opposition to anti-privacy laws, that the applicant was, at least, indifferent to the prospect of Bad Actors becoming customers of the bank.
(27) On about 23 January 2020, the Global Joint Chiefs of Global Tax Enforcement from Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, the UK, and the US known as the "J5 Crime Group" (J5) commenced an unprecedented, coordinated global investigation called "Operation Atlantis". The apparent purpose of Operation Atlantis was to stop suspected facilitation of offshore tax evasion and money laundering by the bank. Operation Atlantis was the first major operational activity by the J5 anywhere in the world, and involved a coordinated global "day of action" concerning the bank. The day of action involved evidence, intelligence and information collection activities using search warrants, interviews and subpoenas in several jurisdictions. Over 100 Australian customers of the bank were targeted by the J5 as part of Operation Atlantis.
(28) One of the Australian customers targeted by the J5 as part of Operation Atlantis was Simon Paul Anquetil, an Australian citizen, and founder and Chief Executive Officer of a company, Plutus Payroll Australia Pty Ltd. Mr Anquetil was a customer of the bank between at least 25 May 2017 and 3 September 2021. By 24 February 2020, Mr Anquetil had pleaded guilty of being involved in a conspiracy to defraud the Australian Taxation Office with the intention of dishonestly causing a loss to the Commonwealth, between 1 March 2014 and about 18 May 2017, and having dealt with the proceeds of crime, in excess of $1,000,000. He was sentenced in July 2020 to a term of imprisonment of seven years and six months. On 3 September 2021, orders were made by the Supreme Court of New South Wales, pursuant to which various assets of Mr Anquetil were forfeited to the Commonwealth. Those assets included funds held by the bank in account number 19515052. The Plutus Payroll tax fraud conspiracy and the above proceedings were the subject of wide reporting during the period between May 2017 and, at least, 18 October 2020.
(29) Another customer of the bank was Michael Wilson, a dual citizen of Canada and the United States. He was a customer of the bank by no later than 2017. On or about 18 July 2017, Mr Wilson pleaded guilty to wire fraud and Mr Wilson's various assets were ordered to be forfeited. Those assets included four accounts for approximately $950,000 held at the bank. Mr Wilson's proceedings, as well as Mr Wilson's arrests in Canada and Vietnam, were the subject of wide media reporting between 2010 and 2017. On or about 4 April 2018, Mr Wilson was sentenced to 108 months' imprisonment.
(30) Since 2017, the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission has generated and maintained an Australian Priority Organisation Target (APOT) list for the purposes of identifying, assessing, designating and coordinating operational responses against transnational serious and organised crime targets that pose the greatest threat to Australia's interests. The strategic intent of the APOT list is to improve understanding and facilitate collaborative domestic and international disruption efforts.
(31) By no later than 18 October 2020, ACIC had placed the bank on the APOT list and had thereby designated it as a threat to Australia's interests through the facilitation of global tax evasion and money laundering and by the use of the bank by its customers, including Australian customers, to avoid tax obligations, launder funds and reduce law enforcement visibility.
(32) Between 19 October 2020 and 30 June 2021, the OCFI and the Commissioner of Financial Institutions in Puerto Rico (Commissioner) performed an examination into the operations of the bank to determine, amongst other things, the extent of compliance by the bank with Puerto Rican and federal laws. That examination found the bank was "critically deficient" in a number of respects, including:
(a) in its management performance;
(b) in its risk management practices;
(c) that the bank had deficient earnings and capital levels;
(d) that accounting records were inaccurate; and
(e) the bank's money laundering and customer due diligence program was inadequate and additionally failed to comply with the Bank Secrecy Act (OCFI Findings).
(33) On or around 1 November 2021, the bank (including the applicant as its director) and the OCFI consented to court orders purporting to address the OCFI Findings (OCFI Consent Order).
(34) By 30 June 2022, the OCFI had filed a complaint and suspended the bank's operations in Puerto Rico for non-compliance with the minimum capital requirements under law and the OCFI Consent Order.
(35) Further, by 30 June 2022, the ATO had scrutinised over 100 cases concerning Australian customers of the bank revealed by Operation Atlantis, had imposed tax penalties in some, but not all, of those 100 cases, had reported that further steps were necessary in at least 50 cases to ensure compliance with Australian tax obligations, and had referred some Australian customers of the bank for criminal investigation by other authorities including the Australian Federal Police and the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, through the Serious Crime Taskforce.
(36) By no later than 8 August 2022, the bank and the OCFI had entered into an agreement whereby the bank agreed to its liquidation, to surrender its financial license, to cease all financial operations in Puerto Rico permanently and irrevocably, to pay fines for its infringements of legal and regulatory requirements and refund all client deposits. The Applicant entered into this agreement on behalf of the bank in his capacity as its director and sole shareholder. A formal consent order was subsequently filed by OCFI and the bank on 9 August 2022.
(37) By no later than 7 September 2022, HMRC publicly announced that hundreds of civil and criminal investigations involving the bank have been launched across the J5 jurisdictions of the UK, Canada, Australia, Netherlands and the United States. So far, at least one customer of the bank has been convicted and sentenced in the Netherlands. Further and better particulars of that conviction, and any others, will be provided in due course.
(38) At or about the time of first publication of the Segment, the New York Times also published an article about the bank and Operation Atlantis entitled "Chasing Illicit Money, Global Officials Circle a Puerto Rican Firm". The Respondents will rely at trial upon the content of that publication. The Applicant has not commenced proceedings against the publisher of the New York Times and has thereby refrained from complaining about any reputational damage in the United States.
(39) On 23 October 2020, the applicant posted a video to TPSS on YouTube entitled "60 Minutes Australia and The Age are Fake News" which in substance claimed that the applicant had been defamed in the Broadcast by the respondents. By 23 September 2022, the applicant had:
(a) amended the YouTube Post to include a statement that, in substance, stated an Australian judge had ruled the Broadcast defamatory (Amended Post). The Amended Post has been published widely, including to the applicant's 553,000 subscribers to TPPS on YouTube.
(b) published to his approximately 1 million followers on Twitter a "tweet" that republished the Amended Post and which, in substance, stated that he had won his defamation case against the respondents, and that he should be awarded substantial damages.
(c) published to his approximately 1 million followers on Twitter a "tweet" that, in substance, stated that he had won the first part of his defamation case and that the next phase of the litigation was to determine the quantum of damages to be awarded to him, which would be substantial.
It is to be inferred in the circumstances that the applicant published the tweets and the Amended Post for the purposes of vindicating his reputation.
(40) On 28 September 2022, the applicant authorised his U.S. lawyer, Mr. Larry Davis, to hold a press conference in Washington D.C that communicated to the media and other persons present that the Federal Court of Australia had found the Broadcast to be defamatory, and that his reputation had, in fact, been vindicated in whole or in part.