Opposition by VIP
23 VIP's opposition to the application is supported by an affidavit of its solicitor which stresses the dilatory performance by Schütz. More importantly, it contends that the majority of Mr Pease's affidavit is in the form of evidence in chief, relating to the claims by Schütz, rather than constituting evidence in reply to that advanced by VIP on infringement. It asserts that only 24 paragraphs of Mr Pease's affidavit (paragraphs [217] to [241]) refer to the evidence of VIP's witnesses and appear to be genuinely in reply to the evidence of VIP witnesses. Rather, Mr Pease seeks to introduce new evidence into the proceedings on the infringement issues which is different from the evidence filed to date by Schütz. He also seeks to supplement and expand the evidence on the infringement issues already filed by Schütz in chief. Specific paragraphs are pointed to in this regard. The point is made that VIP's evidence on infringement has been closed since August 2012. In order to rely on any additional evidence in relation to the infringement issues, VIP would need to seek the leave of the Court. Therefore if Schütz is permitted to rely on the evidence objected to, VIP submits that it would need to undertake substantial additional work and incur significant additional costs to respond to the evidence. In short, VIP claims that in many respects, VIP will need to start again with its evidence in answer to the infringement issues. This in turn will involve VIP incurring additional substantial costs and will also interfere with VIP's preparation of its evidence in reply.
24 VIP raises a particular complaint about the new evidence given by Mr Pease concerning his interviews with representatives from the Australian dangerous goods industry. Mr Pease deposes that he made enquiries with 24 representatives from the Australian dangerous goods and packaging industry located in Western Australia, Victoria and New South Wales between 13 October 2012 and 31 October 2012, including representatives of regulators in Victoria, Western Australia and New South Wales. That exercise was carried out after VIP filed its evidence on the infringement issue in August 2012.
25 Prior to the filing Mr Pease's affidavit, Schütz had not indicated that it was undertaking such an extensive exercise. There was no suggestion at the case management conference held earlier this year in February that this exercise was being carried out. VIP complains that in order to respond to this evidence VIP would need to attempt to contact each of the 24 individuals that Mr Pease had interviewed and, in turn, interview a number of them. VIP's solicitor deposes that this process is likely to involve interstate travel at least to those individuals in Western Australia and Victoria and other potential witnesses in the industry who may be capable of giving evidence responsive to that given by Mr Pease. VIP says it would then have to prepare affidavit evidence to be filed from some or all of the witnesses identified in the process in response to by Mr Pease's evidence.
26 VIP's solicitor estimates that this would take one to two lawyers around six to eight weeks to repeat the exercise given that Mr Pease has spent some five months on and off pursuing the exercise. In addition there would be costs thrown away in relation to evidence already collated by VIP on infringement issues and the need to reinterview various witnesses who have already given sworn affidavits.
27 VIP's solicitor further submits that Mr Pease's affidavit introduces new evidence in relation to the reconditioning practices in Australia. This evidence is given at some length. VIP says that it would have to conduct a similar exercise in response to it. Similar complaints are raised in relation to new evidence on the likelihood of confusion arising from cross-bottling, specific safety risks of cross-bottled IBCs, and practices and entities in the UK (said by VIP to be of dubious significance). VIP complains that there would be serious interruption to its existing evidence preparation and a significant impact on the timetable. In particular, the current timetable is computed on the premise that a further mediation is to occur by 20 June 2013. VIP's solicitor deposes that it is unlikely, if Schütz is permitted to rely on the paragraphs in Mr Pease's affidavit to which VIP objects, that VIP will be in a position to deal with matters fully at the proposed mediation. VIP submits that if the evidence is permitted, a further extension to the timetable will be necessary.
28 VIP complains that Schütz has failed to explain why Mr Pease was not briefed earlier given that he has been instructed in the proceeding for over 12 months. Further, large parts of Mr Pease's affidavit were filed in parallel UK proceedings in 2011 when Mr Pease gave evidence in the proceedings which were the subject of the decision in Schütz (UK) Limited & Schütz GMBH & Co KGAA v Delta Containers Limited & Protechna SA [2011] EWHC 1712 (Ch). Given that a large amount Mr Pease's affidavit repeats matters raised in his report for the 2011 UK proceedings, there is no explanation offered, VIP says, why that material could not have been filed in this proceeding before March 2013.
29 Similar but more limited objections are raised to the affidavit of Mr Banks in relation to his observations in respect of VIP cross-bottled IBCs. Mr Banks' affidavit concerns VIP's certification approvals, pleaded by Schütz at paragraph [26] of the current Fifth Further Amended Statement of Claim filed on 19 December 2012. VIP complains that it has not had the opportunity to respond to this material which is essentially evidence in chief.
30 In particular VIP stresses that the evidence in Mr Banks' affidavit is in the nature of evidence in chief rather than evidence in reply and that VIP has not had the opportunity to respond to that evidence.
31 VIP relies upon a summary by Finklestein J and Black & Decker (Australasia) Pty Ltd v GMCA Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1623 (at [5]) where his Honour considered that the principles applicable to the exercise of the Court's discretion to grant leave took into account:
(a) the direct and indirect prejudice to the opposing party;
(b) the impact of the delay on the proceedings;
(c) the reason for the delay;
(d) good faith or lack of good faith on the part of the party seeking to be excused; and
(e) the effect of putting off a trial both on other litigants and generally on the Court's ability to efficiently manage its cases.
32 VIP complains it would suffer serious prejudice if Schütz were permitted to rely upon the further evidence in chief contained in Mr Pease's affidavit. A substantial amount of additional work would have to be carried out given the size of the formerly undisclosed project carried out by Mr Pease. The impact of the delay on the proceedings would be significant.
33 As VIP is presently preparing responsive evidence to the seven expert reports and 13 lay witness affidavits filed by Schütz on the revocation issues, it is fully engaged in existing tasks of substantial scope. It says that it is inevitable that there would be necessary extensions to the remainder of the timetable deferral of the trial dates at considerable inconvenience costs and prejudice. It has also complained with some force that the adequacy of the explanation given for the late filing of Mr Pease's affidavit is insufficient given that Schütz is seeking the indulgence of the Court for a second time having filed evidence outside of the terms of leave previously given.
34 VIP submits that it is the only available inference in the absence of a proper explanation is that the timing of the filing of Mr Pease's evidence was the result of a forensic decision not to deploy his evidence in chief and thereby afford VIP the opportunity to respond to it, but rather to hold it back until a reply and to obtain a forensic advantage thereby.