History of Local Court proceedings
8 By statement of claim dated 11 September 2006, Pool Data claimed the amount of $29,794.11 for money due by Mr Saul for work performed by Pool Data, plus interest.
9 Pool Data had prepared an expert's report to support a claim that Mr Saul had lodged in the Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal (CTTT). Mr Saul lost in the CTTT. By defence in the Local Court proceedings, Mr Saul has pleaded that the services provided were not in accordance with the retainer and he provided legal services for which he was not entitled to recover any fees.
10 On 24 January 2007, the matter was listed for pre-trial review in the Local Court at Forster and the following directions were made: The parties were to exchange statements of evidence by 9 March 2007; the matter was listed for a status conference on 14 March 2007 and was listed for hearing on 22 March 2007.
11 In February 2007, Stephen Bromhead, solicitor ceased to act for Pool Data. Pool Data then engaged the services of Mark Morris, solicitor. Mr Morris sought Mr Saul's consent to vacate the hearing date and the adjournment of the hearing. Mr Saul consented to this.
12 On 14 March 2007, the following directions were made; (a) Hearing vacated; (b) subpoenas returned on 18 April 2007; (c) parties exchange statements of evidence by 27 April 2007; (d) matter listed for mention on 1 May 2007; and (e) matter listed for hearing on 10 May 2007.
13 On 24 April 2007, Mr Saul attended a conference with Paul Batley, of counsel, and Steve Young, a solicitor employed by Mr Saul's solicitor, D I McKern. During the course of that conference, Mr Young informed Mr Saul that D I McKern could no longer act for him because there was a conflict of interest.
14 On 1 May 2007, Mr Batley attended the Local Court at Forster when the hearing date for 10 May 2007 was vacated and the matter was adjourned for directions on 10 May 2007. In about early May 2007, Jane Adams solicitor, agreed to represent Mr Saul.
15 On 10 May 2007, Mr Laurie Hagan, solicitor, appeared as agent for Ms Adams. The matter was adjourned until 23 May 2007. On 23 May 2007, Mr Hagan again appeared as agent for Ms Adams and the following directions were made: (a) parties exchange witness statements in the Local Court registry at Forster at 11.00 am on 29 June 2007; (b) matter listed for mention on 4 July 2007; and (c) matter listed for hearing on 12 July 2007.
16 On 26 June 2007, Mr Saul was informed by George Domaradzki of the Legal Aid Commission that Ms Adams had notified him that she was not prepared to continue to act for him. On 28 June 2007, Mr Saul attended the office of Mr Batley and completed a statement for the purpose of the proceedings and completed a notice of motion and affidavit. The notice of motion sought that the hearing date be vacated and that Mr Saul be given leave to file a cross claim within 14 days.
17 On 4 July 2007, the matter was before the Magistrate to ensure that there had been compliance with the prior court orders. Mr Morris, the solicitor who appeared for Pool Data, stated:
"There has been exchange of statements your Honour but it was done informally and I have here the originals of my client's statement and that of his expert witness, Anthony Grieve and I seek to hand those up to your Honour." (t 1)
18 Later at (t 4) Mr Morris again stated:
"…Well your Honour the submissions of the plaintiff are that the parties have already exchanged statements in the matter, which your Honour had previously ordered. So therefore if the motion were granted, there would have to be, there would be a re-opening of the pleadings, and therefore further statements may have to be filed to answer the issues raised by the further pleadings."
19 The Magistrate in his extempore reasons for decision relevantly stated (at t 7):
"…The court can strike out the defence filed by the defendant in these proceedings. No such application is made.
The notice of motion now, in my view, seems to suggest that if I do adjourn the matter, I have to vacate the hearing date. One of the effects of that would be is that the defendant in the proceedings has access to the plaintiff's material, at a time which would allow the defendant to then draft his material. It is possible and there is no doubt a submission that would be put, that his material would be drafted in light of the access to the plaintiff's material. In my view, that would be totally in appropriate and could well be seen as a disadvantageous position from the plaintiff's perspective.
So in respect of the motion firstly to vacate the hearing date, that is refused. In respect of the motion which I take to be that leave be granted that the defendant be allowed to file a cross-claim, in relation to that the motion is also refused. In respect of the matter before the Court, the defence filed in these proceedings by the defendant is struck out."
20 On 4 July 2007, the Magistrate refused to vacate the hearing and did not grant leave to file a cross claim. As previously stated, this part of the Magistrate's decision is not the subject of this appeal.
21 It is appropriate at this point that I remind myself of the principles according to which this court is to decide the Magistrate's discretionary decision. They are stated definitively in a short passage in the joint judgment of Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504-505. It is, I think, useful to re-state them as follows:
"The manner in which an appeal against an exercise of discretion should be determined is governed by established principles. It is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so. It may not appear how the primary judge has reached the result embodied in his order, but, if upon the facts it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance. In such a case, although the nature of the error may not be discoverable, the exercise of the discretion is reviewed on the ground that a substantial wrong has in fact occurred."
22 Counsel for Mr Saul referred to Part 6 Division 1 provisions
"Part 6 Case management and interlocutory matters
Division 1 Guiding principles