SANTOS v R

Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW)|2010-03-02|Before: Giles JA, Hulme J, Latham J

The Applicant's Subjective Circumstances 15 The applicant's subjective case was a very favourable one. At the time of sentence he was 25 years of age and had no prior convictions. He was educated to university level and obtained degrees in business and information systems. He supported himself throughout his tertiary studies by working in the hotel industry. After his graduation he was unable to obtain full-time work in the business community, so he continued working in bars and related hospitality areas. However, at the time of sentence he had obtained full-time employment with a financial institution as a systems analyst. A testimonial from his employer spoke positively of the applicant's work ethic. 16 An impressive number of very positive testimonials were tendered on sentence. The applicant had voluntarily participated in programs at Ronald McDonald house in July 2002 and had also volunteered at the Matthew Talbot Hostel in East Sydney since his arrest. The Judge accepted that his prospects of rehabilitation were good and that he was unlikely to re-offend. There was cogent evidence of the applicant's contrition and remorse. 17 The principal subjective circumstance upon which the applicant's legal representative relied on sentence and on the hearing of the appeal was the fact that the applicant was diagnosed with cancer at the age of nine. He underwent lengthy treatment, including chemotherapy and annual medical checkups. In June 2002, it appeared that the cancer had re-emerged, however further investigation discounted that possibility. The applicant lives with the anxiety of a recurrence of his childhood cancer, a fear which was more acute at the time of sentence owing to a diagnosis of cancer in his grandmother.

Error in the Consideration of the Applicant's Subjective Case 25 The Judge noted what was said in R v Gip ; R v Ly [2006] NSWCCA 115 concerning the features of trafficking, and went on to consider whether the applicant's subjective circumstances warranted the description "exceptional", so as to justify the imposition of a sentence falling short of full-time custody. 26 The combination of circumstances enumerated by the Judge were the applicant's age, his good character, his employment history and the fact that he was drug-free. These were relied upon by the applicant, in combination with the applicant's heightened susceptibility to risk taking behaviour, such as drug abuse, and the applicant's post traumatic stress disorder, arising directly out of his experience as a cancer survivor from a young age. The applicant's legal representative referred expressly to Mr Diment's report and to Dr Cohn's report in submitting that it was this aspect of the applicant's history which elevated it to "an exceptional case". Yet, the Judge did not include this arguably most significant factor when addressing this particular issue. 27 Earlier in his remarks, the Judge referred to the applicant's cancer diagnosis, but failed to link it to his consideration of exceptional circumstances. To the extent that the applicant was undergoing treatment for depression, that was considered in the context of a finding of special circumstances. Dr Cohn's and Mr Diment's report were not referred to by the Judge, although it is accepted that he was aware of the significance that the applicant attributed to them. 28 In my view, the applicant has established error in this respect. The applicant's primary submission is that the error leads to the conclusion that the Judge ought to have found exceptional circumstances. In the alternative, the applicant submits that the error leads to the conclusion that the sentence is manifestly excessive.

Exceptional Circumstances 29 As Handley JA observed in R v Saba [2006] NSWCCA 214 at [17] to [19] :- This Court has consistently held that drug trafficking requires the imposition of a sentence of full time custody unless there are exceptional circumstances. Although this principle predates the decision in R v Clarke (NSWCCA, 15 March 1990, unreported), that case is commonly cited for this proposition. As Priestley JA pointed out in R v Cacciola (1998) 104 A Crim R 178, this Court has not undertaken an exhaustive definition of what does and does not constitute exceptional circumstances. Nevertheless there are some clear guidelines. 18 Rehabilitation by itself is not an exceptional circumstance. That was established in R v Thompson (NSWCCA, 4 April 1991, unreported), particularly in the judgment of Hunt J at pp 9 and 10. His Honour referred to the case of R v Betwell (NSWCCA, 4 December 1990, unreported) where two Judges of this Court held that a combination of a period of full time custody, in that case seven months, and rehabilitation did constitute exceptional circumstances. 19 Further consideration was given to this question in R v Carrion (2002) 49 NSWLR 149 in the judgment of Grove J at 153-155, concurred in by other members of the Court. His Honour distinguished between matters he categorised as commonplace and matters he categorised as exceptional. 30 Grove J's analysis in Carrion confirms that the relevant exceptional matter is regarded as such because it is "a matter of exceptional mitigation" (at [28]) or because it constitutes "an exceptional reason for departing from applicable authority" (at [31]). 31 In R v Cacciola (1998) 104 A Crim R 178, it was said that "a combination of subjective circumstances each strong in itself does not add up to exceptional circumstances unless the aggregate of all those circumstances point to the case being one of real difference from the general run of cases that come before the Courts." 32 Accepting that the applicant's childhood cancer diagnosis, and his subsequent treatment, was a significant feature of his subjective case, did the combination of all of the subjective factors take this case out of the general run of cases, and mitigate the objective gravity of the offences, to the extent that a penalty other than full-time custody adequately reflected the criminality of the applicant? There are a number of features of the applicant's offending that compel me to answer "no". 33 The applicant was not so immature or lacking in judgment that he could not appreciate that the supply of prohibited drugs was a serious criminal offence. The applicant's use of ecstasy commenced, on his own account, during his last year at university. Since gaining his tertiary qualifications at the end of 2006, the applicant's preferred form of casual employment gave him ready access to the drug culture.

34 The applicant's grandmother was diagnosed in 1993 with an inoperable benign tumour on the right side of the brain. Since that time, she has had cancer of the left kidney (2003) and cervical cancer (October 2007). As at the date of sentence, the applicant's grandmother was 81 years of age and undergoing 3 monthly check-ups. In short, the applicant had lived with the knowledge that his grandmother had cancer since at least 2003. I accept that a diagnosis of cancer in a family member at any time would remind the applicant of his own mortality. It may be accepted that the applicant's use of ecstasy increased in 2007 as a result of that anxiety. However, implicit in the applicant's argument is the proposition that he would not have engaged in the wholesale purchase and supply of ecstasy, but for his heavy consumption of that drug, which was in turn related to his childhood cancer and sequelae.

35 The applicant's evidence was that his personal use at its height was up to 15 tablets per week at a cost of approximately $340. The applicant was financing his use from his bar earnings. Given the lack of any substantial expenses, that represented about half of his weekly income, which was well within his means. He estimated that he had sold about 120 tablets in total for $30 each between December 2008 and his arrest, and that he had used about 100 tablets in that time. The applicant further admitted that he proposed selling about 100 of the 250 tablets that were the subject of the deemed supply charge. By selling about half of the amount that he purchased at about twice the cost, the applicant was effectively breaking even. This allowed the applicant to indulge in drug-taking without having to pay for it from his legitimate earnings. 36 I reject the proposition that the applicant was somehow driven to engage in the supply of ecstasy because of his personal use. It was a deliberate and calculated decision to obtain free drugs for himself, rather than deplete his wages. Whatever personal factors might incline one to engage in risk-taking behaviour, such as the consumption of illicit drugs, those same personal factors ought not necessarily lead to a conscious decision to supply drugs. 37 The applicant's circumstances were not so exceptional that a sentence other than full-time custody was within the proper exercise of the sentencing discretion. I turn to the question whether the sentence is manifestly excessive.

Manifest Excess 38 There can be no complaint that a fixed term of 4 months for an actual supply of 4.4 g of MDMA is manifestly excessive. The amount of the supply on this count represents slightly more than three times the indictable quantity. In any event, the applicant only served one month's custody solely referable to this offence, given the commencement of the sentence imposed for the second count. 39 The amount in the possession of the applicant on the second count represented 60 times the indictable quantity. A sentence of 2 years and 4 months for an offence carrying a 15 year maximum penalty falls in the lower half of the range of sentences imposed in the District Court on first-time offenders pleading guilty, with a matter on a Form 1, according to the Judicial Commission statistics. This is a sentence which is consistent with the Judge's finding that the offence fell below the midrange of objective gravity. It is not, in my view, manifestly excessive. 40 The Judge rightly recognised the applicant's strong subjective circumstances by reducing the non parole period to approximately half of the sentence. That factor is of some significance on this ground of the appeal, given that the non parole period also plays a role in reflecting the objective gravity of the offences. 41 I would grant leave to appeal and dismiss the appeal. **********

DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.

R v Gip ; R v Ly [2006] NSWCCA 115 CASES CITED : R v Saba [2006] NSWCCA 214 R v Cacciola (1998) 104 A Crim R 178

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Source

Judgment (8 paragraphs)

Parties

Cases Cited (3)

Cited By (2)