By a notice of motion filed on 17 March 2015 the Director of the Independent Commission Against Corruption, to whom I shall refer to as the applicant, seeks an order that the proceedings brought by the three named plaintiffs be dismissed pursuant to rule 13.4 (1)(b) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 ("the Rules"). In the alternative, the applicant seeks that the statement of claim filed by the plaintiffs be struck out pursuant to rule 14.28 (1) of those rules. There was some suggestion that the correct name of the defendant is in fact "Independent Commission Against Corruption" although no formal application for amendment has been made.
It was made clear in the course of argument that notwithstanding the fact that the first prayer for relief in the notice of motion is made pursuant to rule 14.28(1), the applicant's principal position is that the proceedings ought to be dismissed pursuant to rule 13.4(1)(b). In support of the notice of motion the applicant read two affidavits of Karen Susan Fox, solicitor, sworn on 7 April 2015 and 31 August 2015 respectively. The plaintiffs Sandra Lazarus and Jessica Lazarus filed a "joint" affidavit of 25 June 2015 which was also read.
Before dealing with the motion itself, it is necessary to outline a number of events which occurred at the commencement of the proceedings this morning and which resulted in the plaintiffs making an application for adjournment.
When the matter was called, Mr Chrysostomou of counsel announced his appearance on behalf of the applicant. The transcript will reflect that when he did so I enquired as to whether or not he knew if the plaintiffs were at Court. He indicated that although he had not seen the plaintiffs himself, some information had been provided to him which suggested that one or more of the plaintiffs were in fact in the precincts of the Court. My Tipstaff then called the matter of "Sandra Lazarus and others against the Independent Commission Against Corruption" outside the Court and made a search of the public area on Level 10. There was no appearance by any of the plaintiffs at that point. However, because it had been indicated to me that one or more of the plaintiffs had in fact been seen within the precincts of the Court earlier in the morning, I asked my Tipstaff to go to the Registry to make enquiries as to whether or not any of the plaintiffs were within that area of the building.
After my Tipstaff left the Court room for that purpose, the plaintiff Jessica Lazarus appeared before the Court. The following exchange took place (commencing at T2 L40):
"HIS HONOUR: Yes, Mam, are you one of the plaintiffs in these proceedings.
THIRD PLAINTIFF: Yes, I am.
HIS HONOUR: And your name is?
THIRD PLAINTIFF: Jessica Lazarus.
HIS HONOUR: Are your two sisters here?
THIRD PLAINTIFF: No, they are not.
HIS HONOUR: They are not?
THIRD PLAINTIFF: No.
HIS HONOUR: Are they intending to come?
THIRD PLAINTIFF: No.
HIS HONOUR: They are not?
THIRD PLAINTIFF: I have got an affidavit that I wanted to‑‑
HIS HONOUR: All right. Just have a seat there."
The affidavit to which Ms Lazarus referred was an unsworn affidavit of 1 September 2015. A sworn copy was later filed. A copy of that affidavit was provided to Mr Chrysostomou who sought an adjournment in order to obtain instructions in relation to its contents.
During the course of the adjournment I was informed by my Tipstaff that two persons who had identified themselves as the plaintiff Sandra Lazarus and Michelle Lazarus were in fact on Level 4 of the Court building speaking to Registry staff about subpoenas. My Tipstaff informed them that the motion brought by the applicant was before me for hearing this morning, and invited them to accompany him to Court. They refused. I was informed that one of them at that stage said words to the effect, "Don't tell him anything." There is, in the light of what I was subsequently told by the plaintiff Jessica Lazarus, an issue as to what may have been said but in the circumstances it is of no moment.
I then resumed the proceedings and placed what I had been told on the record. I indicated to the plaintiff Jessica Lazarus that in light of what I had been told, and in particular in the light of the fact that the two other plaintiffs were in fact within the Court building, I regarded her previous answers to my questions as being, at the very least, misleading.
Ms Lazarus confirmed that she wished to make an application for an adjournment of the hearing today. In support of her application she relied on her affidavit of 1 September 2015. Having read that affidavit and heard submissions, I concluded that the application should be refused. I indicated that I would provide reasons later. Having given that indication, I adjourned the proceedings for a further 20 minutes to allow Ms Lazarus to go down to Level 4 to speak to her sisters, and to ascertain whether they wished to take part in the proceedings.
When I resumed, Ms Lazarus was initially not present in Court although she appeared before me a short time later. She effectively re-agitated her application for an adjournment, variously stating that she and her sisters were unrepresented, and that they were psychologically ill and in no fit medical state to appear before the Court. Ms Lazarus submitted that in the circumstances it would be unjust if the matter were allowed to proceed. In putting those matters before me, Ms Lazarus made it clear that she was relying on the various medical certificates which were annexed to her affidavit of 1 September 2015. I indicated to her that for reasons that I would articulate, her application for an adjournment was refused. At that point she told me that she wished to "take her leave" because she did not consider herself to be in a position to proceed. I indicated to her that whether she remained was a matter for her, at which time she left the Bar table and walked out of the Court room. She did not return.
In terms of the application for an adjournment, it is relevant to note that the affidavit of Ms Fox sworn on 31 August 2015 establishes that the matter was listed before the Court for directions on 28 July 2015. Mr Chrysostomou of counsel appeared for the applicant on that occasion before Registrar Kenna but the plaintiffs did not appear. The Registrar ordered that:
1. the plaintiffs file and serve their submissions in respect of the applicant's motion by 5 August 2015;
2. the motion be listed for hearing on 1 September 2015;
3. the applicant notify the plaintiffs of such orders.
The affidavit of Ms Fox also deposes (at paragraph [4]) to the fact that letters setting out these orders were sent to each of the plaintiffs on 28 July 2015. It is self-evident, given the appearance of the plaintiff Jessica Lazarus before the Court this morning, that she received notification of those orders. I also infer that her two sisters, the plaintiffs Sandra Lazarus and Michelle Lazarus, also received the letters sent to them or were otherwise made aware that the matter was listed today. I draw that inference from the fact that they were in fact present in the Court building earlier this morning. It is also relevant to mention that the order made by the Registrar requiring the plaintiffs to file and serve their submissions by 5 August 2015 was not complied with.
I have already indicated that the principal evidentiary basis of the application for an adjournment was the affidavit of the plaintiff Jessica Lazarus of 1 September 2015. That affidavit annexed a number of medical certificates which were relied upon in support of the proposition that none of the plaintiffs were medically fit to attend Court and deal with this matter today. It is necessary in those circumstances to set out, at least in part, some of the contents of those medical certificates.
The first two certificates related to the plaintiff Jessica Lazarus. The first was dated 14 August 2015 under the hand of Ed Lukaszewski, a psychologist and counsellor who practices at the Counselling and Psychological Services at the University of New South Wales. Mr Lukaszewski's certificate stated that Ms Lazarus attended personal counselling on three occasions between 4 June and 14 August 2015. According to Mr Lukaszewski, a standardised psychological test which was administered indicated that Ms Lazarus "was highly stressed and moderately depressed". On the third of the consultations with Mr Lukaszewski (on 14 August 2015) Ms Lazarus informed him that she had been experiencing a number of symptoms including hyperventilation, difficulties concentrating on complex tasks and excessive worry. In the opinion of Mr Lukaszewski these were signs of elevated levels of anxiety and of low mood. Mr Lukaszewski did not make any reference to a prognosis in his certificate.
In light of Mr Lukaszewski's recorded history, it should be noted that in appearing before me today, and notwithstanding the fact that she is not an admitted legal practitioner and has no legal training, Ms Lazarus, in my observation, was able to articulate her position clearly and succinctly. She exhibited no overt signs of hyperventilation. Her level of articulation was, in my observation, inconsistent with having a difficulty in concentrating on the task at hand.
The second medical certificate annexed to the affidavit also relates to the plaintiff Jessica Lazarus and is under the hand of Dr Kathryn Medynski of University Health Services at the University of New South Wales. That certificate is dated 17 August 2015. Dr Medynski obtained a history from Ms Lazarus on that occasion that she felt "unfit to litigate and complete upcoming Court submissions within the scheduled timeframe." Dr Medynski thought that Ms Lazarus was exhibiting symptoms of anxiety and panic but her certificate did not state any formal diagnosis. Dr Medynski suggested to Ms Lazarus that she "engage in an assessment and treatment with specialists in psychiatry and psychology." Dr Medynski provided Ms Lazarus with referrals to those specialist practitioners. There is no evidence before me that Ms Lazarus acted upon any of the referrals that she was given.
Dr Medynski's reference to Ms Lazarus being "unfit to litigate" was part of the history provided to her. It was not an expression of her opinion. It is significant that Dr Medynski, although noting that Ms Lazarus exhibited symptoms of anxiety and panic, stopped short of expressing any opinion that those symptoms prevented Ms Lazarus from attending today's hearing and dealing with the motion that was before the Court.
A further medical certificate was provided in relation to the plaintiff Michelle Lazarus under the hand of Dr Clifford Au, a General Practitioner in Mount Druitt. That certificate was in the following terms:
"Ms Michelle Lazarus is receiving medical treatment for major depressive disorder and excessive agitation and anxiety.
She was admitted into a mental health hospital on 3 June 2015.
For the period 5 August 2015 to 5 September 2015 inclusive she will be unfit to litigate or attend Court."
This certificate was completed on 5 August 2015 which was, of course, the date by which the Registrar had ordered that the plaintiffs file and serve their submissions in respect of the motion. A number of observations should be made about this certificate.
Firstly, the certificate does not articulate the nature of the "medical treatment" which Ms Michelle Lazarus is said to be receiving. Secondly, the certificate makes no reference to the period over which such treatment has been administered. Thirdly, the identity of the medical practitioner who diagnosed the "major depressive disorder" from which the plaintiff is said to be suffering is not disclosed. Fourthly, the mental health hospital to which the plaintiff is said to have been admitted on 3 June 2015 is not nominated. Fifthly, it is not clear on the face of the certificate whether it was the plaintiff who admitted herself to that mental health hospital or whether she was admitted by a registered medical practitioner. Sixthly, the certificate makes no mention of the period of time over which the plaintiff was an inpatient at any mental health facility. Seventhly, the certificate makes no mention of what, if any, psychiatric diagnosis was made as a consequence of such admission. In short, the certificate poses more questions than it answers.
It is also significant that in the opinion of Dr Au, the plaintiff's condition is such that she is unable to "litigate or attend Court." Whilst I appreciate that the term "attend Court" may be capable of more than one interpretation, the fact remains that on the information which is available to me today, Ms Lazarus was indeed capable of attending Court, and apparently capable of making enquiries with the registry staff about subpoenas.
In all of these circumstances I regard the medical certificate of Dr Au to be of little or no weight.
A further medical certificate under the hand of Dr Au, relating to the plaintiff Ms Sandra Lazarus, was also annexed to the affidavit. That certificate was in the following terms:
"Ms Sandra Lazarus is receiving medical treatment due to exacerbation of her chronic pain and attendance to pain clinic on 24 August 2015 and for the period 1 September 2015 to 30 September 2015 inclusive she will be unfit for Court proceedings attendances and litigation."
This certificate was completed on 25 August 2015. As is the case with Dr Au's certificate in relation to the plaintiff Ms Michelle Lazarus, this certificate omits relevant information.
Firstly, the nature of the "medical treatment" with which Ms Lazarus is said to be receiving is not specified. Secondly, the period of time over which the treatment has been received is not specified. Thirdly, other than a reference to "chronic pain" the certificate does not diagnose an actual medical condition. Fourthly, the pain clinic which the plaintiff is said to have attended on 24 August 2015 is not specified. Fifthly, it is not clear from the certificate whether the plaintiff's attendance at the pain clinic on 24 August 2015 was her first attendance or not.
Insofar as Dr Au's certificate states that the plaintiff Sandra Lazarus will be unfit for "attendances," her presence in the Court Registry this morning would tend to suggest that, at least in relation to that type of attendance, she suffers from no impediment. What is also worthy of note is that this certificate was completed on 25 August 2015. However, the plaintiff's suggested unfitness was said to become operative from 1 September 2015, which is today. It is, to say the least, curious, that on the face of the certificate the plaintiff was somehow fit between 25 August 2015 and 1 September 2015 but then apparently became unfit for a period commencing on 1 September 2015.
For all of those reasons, I regard the certificate of Dr Au relating to the plaintiff Sandra Lazarus to be of little or no weight.
None of the material annexed to the affidavit of Jessica Lazarus satisfies me that the plaintiffs are not in a position to deal with this matter today. The demeanour of the plaintiff Jessica Lazarus before me earlier this morning was, as far as I could observe, at odds with the complaints of ill health that she made. I have dealt with the shortcomings of the medical evidence in support of the application as it related to the two remaining plaintiffs and I have already alluded to the fact that their presence in the Court building today was itself, at least in part, at odds with the opinions of Dr Au which were expressed in his respective certificates.
Given all of those matters, and bearing in mind the period which has elapsed since the notice of motion was set down for hearing, and also bearing in mind that there was an order requiring the plaintiffs to file submissions by 5 August which was not complied with, I concluded that this matter should proceed. As to that last issue, it is also of some significance, in my view, that in circumstances where the plaintiffs are said to have been suffering from various medical conditions, there was no attempt made to obtain any extension of the order requiring submissions to be served.
I turn then to the determination of the motion which is before the Court.
The first of the affidavits of Ms Fox sets out the background to these proceedings and I draw the following summary from that affidavit.
In August 2011, the applicant published a report entitled "Investigation into corrupt conduct involving alleged fraud on two Sydney hospitals". Annexure A to the affidavit of Ms Fox is a fact sheet summarising the applicant's findings following its investigation. The applicant found that the plaintiff Sandra Lazarus had engaged in corrupt conduct in relation to claims she made and authorised (absent a delegation to do so) for payments in excess of $680,000.00 from the Royal Hospital for Women and the Royal North Shore Hospital, in favour of companies in which she had undisclosed interests and for services that were never provided. A further finding was made that the plaintiff Michelle Lazarus engaged in corrupt conduct in relation to both hospitals by concurring with the submission of false invoices made by Sandra Lazarus on behalf of Wish Consulting Pty Ltd, which was one of three companies in which Sandra Lazarus or Michelle Lazarus had an undisclosed interest. No findings of corrupt conduct were made against Jessica Lazarus. In the course of its report, the applicant made a recommendation that consideration be given to obtaining advice from the Director of Public Prosecutions for New South Wales in respect of the prosecution of Sandra Lazarus and/or Michelle Lazarus.
Sandra Lazarus was subsequently prosecuted for 42 offences of making or using false instruments contrary to s 300(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), as well as 16 offences of obtaining money by false or misleading statements contrary to s 178BB of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). On 27 November 2014 she was found guilty of 27 of the 42 offences contrary to s 300(1), together with the entirety of the 16 offences brought which were contrary to s 178BB. The affidavit of Ms Fox indicates that the matter was then adjourned for sentence. The ultimate outcome of the proceedings is not entirely clear, although that is not material for present purposes.
Proceedings were then brought by Sandra Lazarus seeking judicial review of the Magistrate's decision. The outcome of that matter is also not clear, but again it is of little or no moment. Sandra Lazarus was also referred to this Court in respect of an allegation of contempt arising from her refusal to answer questions put to her when directed to do so by the Magistrate in the Local Court. Again, the outcome of that matter is not apparent.
Criminal proceedings were also brought against Michelle Lazarus who was charged with seven offences of giving false or misleading evidence contrary to s 87(1) of the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988 ("the Act"). She was found guilty of those charges and sentenced to terms of imprisonment which were wholly suspended upon her entering into a good behaviour bond. She apparently lodged an appeal against her convictions for those matters, the outcome of which is not known.
Against that background, the three plaintiffs filed a statement of claim in this Court on 9 February 2015. In that statement of claim each plaintiff seeks damages of $320 million together with payment of interest said to amount to a further $7,200,000. Because of the nature of the present application it is necessary for me to set out the statement of claim in its entirety. It is pleaded as follows:
"1. On 28 May 2010 the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) executed a search warrant at 33 Pangari Crescent, Dharruk, NSW 2770. The ICAC neglected to follow proper search warrant procedures, resulting in professional negligence.
2. On 12 July 2010 and 15 December 2010 the ICAC conducted a private Inquiry in which Sandra Lazarus (plaintiff 1), Michelle Lazarus (plaintiff 2), and Jessica Lazarus (plaintiff 3) where (Sic) affected parties/witnesses. During the Private Inquiry the ICAC neglected to fully investigate the matter.
3. The ICAC began a Public Inquiry on 14 February 2011 during which they neglected to fully investigate the matter.
4. Prior to and/or during the ICAC inquiries, ICAC personnel involved in the matter made false and/or misleading statements to witnesses during collection of evidence and during formal correspondence in relation to the private and public inquiries. This amounted to serious professional negligence.
5. The ICAC also engaged in professional negligence during handling of evidence for the investigation/inquiries.
6. The ICAC's professional negligence during the investigation/inquiry resulted in a serious bias against the plaintiffs both during and beyond the private and public inquiries.
7. The ICAC neglected to fully investigate the matter which again amounted to serious bias and professional negligence.
8. The ongoing professional negligence of the ICAC resulted in ongoing serious harm, injury and damages to the plaintiffs."
It will be evident from the manner in which the statement of claim is pleaded that the cause of action which the plaintiffs apparently seek to bring is one in negligence. But for the contents of paragraph 4 (to which I will return) it is not pleaded that the alleged negligent conduct was in bad faith.
Rule 13.4 of the Rules is in the following terms:
13.4 Frivolous and vexatious proceedings
(cf SCR Part 13, rule 5; DCR Part 11A, rule 3; LCR Part 10A, rule 3)
(1) If in any proceedings it appears to the court that in relation to the proceedings generally or in relation to any claim for relief in the proceedings:
(a) the proceedings are frivolous or vexatious, or
(b) no reasonable cause of action is disclosed, or
(c) the proceedings are an abuse of the process of the court,
the court may order that the proceedings be dismissed generally or in relation to that claim.
(2) The court may receive evidence on the hearing of an application for an order under subrule (1).
Rule 14.28 is in the following terms:
14.28 Circumstances in which court may strike out pleadings
(cf SCR Part 15, rule 26; DCR Part 9, rule 17; LCR Part 8, rule 3)
(1) The court may at any stage of the proceedings order that the whole or any part of a pleading be struck out if the pleading:
(a) discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence or other case appropriate to the nature of the pleading, or
(b) has a tendency to cause prejudice, embarrassment or delay in the proceedings, or
(c) is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court.
(2) The court may receive evidence on the hearing of an application for an order under subrule (1).
Counsel for the applicant filed written submissions with the Court on 22 July 2015. In the course of those submissions counsel properly recognised the exceptional nature of the power under r 13.4, pursuant to which the applicant principally seeks relief. Counsel nevertheless submitted that the proceedings brought by the filing of the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action and ought be dismissed. The primary basis upon which that submission was advanced was that s 109 of the Act conferred a statutory immunity on the applicant. Section 109(1) in the following terms:
"(1) No matter or thing done by the Commission, the Commissioner, the Inspector or any person acting under the direction of the Commission, the Commissioner or the Inspector shall, if the matter or thing was done in good faith for the purpose of executing this or any other act, subject the Commissioner, the Inspector or a person so acting personally to any action, liability, claim or demand."
It was submitted on behalf of the applicant that such a provision operated to defeat the entirety of the claim which was sought to be advanced by the plaintiffs. It was further submitted that the plaintiffs Sandra and Michelle Lazarus could not establish a causal link between the acts or omissions relied upon to constitute the negligence, and the alleged damage. This, it was submitted, was because both of those plaintiffs were prosecuted and convicted in the Local Court in respect of matters arising out of the applicant's inquiry.
It was further submitted that even absent the provisions of s 109, no duty of care could arise at common law in the circumstances. In that regard, counsel relied on the decision of the High Court in Sullivan v Moody [2001] HCA 59; (2001) 207 CLR 562.
Submissions were also made by counsel for the applicant in respect of the alternative relief sought under r 14.28. In that regard, counsel accepted that the terms of paragraph 4 of the statement of claim may lend themselves more to the application of r. 14.28 rather than r. 13.4.
I have already observed that each of the paragraphs 1 to 8 in the statement of claim allege negligence in various forms on the part of the applicant or its officers. The statement of claim has obviously been drafted by a person without legal training. Leaving aside paragraph 4, the pleadings may be construed in such a way that the various individual complaints which are made by the plaintiffs are essentially particulars of the negligence which is asserted. However irrespective of how it is viewed, the claim brought by the plaintiffs is one in negligence. Such negligence is said to arise from:
1. the execution of a search warrant;
2. the conduct of an inquiry;
3. a failure to fully investigate allegations; and
4. the making of false and misleading statements.
But for the matter in (d), there is no suggestion that anything done by or on behalf of the applicant constituting the alleged negligent conduct was done in bad faith. That is obviously significant given the terms of s. 109 of the Act.
I am necessarily mindful of the nature of the power contained in r 13.4. The power is an exceptional one, and it is only appropriately exercised where a claim is so clearly deficient that it would be inappropriate to allow the proceedings to continue: see Tanious v Australian Medical Council Limited [2015] NSWCA 189 at [32] citing General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1964] HCA 69; (1964) 112 CLR 125; Dey v Victorian Railway Commissioners (1949) HCA 1; [1949] 78 CLR 62; Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Limited (1983) HCA 25, [1983] 154 CLR 87; Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority [2006] HCA 27 (2006) 226 CLR 256.
However, I am satisfied that the circumstances of the present case attract the operation of the rule. I am satisfied, in particular, that the provisions of s 109 of the Act confer a statutory immunity upon the applicant and its officers which operates to prohibit the plaintiffs from advancing their claims in negligence as pleaded in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the statement of claim.
The position in respect of para. 4 of the statement of claim is slightly different. As I have outlined, that paragraph makes an allegation that false and/or misleading statements were made to witnesses during the collection of evidence and in correspondence. Although not stated in specific terms, the reference to false and misleading statements may be construed as an assertion that the applicant or its officers acted otherwise than in good faith. Needless to say, that is not a determination I am required to make for the purposes of the present motion. But if that is in fact what the plaintiffs intend to convey, and if the plaintiffs were able to prove such a fact, then the provisions of s 109 of the Act may not confer immunity upon the applicant. For that reason it seems to me that paragraph 4 of the statement of claim stands apart from the remaining paragraphs which are pleaded.
In those circumstances, I have come to the view that the power in r 13.4 is not appropriately exercised so as to dismiss the proceedings insofar as they relate to that paragraph. That said, the pleading in its current form is embarrassing in the sense contemplated by r. 14.28(1)(b). In my view, the appropriate course is to strike out paragraph 4 of the statement of claim and make orders allowing the plaintiffs to re-plead that part of the cause of action that they seek to bring. Depending upon the terms in which it is then pleaded, it will be open to the applicant to seek further particulars and then consider what, if any, course it may wish to take.
Finally, I note that Annexures E, F and G to the first of the affidavits of Ms Fox are copies of correspondence sent to each plaintiff on 7 April 2015. In that correspondence, Ms Fox advised each of the plaintiffs that in the view of the applicant no reasonable cause of action was disclosed in the statement of claim, that the proceedings were without merit, and that they themselves were doomed to fail. In each letter Ms Fox advised that she was instructed to offer to resolve the proceedings on the basis that:
1. a verdict would be entered in favour of the applicant/defendant against each of the plaintiffs; and
2. each party would pay its own costs of the proceedings.
That offer remained open until 5:00 pm on 28 April 2015. There is no evidence of a response being received from any of the plaintiffs. Significantly, it was pointed out by Ms Fox that in making such an offer the applicant was offering to compromise its costs of the proceedings and that in the event that the offer was not accepted, and that in the further event that the applicant was (as it has largely been) successful on the notice of motion, it was highly likely that each of the plaintiffs would be ordered to pay the applicant's costs. It was pointed out that such costs would increase significantly if the applicant was required to prepare for the hearing of the notice of motion.
In those circumstances the applicant should have its costs of the notice of motion.
The orders I make are as follows:
1. Pursuant to rule 13.4(1)(b) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005, I dismiss the proceedings brought by the plaintiffs insofar as those proceedings are contained in paras 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the statement of claim filed on 9 February 2015.
2. Pursuant to Rule 14.28(1)(b) of the Rules, I strike out paragraph 4 of the statement of claim filed on 9 February 2015.
3. I grant leave to the plaintiffs to file and serve an amended statement of claim, restricted to the cause of action pleaded in paragraph 4 of the statement of claim filed on 9 February 2015, by 5:00 pm on 15 September 2015.
4. I stand the matter over for directions before me at 9.15am on 22 September 2015.
5. I grant liberty to any party to restore the matter to the list within 24 hours of contacting my Associate.
6. I order that the plaintiffs pay the defendant's costs of and incidental to the notice of motion, such costs to be payable on the ordinary basis.
7. I direct that the solicitor for the defendant forward to each of the plaintiffs, either by email or by prepaid post, the details of these orders by 5:00pm today, 1 September 2015.
[3]
DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.
Decision last updated: 03 September 2015
Parties
Applicant/Plaintiff:
Sandra Lazarus, Michelle Lazarus and Jessica Lazarus
Respondent/Defendant:
Director of the Independent Commission Against Corruption