SafeWork NSW v MGW Engineering Pty Ltd

THE INCIDENT

1. On 1 February 2018, Mr Manning was injured when he was struck by the uncontrolled release of pressurised water from a fire and deluge main pipe riser located in XP25.
2. He suffered multiple fractures to his left rib, a small laceration to his left lung, a liver laceration and a probable splenic laceration. He did not require surgery. Mr Manning has fully recovered from his injuries and returned to work in full capacity 18 workings days after the incident.
3. On 31 January 2018, being the day before the incident took place, as part of the defendant's contracted tasks, a fire and deluge main that ran between XP25 to XP29 was undergoing hydrostatic water pressure testing. The test was commenced by Mr Stambe. The test involved filling pipes with pressurised water to identify any leakages. Mr Currey was with Mr Stambe when the test commenced.
4. A barricade was installed at XP25 and only Mr Stambe and Mr Currey were allowed in the area. The barricade remained in place until Mr Stambe was satisfied there were no leaks in the pipes under pressure.
5. Mr Stambe decided to continue the hydrostatic water pressure test overnight to ensure any points of concern for leakages would be identified. He requested Mr Bourke to continue the test and check for any leaks over the course of the night. Mr Stambe did not document the handover he provided to Mr Bourke in relation to the continuation of the pressure testing.

Pre-Start Meetings

1. On 1 February 2018, Mr Stambe, Mr Manning and Mr Komulainen attended a pre-start briefing conducted by Mr Lawson. Shortly after the briefing, Mr Stambe, Mr Komulainen and Mr Lawson had a discussion in relation to the work of XP25. This discussion was not documented.
2. During this time, Mr Stambe informed Mr Komulainen and Mr Lawson that the hydrostatic pressure test had been done but the pipe was still under pressure. Mr Lawson did not record the hydrostatic pressure testing in the 'relevant feedback form [sic] previous shift' on the pre-start form.

Works Undertaken on the Day of the Incident

1. Mr Komulainen conducted Kenny Constructions' pre-start meeting and Mr Manning was in attendance. Mr Komulainen advised workers that the pressure test was completed and that the workers could continue works as planned for the day including a concrete pour in XP25.
2. A temporary spool pipe that was situated between each riser's blank cap at XP25 was in the way for Kenny Constructions to perform the concrete pour and a decision was made to remove the temporary spool pipe.
3. It appeared to Mr Manning the temporary spool pipe was connected to a coupling at each of the risers which needed to be removed. No one requested Mr Manning to remove the spool. He mistakenly believed that it was something that had to be done in order to perform the concrete pour. There was no need for Mr Manning to remove the clamp or coupling to disconnect the spool pipe.
4. In removing the bolt of the coupling, Mr Manning was struck by pressurised water which was released from the riser and resulted in his injuries.
5. The spool could have been removed without unbolting the coupling. This is because the spool was only sitting in place on a temporary basis and was only connected to the coupling by tire wire.
6. The fact the spool was not clamped onto the riser should have been evident to someone familiar with spools and indicated that it was not connected to the riser.
7. Mr Komulainen had undertaken the removal of spools in XPs on three separate occasions prior to the incident. However, on those occasions, the caps on the spool had holes in them such that the pipes could not have been subject to water pressure.
8. At the time that Mr Manning was undertaking the task of removing the temporary spool pipe, there were no barricade and/or exclusion zones directly around the riser. There were no information tags on the riser to indicate that it was under pressure and had been isolated.
9. Although a barricade was installed at XP25 and the area was cleared of workers when the pipe was initially pressurised, there was no exclusion zone implemented once the pressure test had been passed. The only barriers in place in the vicinity of XP25 were those of Kenny Constructions to prevent people from accessing their work areas.
10. The defendant did not provide signage around the riser at XP25 as it was not part of the work method specified in SWMS-Services under which the defendant was operating at the time.
11. There had not been pipework tagged out or barricaded to indicate pipes might be under pressure. According to Mr Lawson, on previous occasions when different parts of the deluge system were under pressure, bollards and tape were put in place. Bollards were put up within a couple of hours after the incident had occurred.

Documentation

1. Clause 25.3 of the contract between the defendant and the Joint Venture required the defendant to implement its own safety and management health system. Clause 25.4 of the contract required the defendant to provide the Joint Venture a Safety Management Plan and a Safe Work Method Statement ('SWMS').
2. The defendant's safety management system included: 1. Work Health and Safety Policy; 2. Risk Management Policy; 3. PPE Policy; 4. Hazard Reports and reporting Flowchart; 5. Service and Inspection Registers; 6. Verification of Competency Statement; 7. SWMS; 8. Job Safety and Environmental Analysis; 9. Site Safety Management Plan; 10. Toolbox Meeting Minutes; 11. Work Health and Safety Meeting Minutes; and 12. Checklists.
3. The defendant had a SWMS dated 8 May 2017 ('MGW-SWMS') for the M4 East project. The MGW-SWMS identified pressure testing as an HRCW activity with an associated risk of uncontrolled release of pressure. It provided the following hazard controls in relation to work on or near pressurised gas pipes or mains: 1. Pressure testing: 1. Length of pipe to be tested to be barricaded at all times during pressure testing; 2. Area may be un-barricaded during the filling of the line; 3. Spotter to check for leaks; and 4. Test to be suspended, any remaining pressure bleed off before any repair to leads.
4. The MGW-SWMS was provided to the Joint Venture prior to the incident. After the MGW-SWMS was provided to the Joint Venture, the Joint Venture in consultation with Mr Stambe, prepared the Joint Venture SWMS-Services. The Joint Venture SWMS-Services applied to work performed by the defendant in substitution of the MGW-SWMS.
5. The defendant had a 'Pipeline Hydrostatic Test Procedures' document. It outlined the hydrostatic testing process and requirements for the project undertaken by the defendant at another site. The procedures specified: 1. Warning signs and barricades erected where practical; 2. Personnel in the immediate vicinity, but not involved in the testing process shall be advised of the area to be tested and the duration; 3. Test shall be monitored and patrolled throughout the duration of pressurisation; and 4. Isolate test section at specified boundaries using flanges or spades.
6. Mr Stambe assisted in preparing the Hydrostatic Test Procedures document. This document was never requested by the Joint Venture, however, it was provided to the Joint Venture post-incident.
7. The defendant was not in possession of the SWMS-Services at the date of the incident. The Joint Venture documented systems of work specific to both the defendant and Kenny Constructions did not include reference to the following Joint Venture procedures: 1. Procedures - Stored Energy; 2. Procedures - Personal; and 3. Procedures - P&E Isolation.

Training

1. No specific qualifications are required to pressure test pipes. However, such workers should have a poly weld qualification which Mr Stambe did have.
2. Mr Stambe received no specific training on undertaking pressure tests but had learnt them through job training and experience. Mr Stambe attended a two-day induction provided by the Joint Venture, but he could not recall being inducted on energy sources.

Supervision

1. Mr Stambe was the on-site supervisor. Gordon Parker ('Mr Parker') was Mr Stambe's supervisor. Mr Parker was an Operations Manager for the defendant and was not onsite during the hydrostatic testing. Mr Stambe usually reported to Mr Parker by telephone.
2. Mr Stambe was not supervised when carrying out hydrostatic pressure testing, however, Mr Parker was available to him via telephone. Mr Stambe was not directly supervised as he was the on-site supervisor and qualified to do the work.

SYSTEMS OF WORK AFTER THE INCIDENT

1. The defendant and Mr Stambe participated in the Joint Venture's investigation. As part of that investigation, a review was undertaken of the existing procedures and SWMS. The defendant was not provided with a copy of the Joint Venture investigation.
2. The defendant implemented the following measures after the incident: 1. Employment of a HSEQ Manager on 28 May 2019 reporting directly to the HR & Compliance Manager; 2. Creation of the position of Site Superintendent for the M4 East Project to monitor compliance issues across CPB projects; 3. Creation of the position of Operations Superintendent for Sydney operations to assist in the management of compliance requirements across its Sydney operations; 4. Incorporation into their document work health and safety system of the following: 1. Pressure Test Checklist; 2. Verification of Competency document; and 3. Documented (site) toolbox meeting minutes for MGW personnel.

SENTENCING

1. The penalty to be imposed must be one which will give overall effect to the policy of the Act, in particular, ensuring the safety, health and welfare of workers and others on workplace premises. I have had regard to the principle contained within the Act that workers should be given the highest level of protection against harm to their health, safety and welfare from hazards and risks arising from work: s 3 of the Act.
2. I have had regard to the objectives set out in s 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) ('the Sentencing Act') for the purpose of sentencing. The purposes for which a Court may impose a sentence on an offender are as follows: 1. to ensure that the offender is adequately punished for the offence; 2. to prevent crime by deterring the offender and other persons from committing similar offences; 3. to protect the community from the offender; 4. to promote the rehabilitation of the offender; 5. to make the offender accountable for his or her actions; 6. to denounce the conduct of the offender; and 7. to recognise the harm done to the victim of the crime and the community.
3. The Court is to be guided by the provisions of the Sentencing Act which include: 1. Section 3A which sets out the purpose of sentencing; 2. Section 21A which sets out the aggravating, mitigating and other factors in sentencing; and 3. Section 22 which provides that a guilty plea is to be taken into account on sentence, as is the time when the plea was effectively indicated or entered.
4. The Court is to approach a sentencing exercise on the basis of it being one of 'instinctive synthesis': Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357.
5. The approach to sentencing has been identified by Russell SC DCJ in SafeWork NSW v HCM Building Pty Ltd [2019] NSWDC 632 at [109] in this way: 'The court must identify all the factors that are relevant to the sentence, discuss their significance and then make a value judgment as to what is the appropriate sentence given all the factors of the case: Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39; [2011] 244 CLR 120. This approach to sentencing, known as the "instinctive synthesis" approach, involves the making of a global judgement without any attempt to state precisely how any given factor has influenced the judgement.'

OBJECTIVE SERIOUSNESS OF THE OFFENCE

1. The primary factor to be assessed is the objective seriousness of the offence. Subjective factors play a subsidiary role: Lawrenson Diecasting Pty Ltd v WorkCover Authority (NSW) (1999) 90 IR 464, 474-5.
2. Subjective factors should not be permitted to produce a sentence which fails to adequately reflect the seriousness of the offence: WorkCover Authority (NSW) v Profab Industries Pty Ltd (2000) 49 NSWLR 700 at [31].
3. The objective degree of foreseeability is a matter for the Court to have regard to when considering the gravity of the offence: Capral Aluminium Ltd v WorkCover Authority (NSW) (2000) 49 NSWLR 610 ('Capral Aluminium') at [81].
4. The gravity of the offence is determined by the extent of the duty holder's failure to ensure, so far as was reasonably practicable, that its workers were not exposed to risks to their safety: Orbit Drilling v The Queen (2012) 35 VR 399 at [62] (Maxwell P, Bongiorno JA and Kyrou AJA); Veen v R (No. 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465.
5. An offence will be serious where there is an obvious or foreseeable risk to safety against which appropriate measures were not taken even though such measures were available and feasible: Morrison v Powercoal Pty Ltd (No. 3) (2005) 147 IR 117.
6. The Court of Criminal Appeal examined the sentencing process with regard to the Act in the matter of Nash v Silver City Drilling (NSW) Pty Ltd ('Nash v Silver City') [2017] NSWCCA 96. Justice Basten at [34], under the heading 'Assessment of Risk' said: 'The sentencing judge commenced his consideration with the proposition that '[g]reater culpability attaches to the failure to guard against an event the occurrence of which is probable rather than an event the occurrence of which is extremely unlikely.' However, the truth of that proposition depends upon other considerations, including (a) the potential consequences of the risk, which may be mild or catastrophic, (b) the availability of steps to lessen, minimise or remove the risk and (c) whether such steps are complex and burdensome or only mildly inconvenient. Relative culpability depends upon an assessment of all those factors.'
7. His Honour further observed at [42]: 'The culpability of the respondent is not necessarily to be determined by the remoteness of the risk occurring, nor by a step-by-step assessment of the various elements. Culpability will turn upon an overall evaluation of various factors, which may pull in different directions. Culpability in this case is reasonably high because, even if the pressure event of the force which occurred might not be expected to occur often, the seriousness of the foreseeable resultant harm is extreme and the steps to be taken to avoid it, which were not even assessed, were straightforward and involved only minor inconvenience and little, if any, cost. That assessment will involve both objective considerations and a consideration of what the respondent's responsible officers knew or ought to have known.'
8. At [53] his Honour dealt with the proper approach to considering the objective seriousness of offences under the Act, saying: 'It is important to note that the risk to be assessed is not the risk of the consequence, to the extent that a worker is in fact injured, but is the risk arising from failure to take reasonably practicable steps to avoid the injury occurring. To discount the seriousness of the risk by reference to the unlikelihood of the injury occurring is apt to lead to error. The conduct in question is the failure to respond to a risk of injury, conduct which will be more serious, the more serious the potential injuries, whether or not they are likely to materialise. The objective seriousness of the conduct will also be affected by the ease with which mitigation steps could have been taken.'
9. I accept that s 3A of the Sentencing Act is generally regarded as a codification of the common law principles of sentencing: R v MA [2004] NSWCCA 92. The purposes of punishment in the section are constrained by the sentencing principles that exist under the common law such as the principles of proportionality and totality: R v MMK [2006] NSWCCA 272.
10. The Court is obliged to make an assessment of where on the scale of criminality the offence lies referable to the maximum penalty prescribed by the legislature: R v Cage [2006] NSWCCA 304 at [17]-[18] (Latham J).
11. The defendant's duty required it to identify risks at the site and to adopt measures to eliminate or minimise them: s 17 of the Act; Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531 at [34] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).
12. The pleaded measures admitted by the defendant to be reasonably practicable steps which it ought to have implemented, but failed to do so, in breach of their duties under s 19(1) of the Act would have virtually eliminated, and at least significantly minimized, the risk. These admitted failures are set out at paragraph 15 of Annexure A to the Amended Summons as follows: 1. Failure to develop, document (including by way of training, instruction and supervision) an adequate safe system for hydrostatic pressure testing of the fire and deluge system which required: 1. the completion of a hydrostatic Pressure Testing Checklist; and/or 2. the fitting of information tags to the pressurised piping system to inform other persons that the piping was pressurised; and/or 3. the placement of barriers to limit access to the pressurised piping in work areas where simultaneous operations were being undertaken; and/or 4. a handover document to be completed recording the status of the pressure testing when the testing was not completed and/or the piping had not been de-energised prior to the end of one shift. 1. Providing adequate information and instruction to work groups which have interface with the work areas where hydrostatic pressurised testing of the fire and deluge system is being undertaken, in respect to: 1. the location, time for commencement and cessation of the testing; and/or 2. the nature of the hazards involved in the testing, including from the unwanted/uncontrolled release of forms of stored energy; and/or 3. communication of the depressurisation and dewatering of the system.
13. By the entry of a plea of guilty, the defendant acknowledges that as a consequence of its failures, persons, and in particular Mr Manning, were exposed to a risk of death or serious injury. The defendant further accepts that the injuries sustained by Mr Manning on 1 February 2018 were a manifestation of the risk.
14. I accept that the hazard that was created was a known hazard, and the testing procedure was a high risk activity. I also note it was a process required for the construction work, and therefore the risk was foreseeable.
15. Unfortunately, Mr Manning did not realise that the coupling did not need to be undone to remove the temporary spool, and he assumed that it did have to be removed. Had he known, then that step in itself could have been the subject of a risk assessment. I accept that this situation arose because the information that the coupling did not need to be removed to remove the temporary spool, was incomplete when passed on to the workers. They knew that after the testing had been done the temporary spool could be removed but did not know that it had not been de-pressurised.
16. The cap that was on the pipe did eliminate the risk entirely, however, the task of removing the cap was how the risk was created and this was based on an incorrect assumption that the cap had to come off. The interference with the pipe and the failure of the defendant to communicate the correct information with regard to the removal of the cap created the risk.
17. The prosecutor, very fairly, accepts that there were safety systems in place, however, there were further steps that could have been taken. It is also common ground between the parties that the further steps that could have been taken are lower order steps. For example, barriers could have been placed to prohibit the entry to that area, or a handover document provided to indicate that the pipe was pressurised.
18. Where there was an obvious or foreseeable risk to safety against which appropriate measures were not taken, in circumstances where such measures were available and feasible, it will be a serious offence: WorkCover Authority (NSW) v Sarjame Storage Pty Ltd [2015] NSWDC 151 at [37] (Kearns DCJ).
19. Despite that, both parties agree that the offending could be seen to be at the low end of the mid-range.
20. The objective seriousness of an offence under s 32 of the Act is considered in the context of the graduation of offences contained in ss 31-32 of the Act: Nash v Silver City at [54]-[56]. The matters relevant to objective seriousness for a s 32 offence include:

• The potential consequences of the risk. Consequences may range from mild to catastrophic. Offending will be more serious where the potential injuries are severe, regardless of whether they are likely to materialize: Ibid [34];
• The availability of steps to eliminate or minimise the risk: Ibid [53];
• Whether those steps are complex, burdensome or mildly inconvenient. If mitigating steps could easily have been taken, the offending will be more serious: Ibid [53];
• Whether the risk was known or ought reasonably to have been known to or identified by the offender;
• Whether the risk was an obvious or clear one; and
• The vulnerability of the workers exposed to the risk: SafeWork NSW v Grandcity Constructions Pty Ltd [2018] NSWDC 398 at [55] (Russell SC DCJ).

DETERRENCE

1. In fixing a penalty in relation to these offences, an important objective feature is the need for specific and general deterrence. This is enshrined in s 3A(b) of the Sentencing Act.
2. General deterrence is a significant factor when safety obligations are breached. The fundamental duty of the Court to ensure a level of penalty for a breach will compel attention to work health and safety issues so that persons are not exposed to risks to their health and safety at the workplace: Fisher v Samaras Industries Pty Ltd (1996) 82 IR 384 at 388 (Hungerford J).
3. When examining matters of deterrence, both specific and general deterrence apply: R v Miria [2009] NSWCCA 68.
4. The Court of Criminal Appeal in Bulga Underground Operations v Nash (2016) 93 NSWLR 338 at [177]-[180] reaffirmed the principle that both aspects of deterrence are matters which should normally be given weight of some substance in the sentencing process, unless there are exceptional circumstances which would allow a Court to depart from this rule, citing with approval the decision of the Full Bench of the Industrial Court of NSW in Capral Aluminium at [74]-[75] which said: '[74] … It follows that both aspects of deterrence [specific and general] are matters which should normally be given weight of some substance in the sentencing process; and although there may be exceptional cases (see, for example, Page v Walco Hoist Rentals Pty Ltd (No 2) [2000] NSWIRComm 39 at [40]-[43]), we would expect such cases to be very rare and where the relevant circumstances were held by the sentencing judge to be established, the judge must indicate with some precision the circumstances which had led to the exceptional course being adopted. '[75] … Even where an offender demonstrates good character or a commitment to rehabilitation, the court may be obliged to have regard to the need for general deterrence: see R v Thompson (1975) 11 SASR 217 at 222. This is particularly so where the offence in question is prevalent in society and represents a serious threat to the community. The need for general deterrence in relation to serious offences under the Act is undeniable.'
5. The requirement to comply with the expectation of the community, that both large and small employers will comply with safety requirements, means that employers must take the obligations imposed by the Act very seriously. However, whilst general deterrence is a matter that I must consider in the sentencing process, it is not a factor to dominate the exercise of sentencing discretion to the exclusion of all other factors.
6. Conduct such as the defendant's must be denounced as the exposure of workers to the potential risk of serious injury or death as a result of being struck by high pressure water due to the uncontrolled release of stored water energy whilst uncoupling the main pipe, requires that the message of work place health and safety be front of mind to all employers at all times.
7. General deterrence must be approached, in my view, in the context of the engineering industry in which the defendant operates. The types of activities, as well as the broader hazards and risks associated with the processes involved in the hydrostatic testing of pressurised piping systems, including the requirements for safe systems of work for the testing process, and provision of adequate information and instructions to work groups which might interface with the work areas where pressure testing was being undertaken, may reasonably be expected to be common throughout other businesses which are undertaken in engineering, mining and tunnel construction.
8. However, I accept that there was no deliberate conduct on the part of the defendant to avoid or ignore its obligations.
9. The defendant had a safety management system which relevantly included a SWMS that identified pressure testing as a high risk construction work activity, with an associated risk of uncontrolled release of pressure, which in turn identified various hazard controls in relation to the work on or near pressurised gas pipes or mains.
10. The defendant had provided that SWMS to the principal contractor and Mr Stambe had consulted with the principal contractor regarding the development of a SWMS in relation to the work which was ultimately performed.
11. Mr Stambe had assisted with the preparation of the Pipeline Hydrostatic Test procedure and was aware of its contents. I accept that it was his responsibility as the defendant's onsite supervisor to ensure tha the safety procedures were followed.
12. Again, and most unfortunately, the fact that the testing had been completed and that the pipes were still under pressure was not communicated to Mr Manning.
13. In relation to specific deterrence, the attitude of the defendant to questions of workplace safety and any steps taken to improve the safety of its worksites following a breach of a duty are relevant, as is the propensity for the defendant to reoffend.
14. I accept that Mr Redfern's affidavit (Exhibit 1) demonstrates that in the period subsequent to the incident, the defendant undertook a number of steps to improve safety in response to the incident.
15. I note that the defendant continues to perform the same work it did when the incident occurred, but the extensive steps taken following the incident, and the acknowledgement of its failing's give me comfort that the prospects of rehabilitation of the defendant are very good, and the need for an element of specific deterrence is minimal in these circumstances.

AGGRAVATING FACTORS

1. The injuries sustained by Mr Manning were serious. He was struck by high pressure water from the uncontrolled release of stored water energy, approximately 1600kPa when he unbolted the coupling. He sustained multiple left sided rib fractures, a small lung laceration medially in the left lung, a Grade 2 liver laceration and a probable Grade 1 splenic laceration.
2. I have also had regard to Mr Manning's Victim Impact Statement (Exhibit B). It is apparent that Mr Manning continues to suffer from the injuries he sustained in the accident and the impact of what must have been a frightening event, continues to trouble him: s 21A(2)(g) of the Sentencing Act.

MITIGATING FACTORS

1. The defendant entered an early plea of guilty, and the prosecutor submits it is open to me to find that the defendant is entitled to the maximum discount on that basis, thus I will allow the deduction of 25% for the utilitarian value of the plea: s 22 of the Sentencing Act.
2. The defendant co-operated with the investigation by SafeWork and I have taken that into an account as a mitigating factor: s 21A(3)(m) of the Sentencing Act.
3. The defendant has no previous convictions and the prosecutor fairly concedes that this is a matter that can be taken into account as a mitigating factor. To my mind, noting the defendant has operated in an industry which is inherently dangerous for a lengthy period, this is a significant mitigating factor: ss 21A(3)(d) and (e) of the Sentencing Act.
4. Further, the prosecutor also fairly concedes, with which I agree, that the defendant has good prospects of rehabilitation: s 21A(3)(h) of the Sentencing Act.
5. Section 21A(3)(i) of the Sentencing Act provides that remorse may be taken into account as a mitigating factor and this has been demonstrated in Mr Redfern's affidavit (Exhibit 1). The prosecutor concedes, and I accept that the defendant, through Mr Redfern, has shown remorse and contrition and as such is entitled to leniency on that basis.
6. I accept that the size and nature of the defendant's undertaking and the inherent risks involved in the construction industry are matters which I can take into account in mitigation and I have done so in coming to my determination of penalty. At the time of the incident the defendant was a relatively small business, and currently employs 77 employees on a permanent basis and 40 people on a casual basis as well as contractors on an 'as needed' basis.
7. I also note that the defendant regularly participates in charitable activities and make significant donations to charities, organisation and community events. I therefore accept that the defendant is a good corporate citizen.
8. The appropriate fine is $150,000.00. The defendant is entitled to a discount of 25% for the early plea.

PENALTY

1. I make the following orders: 1. The defendant is convicted. 2. The appropriate fine is $150,000.00 and that will be reduced by 25% to reflect the early plea. 3. Accordingly, I order the defendant pay a fine of $112,500.00. 4. Pursuant to s 122(2) of the Fines Act 1996 (NSW), 50% of the fine imposed is to be paid to the prosecutor. 5. Pursuant to s 257B of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 the defendant is to pay the prosecutor's costs as agreed or assessed.

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DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 23 July 2021