purpose intended or contemplated by the testator (Biscoe v. Jackson
(1) ). "The authorities," said Parker J.in In re Wilson ; Twentyman
vy. Simpson (2), " must be divided into two classes. First of all, we
have a class of case where, in form, the gift is given for a particular
charitable purpose, but it is possible, taking the will as a whole, to
say that, notwithstanding the form of the gift, the paramount
intention, according to the true construction of the will, is to give
the property in the first instance for a general charitable purpose
rather than a particular charitable purpose, and to graft on to the
general gift a direction as to the desires or intentions of the testator
as to the manner in which the general gift is to be carried into effect.
In that case, though it is impossible to carry out the precise directions,
on ordinary principles the gift for the general charitable purpose will
remain and be perfectly good, and the court, by virtue of its adminis-
trative jurisdiction, can direct a scheme as to how it is to be carried
out. In fact the will will be read as though the particular direction
had not been in the will at all, but there had been simply a general
direction as to the application of the fund for the general charitable
purpose in question. Then there is the second class of cases, where,
on the true construction of the will, no such paramount general
intention can be inferred, and where the gift, being in form a par-
ticular gift, - a gift for a particular purpose - and it being impossible
to carry out that particular purpose, the whole gift is held to fail.
In my opinion, the question whether a particular case falls within
one of those classes of cases or within the other is simply a question
of the construction of a particular instrument."