102 In Navarro v Spanish-Australian Club of Canberra Inc (1987) 87 FLR 390, the plaintiff's membership of the defendant club was purportedly suspended. The rules made provision for notice in the case of expulsion but were silent in the case of suspension. Miles CJ held that the absence of proper notice was not a breach of the rules, though it was a denial of natural justice by reason of which the resolution was void. Insofar as breach of the rules was alleged, his Honour said (at 397):
I am unable to see on any of the material put before me how an incorporated body such as the club becomes liable in damages simply because it has, through its Committee, acted in breach of the rules of the club to the detriment of a member. No authority was cited as direct support for this broad proposition. In any event there is no causal connection between the breach, namely the failure to give notice of the meeting, and the damage alleged, that is the detriment suffered by the loss of membership for a year. It was the decision of the Committee to suspend membership (not the failure to give notice) which caused the detriment. The decision, and the detriment, might just as well have occurred if notice had been given. Damage to loss of reputation was not pleaded and there was no evidence of it.
103 As to the consequences of a breach of the rules of natural justice, his Honour said:
For the plaintiffs it was submitted that a breach of those rules led to a right to damages if damages were sustained. No authority was cited for that submission. It is, in my view, contrary to principle. Where a body is required to observe the rules of natural justice but fails to do so, any decision consequent thereon may be declared void by a competent court and a person adversely affected is restored to the position which he or she occupied prior to the decision. The relief granted which has the effect of nullifying the decision taken, may be by way of a declaration or the prerogative writ of prohibition, but if a right to damages exists, it has to be found elsewhere than in the right to have the decision nullified for breach of natural justice. As I have said, the plaintiffs' claim is not for breach of contract. The club was not guilty of breach of contract, and the decision of the Committee was not a breach of r 93. I can see no basis on which damages might be awarded.
104 With great respect, there are a number of difficulties with this. First, insofar as his Honour held that an incorporated club did not become liable in damages for acting in breach of its rules to the detriment of a member, and that no authority had been cited for the proposition that it did, reference cannot have been made to Abbott v Sullivan, King v Foxton Racing Club, Fagan v National Coursing Association of SA Incorporated or Byrne v Auckland Irish Society Inc, all of which support the view - on which some of them depend - that damages may be awarded in respect of a wrongful expulsion, on the basis of breach of contract, in the case of an incorporated club. Secondly, insofar as his Honour denied a causal connection between the failure to give notice in accordance with the rules and the detriment suffered by loss of membership which was found to flow not from the failure to give notice but from the resolution to suspend, that gives too narrow a content to the obligation to give notice: the true obligation is not to expel (or suspend) without due notice, and the detriment flows directly from the suspension in breach of that obligation. The circumstance that the plaintiff might have been suspended in any event had proper notice been given goes to the measure of damages, not to causation.