I have made my son Edward manager of my estate
as long as we both live.
If I become mentally/physically incapacitated, Ed
is to care for me in consultation with DR HANNAM or
his delegates.
Ed is to act as he sees fit to protect, consolidate
and expand my estate, so that it will be as fully
sheltered as possible from taxation both here &
abroad, when my estate passes to Ed & his heirs.
I exempt Ed & his family for the return of all
loan monies & interest, Ed accrues form Trust & Sales
Real Estate loan etc from my estate.
If Ed dies before me, I want Ed's wife
Gwyneth & children to take over from Ed, my
health & estate care needs.
April 5 1998
GIACOMO. G. ROMANO
G. Romano
V. Chose
R. Chose
5 The third document contains no expression which identifies it as a will, and no expression showing that the operation of anything it says was postponed until the death of the deceased. It does not mention the earlier Will and Codicil, or any earlier Will, and does not revoke them or say, in any way, what effect they were to have, or that they were to have no effect. Giacomo Romano had had quite enough ordinary life experience, more than most people, to be aware that wills are usually prepared in a formal way by professional advisers; he had executed several prepared in that way. There was no practical or economic obstacle to his consulting a solicitor about preparation and execution of a Will; he was, in April 1998, engaged in selling several properties so as to raise some millions of dollars. He had ready access to professional and other expert advice in legal business, and also in accountancy and real estate, and there was no lack of sophistication and no inhibition against approaching professional persons in his circumstances, or in the circumstances of his family. If his intention was to prepare and execute a document which was to stand as his testament it is very unlikely that he would have done so in such an informal way and with such informal language.
6 If a document is intended to be a will, and is executed in accordance with formal requirements prescribed by s.7 of the Wills, Probate and Administration Act 1898, the law gives effect to the document. The Act does not comprehensively define a will. Section 3 in its definition of "Will" is not presently helpful, in its alphabetical arrangement or otherwise. For a document to operate as a will it must have been intended by the testator to be his will: to be his testament. What is necessary to give a disposition testamentary character is illustrated by the decision in Bird v. Perpetual Executors and Trustees Association (1946) 73 CLR 140 and by the judgment of Latham CJ at 143-144, Starke J at 144-145, Williams J at 153. See too Russell v. Scott (1936) 55 CLR 440, Starke J at 448, Dixon and Evatt JJ at 454. For the present purposes a will must be and must be intended to dispose of property or of rights of the testator in a disposition which is to take effect when the testator dies, but until then is not to take effect, but is to be revokable. (Other things which a will may do without disposing of property, including appointing an executor, revoking a will and appointing a guardian of an infant are not presently relevant.) If the third document has the effect contended for, the earlier will and codicil will not have any continuing effect except as to the appointment of Mr Edward Romano as executor.
7 The requirements for the form and manner of execution of wills specified in s.7 of the Wills, Probate and Administration Act 1898 were actually fulfilled for the third document; the evidence of Mr and Mrs Chose shows that the signature of Giacomo Romano was made by him in the presence of two witnesses present at the same time, and that Mr and Mrs Chose attested and signed the document in the presence of Giacomo Romano, and of each other. They attested it only by signing it; they did not state or certify in the document any statement that they attested it or that they were witnesses; but in my understanding by signing their signatures after the signature of Giacomo Romano they attested the document in the manner referred to in subs.7(1)(e).
8 It is not necessary that it should appear from the terms of a document that it was intended to be a will. In Whyte or Hamilton v. Pollok or Whyte 7 App Cas 400 Lord Selborne LC, in a Scottish case but referring to an English text, at 409 approved the following passage from Treatise on Wills, Jarman, 3rd ed p13:
The law has not made it requisite to the validity of a Will that it should assume any particular form, or be couched in language technically appropriate to its testamentary character. It is sufficient that the instrument, however irregular in form or inartificial in expression discloses the intention of the maker respecting the posthumous destination of his property; and if this appear to be the nature of its contents, any contrary title or designation which he may have given to it may be disregarded.
9 In that case the document was headed "Notes of intended settlement …" but everything else in it was expressed appropriately for a Will.
10 Although it is usual to find a clear statement identifying the document as a will, that is not legally essential, nor is it essential that expressing the testator's will is the only subject with which the document should deal. See subs.7(1)(c); evidence extrinsic to the document itself is admissible. See too In Re Resch's Will Trust [1969] 1 AC 514, Lord Wilberforce for the Judicial Committee at 547, citing Methuen v. Methuen (1817) 2 Phillimore 416; (1817) 161 ER 1186. If only part of a document expresses the will of the testator, while other parts deal with other matters, the Court may grant probate of the testamentary part only. Actual instances of this seem to be extremely rare. There is inconclusive discussion of the admission to probate of part of the document in Rhodes v. Rhodes (1882) 7 App Cas 192 at 198 (Lord Blackburn for the Privy Council); in that case none of the document was excluded from Probate.
11 The modern law with respect to testamentary capacity begins with Banks v. Goodfellow (1870) LR5QB 549, Cockburn CJ at 556. Testamentary capacity was considered in the High Court of Australia in Timbury v. Coffee (1941) 66 CLR 277 and Bull v. Fullton (1942) 66 CLR 295; see Latham CJ at 299. See too discussion and further authorities in Re Hodges; Shorter v. Hodges (1988) 14 NSWLR 698 at 706 (Powell J); and consideration in the Court of Appeal of New South Wales Re Estate Griffith deceased; Easter v. Griffith (unreported) 7 June 1995 and Shaw & Anor v. Crichton (Unreported) 23 August 1995. It is not essential that there be insanity or any disorder of the mind, or that there be delusions, for it to be shown that a person did not have testamentary capacity. For a person to have testamentary capacity he must be able to call to mind and consider the property that he has available to dispose of, and the persons who have natural claims for consideration as objects of his bounty; and he must be able to do that without his consideration being affected by hostility which is not rationally based.
12 The burden of proof of all issues is on the plaintiff. The plaintiff bears the onus of proving that the third document or some passages in it were intended by Giacomo Romano to be his Will, and that at the time of executing it he was of sound mind, memory and understanding. The defendants have put testamentary capacity in issue by denying it in the pleadings and by adducing evidence which shows that capacity is open to consideration; but the plaintiff must discharge the burden of proof if he is to succeed. A person who is of sound mind, memory and understanding can make any testamentary disposition he wishes, no matter how inofficious or eccentric; but if dispositions are eccentric or do not recognise obvious claims, those facts may be relevant to capacity. Where a document is expressed and executed in circumstances of regularity the person propounding it is usually taken to have discharged the onus of proof of capacity; but all relevant facts in evidence must be taken together.
13 Several circumstances of the preparation, execution and later treatment of the third document indicate to me that the Court should approach with care the question whether it truly expresses intentions of Giacomo Romano, and whether those intentions were testamentary. It is striking that the document was written out by the plaintiff himself, the only person who, according to his claim, could be benefited by it, and that there is no evidence about the circumstances of composing the document and writing it out apart from his own. The testator was familiar with property transactions, and with having wills prepared by solicitors and executing them, and with leaving wills for safekeeping in the office of his solicitor. He did not, according to any evidence, state comprehensively, or even in general outline, what his intended testamentary dispositions were to anybody apart from the plaintiff. He did not make the arrangements for safekeeping the document which were usual for him, which was to the third document in the custody of the solicitor who acted for him in various business and was familiar with his affairs. The Will and Codicil were kept in safe custody by Mr Shehadie, Giacomo Romano's solicitor, and produced by Mr Shehadie for Edward Romano after Mr Giacomo Romano's death. The evidence of the plaintiff is that the testator said that they would keep the document to themselves; no reason for keeping a testamentary document to themselves was given in evidence and none appears to me. If the third document was intended to be a will there is no reason that I can see why it should have been kept from Mr Shehadie, or, if he was not told its terms, why at least its existence should be kept from Mr Shehadie. I can understand why a document making arrangements for management of the testator's affairs during his lifetime in the event that he lost capacity to manage them himself might be kept to themselves; but that would not be a prudent thing to do, even for such a document, and Giacomo Romano could well have confided his arrangements to the solicitor he repeatedly engaged, or at least told him the nature of the document and given it to him for safe-keeping. Giacomo Romano did not store the third document in a careful manner, in a place where he could rely on its being found, even by the plaintiff, after his death.
14 In Re Meynell Deceased, Meynell v. Meynell & Ors [1949] English Weekly Notes 273 the note includes a dictum by Barnard J to the effect that "… if since the passing of [the Wills Act 1837] a person troubled to comply with its formalities and had a document, whatever its form, duly executed, there was a very strong presumption that that document was intended to be a Will." The note goes on to attribute to Barnard J that: "He could not find that any of his predecessors had said so …" and his Lordship did not act on that basis. This dictum was repeated, again as an obiter dictum, by Turner J in In Re Barnes (Deceased) Public Trustee v. Barnes & Ors [1954] NZLR 714 at 716. What is referred to in these dicta as a presumption is plainly not a presumption of law but an approach to the interpretation of evidence which is very much subject to consideration of the whole of the evidence in a particular case.
15 It was contended that in the third document the third sentence with its closing words "when my estate passes to Ed & his heirs" contains an implied gift of the whole of the testator's estate to Edward Romano and his heirs. It is not possible to see clearly why passing of the estate to heirs was referred to. In the Will and Codicil the only beneficiaries named are John Romano and Edward Romano and there is no express provision for benefits to pass to any person traced through them. The reference to Edward Romano "and his family" in the fourth sentence is as difficult to understand as the reference to "& his heirs" in the third sentence. The fifth sentence shows contemplation that Edward Romano might predecease Giacomo Romano.
16 As a matter of language, the closing words of the third sentence do not refer to a gift, but to the time of an event or series of events in which the estate passes to the persons indicated. The time referred to is the time when all the authority conferred to manage the personal estate of the testator during incapacity will come to an end, and the need for action to shelter the estate from taxation will also come to an end. The language used shows an assumption that the estate was to pass at that time, but does not show the basis of the assumption. To speak in terms which show an assumption or a belief that in some unidentified way a testamentary disposition has been made is not to make that testamentary disposition; it is not a way of expressing an intention to make that disposition. If the assumption is wrong, there is no such disposition. The reading contended for is not assisted by the use of the word "estate". That word is used five times throughout the document, and for three of those times it is altogether clear that the word "estate" refers to the property of the testator while he is still alive. This is quite clear in the first sentence, where "estate" first appears in the third sentence and in the last sentence. In the fourth sentence, which speaks of an exemption made at the present time and capable of operating within the lifetime of the testator as well as later, the word "estate" is capable of referring to the estate of Giacomo Romano in the same sense, that is during his lifetime, at least equally so capable as it is of referring to his estate after his death. In the fourth sentence "accrues" is used in the sense known as the "historic present" which refers to the event whenever it happens, not literally in the present, but in this case including future events of accrual of loans and interest. Nothing in the context of the third document gives the word "estate" in the third sentence the colour which it often has of reference to the estate of a deceased person.
17 In the course of cross-examination the plaintiff accepted a meaning of the word "estate" in the third sentence which was put to him by counsel; but the meaning of the document cannot be established by a concession by a party in evidence.
18 In view of the subject matter with which the third sentence deals the reference to passing of the estate is no more than a part of an explanation of the object with which authority to act is conferred on Edward Romano by the first part of the sentence. Statement of an object of sheltering the estate from taxation at a future time is not an occasion on which the maker of the document should be expected to expound fully everything he expects to happen at that future time, or the legal basis on which he expects it to happen. Why when dealing in the third sentence with conferral of present authority, and explaining the reason for doing so, was Giacomo Romano called on to explain or to state fully what his intentions were for dispositions after his death? This was not the occasion for a full statement. The implication which the plaintiff seeks involves not only that the estate is to pass to Ed and his heirs, but that no part of the estate is to pass to anybody else, notwithstanding any earlier disposition; this puts a heavy weight of implication on the word "estate", a weight sufficient to overcome by implication the then existing state of Giacomo Romano's formal dispositions, which were not stated to be revoked. The thought that it is possible that the testator supposed that with the death of John Romano all the estate would pass to the surviving beneficiary named in the Will and Codicil, and did not advert to preservation of gifts of predeceasing children in s.29, seems to be balanced out by the reference to Edward Romano's heirs, whom it would be significant to mention only in contemplation that he might predecease Giacomo Romano.
19 If it had been the intention of Giacomo Romano to express by the third document a testamentary intention that his estate was to pass to the plaintiff and his heirs on the death of the testator, it would have been extremely simple for him to say so. It is very unlikely that Giacomo Romano intended or that anyone would intend to leave such an important matter to a difficult implication.
20 In my opinion, the third sentence, whether taken alone or with extrinsic evidence, does not convey an implication that the testator intended that it should be his will that on his death the whole of his estate should pass to the plaintiff, or should pass to the plaintiff and other persons referred to as his heirs.
21 If the third sentence had the implied testamentary effect contended for the fourth sentence could not have testamentary effect; it could only operate during Giacomo Romano's lifetime as on his death Edward Romano would inherit all the estate and would not need any exemption.
22 There are no textual indications that the fourth sentence was intended to operate in the way in which a Will operates, upon the death of Giacomo Romano but not earlier. Its language indicates that it is to operate forthwith and in the future, the only possible indication that it might be testamentary would depend on the use of the word "estate", and in the context of the third document as a whole that word is not used in a way which refers to the estate left by Giacomo Romano on his death.
23 In my opinion there is no reason to regard the fourth sentence as expressing a testamentary intention. It speaks to exempt "Ed & his family" at the time of speaking, and at that time there were loan moneys on which interest was accruing. Nothing in the third document suggests or supports the reading that the exemption was postponed and was to take effect only on the death of Giacomo Romano. Nothing else in the third document was expressed to take effect only on the death of Giacomo Romano; quite to the contrary what the document provided for was care of the testator and his property during his lifetime. It is improbable that, in the midst of provisions of that kind, a person would choose to say something which was intended to be testamentary, and it is even more improbable that, if he did choose to do that, he would do so in uncertain or doubtful language. It is further improbable that having done so he would revert to the previous subject. But in this case the language is not doubtful but purports to confer an exemption forthwith for everything which accrues from the estate. In the context "my estate" in the fourth sentence refers to the property of Giacomo Romano during his lifetime.
24 The third document does not do some things which persons making wills usually deal with, with which Giacomo Romano had dealt in other testaments, and which would very probably present themselves for the consideration of anybody who thought about making a will. It does not say in its terms that it was a Will or appoint an executor, it does not say in a clear way that it disposes of property upon death and it does not revoke or otherwise say what was to happen with the then extant written dispositions. None of these things is essential if the document was intended to be testamentary, but their absence is adverse to a finding that it was so intended.
25 In my opinion the third document does not express any testamentary intention, and does not make any testamentary disposition. The terms of the third document show that it was intended to deal with management of property in the event of incapacity, and that the mind of the person who composed the document was dominated by that subject. References to management occur, in various forms of words, throughout and show what references to "my estate" were intended to indicate. The principal object of the third document was to record Giacomo Romano's wishes and authority conferred by him about what Edward Romano was to do, including what he was to do in exercise of the Power of Attorney. Its objects did not include expressing testamentary intention.
26 This is no less correct if it should be found that Giacomo Romano thought or spoke of the third document it as his will. No effect is produced if he thought of it that way unless it also contains a testamentary disposition. It would not avail the plaintiff to prove by extrinsic evidence that Giacomo Romano intended the third document to be testamentary unless in its terms it made a testamentary disposition.
27 On 5 April 1998 the plaintiff already had power to deal with Giacomo Romano's property conferred by Power of Attorney dated 17 November 1997; but he had not acted on it. Later he did act on it; including action affecting property of very significant value, as when on 26 July 1999 he executed on behalf of Giacomo Romano as well as on his own behalf a written agreement relating to a loan to himself of $4,038,662.35. The Power of Attorney was an enduring power, expressed to continue to be effective notwithstanding loss of capacity through unsoundness of mind.
28 The evidence of Mr Victor Chose shows that he knew Giacomo Romano as a friend from about 1951 onwards and that with his wife he visited Giacomo Romano regularly and the visits were returned; there were meetings about once a week. He said that on the day the third document was signed Giacomo Romano telephoned him and asked Mr Chose and his wife to come over. They did so and he said "I would like you to witness my signature on a document" and showed them the third document which Mr Chose read. Giacomo Romano said "Eddy has gone back to America. I want to leave everything to him. I don't want to leave everything to Jeanette". He had previously said, on many occasions, to the effect of "Jeanette is only interested in my money." After Mr Victor Chose read the document Giacomo Romano signed it, in the presence of Mrs Rima Chose and Mr Victor Chose, and of nobody else; Mr Victor Chose then signed the document so as to witness it, and Mrs Rima Chose then signed the document.
29 Mrs Rima Chose also gives evidence of knowing Giacomo Romano since about 1951, and regularly meeting him socially. She said that around the time the third document was signed Giacomo Romano was suffering from high blood pressure and had become upset with Mrs Jeanette Romano; he had said on a number of occasion to the effect of "Jeanette is just after my money" and he had been upset when Mrs Jeanette Romano had asked him to pay her for slippers she had bought for him when he was in hospital. He also said to thus effect: "Jeanette is trying to put me into a nursing home and get me out of the house." On earlier occasions, which must have been during John Romano's lifetime he had said: "John and Jeanette want to try to get me into a nursing home to get me out of this house. They want this house." He had also said "John and Jeanette never helped me. If John cuts the grass here for me he charges me $250.00. He stole my money from under the house." Mrs Chose's evidence shows that with her husband she went to Giacomo Romano's house at Blaxland Road on 5 April 1998; he said "I want you to witness my signature on the document"; she read the document and he said "I'm just going to leave everything to Eddy"; the document was then signed. She said that he appeared to understand the document.
30 Upon the evidence of Mr and Mrs Chose, Giacomo Romano did not speak of the third document as his will, or speak in terms of making a will; he spoke in terms of wanting to leave all his property to Edward Romano, and if that subject was so much on his mind that he spoke of it, it seems to me extremely unlikely that he would not have identified the document being signed as his will, if he had thought that it was. The words referring to leaving everything to Eddy probably, in the context including what was in the document, refer to leaving management of affairs to him. However they could have been intended to refer to leaving him property in a will. Mr and Mrs Chose were the only witnesses to Mr Romano's signature.
31 There was no evidence that Giacomo Romano ever referred to the third document as his Will, or spoke of it in terms which had that effect, even to Mr Edward Romano. The closest approach is found in the evidence of Mr and Mrs Chose, and that is no more than an approach; there is no such actual reference even there.
32 In my opinion, the third document should be understood as containing provisions intended to operate during the lifetime of Mr Giacomo Romano, and only then. The first sentence is a strong statement on that subject, and the document never departs from this subject except, at the end of the third sentence, in a brief explanation of the reasons for one of the directions about conduct during Giacomo Romano's lifetime.
33 The complexity of the examination and inquiry which is required for the possibility of expression of a testamentary intention to be perceived is in itself a warning against finding, by a complex examination, an intention which could be expressed readily and simply in a few words. Counsel for the defendants contended that as well as examining the words of the third document closely I should take a step back, form a general view of it and consider whether that showed whether or not it expresses Giacomo Romano's will. I have done that and the exercise shows very decidedly that the third document does not appear to be a will. It does not look like a will, it does not read like a will and it does not say the things that people say in their wills. Only close lawyerlike attention to its words in meticulous detail could even raise the possibility for consideration. It is extremely unlikely that Giacomo Romano intended to act that way.
34 I do not have confidence in Edward Romano's evidence. He is a witness with a very strong interest in the outcome in terms of value of the money lent to him and of the interest, and also in terms of exemption from examination of the transactions in detail. The opportunity to produce evidence bearing on whether or not the document was intended to be testamentary, and the circumstances in which it was produced, is almost entirely within his power, the defendants and any other persons are in a poor position to adduce evidence about those facts, or to investigate the events, find out grounds for challenge, or to challenge and test the veracity and completeness of his case. There was relatively little cross-examination, and the defendants were in a poor position to find source material from which to make any challenge. I do not regard the evidence of Edward Romano as significantly corroborated, and some of the circumstances had the reverse effect of corroboration; they tend to enhance the care to be applied before acceptation of his evidence. It is particularly strange, if the document were testamentary, that it was seen as a document which Giacomo Romano and Edward Romano should keep to themselves, that it was kept by Giacomo Romano and not put in the solicitor's custody, even sealed up, and that when it was found by Edward Romano, during Giacomo Romano's lifetime, but also during his incapacity, it was found in a place where it could not readily be located. Mr Edward Romano's accounts in evidence of where it was found are not uniform, but it was not in a place where it could readily be located when Giacomo Romano was incapable or (if that had been important) when he was dead.
35 In his first affidavit Mr Edward Romano said to the effect that the third document was found by him at Giacomo Romano's home amongst some of his personal papers and belongings, and Giacomo Romano told him that he had signed it. He said that the will and the codicil were found amongst other papers of Giacomo Romano held by his solicitors Mr Michi, Shehadie and Co. He named himself as the only person entitled in distribution and did not disclose loans to himself as assets in the estate: he did not disclose them because he regarded them as released by the third document. He also said that about 23 April 1998, in a telephone conversation, Giacomo Romano told Mr Edward Romano that he had signed the document and had Mr and Mrs Chose come and witness his signature. In June 1998, on occasion when they were about to go to the bank to have another loan agreement witnessed, Edward Romano asked Giacomo Romano "where is that document that I wrote out for you when I was last here? Giacomo Romano went away and came back with the document and said, "Here it is. I will keep it in a safe place." Edward Romano saw that it was the document that he had written out, and that it was signed and witnessed. In his affidavit of 21 June 2002 he said " I found the document which had then been signed among my mother's funeral papers not long before I appeared before Mr Justice Young in this court in other proceedings in respect of the Guardianship of my father". He said in his affidavit of 19 May 2003 "Sometime during 2000 I found the document in an envelope in a filing cabinet at 341 Blaxland Road, Ryde. It was in an envelope with medical reports relating to my late mother."
36 The arrangements made, according to Edward Romano's evidence, between Giacomo Romano and himself about interest are difficult to understand in relation to the expressed object of minimising taxation. (I refer to evidence about interest further at [50], [63] and [64]. Edward Romano's evidence was that the moneys when advanced were placed in term deposits at a bank in the name of Edward Romano, so that the interest was credited to him, with low withholding tax as he was not an Australian resident. If minimising the incidence of taxation was the object it is difficult to understand why the loan agreements provided for interest. That provision, according to Edward Romano's evidence, led to further discussion about the burden of interest on him, and it seems that that discussion led on to the fourth sentence. Giacomo Romano was not really in a position to exempt a borrower from loans or interest accruing to the trust. If the object was to minimise the burden of taxation there was no reason to provide for the loans to carry interest, while the accrual of a right to interest raised the possibility of liability of Giacomo Romano to income tax whether or not the interest was actually paid.
37 Two written loan agreements later in date than the third document expressly provided for interest, and I am unable to see why such provision was appropriate if Giacomo Romano regarded Edward Romano and his family as exempted from interest, and also from loans. The whole array of references to and dealings with interest do not form any pattern that I have observed. The form and function of the loan agreements before and after 5 April 1998 in providing for interest are difficult to understand, although the behaviour of Edward Romano in not paying interest is not.
38 In the third document the fourth sentence refers among other things to loan moneys and interest Edward Romano accrues from the Trust. There is as it happens no reference anywhere in evidence to a loan from the trust to Edward Romano. Evidence of Mr Thomas of what he said to Giacomo Romano towards the end of March 1998 appears to show that all the income from the trust (and distribution of trust income was discretionary) was paid to Edward Romano.
39 In 1994 Giacomo Romano accused John Romano of stealing a large amount of money from a safe at the house at Blaxland Road. Then for about 6 months he had no communication with John Romano and his wife. After John Romano's death, Mrs Jeanette Romano succeeded to him as a co-owner with Giacomo Romano and Edward Romano of land at Ingleside. Giacomo Romano became aware that Mrs Jeanette Romano wanted to sell the land and he became very upset with Jeanette Romano and with Louise who was John's executrix. After a meeting of family members with a solicitor and an accountant in August 1997 Giacomo Romano agreed to list the Ingleside properties for sale. He later told Edward Romano that he thought that Jeanette Romano would meet expenses associated with the sale including costs of obtaining a valuation, clearing and surveying; this led to a dispute. Giacomo Romano suffered a stroke on 22 October 1997. Later he said to Edward Romano "Jeanette killed my son and now she is trying to kill me." Mrs Jeanette Romano commenced proceedings under s66G of the Conveyancing Act 1919 for the appointment of trustees for sale late in December 1997. Soon after the summons was served, the co-owners agreed that the land was to be sold and the money and the proceeds paid to the owners in their respective shares, and they joined in signing Sales Agreements which authorized a real estate agent to sell the land. The Ingleside land was sold at auction on 28 March 1998 and the sale was completed about June 1998. Each co-owner received approximately $600,000 from the sale.