On 29 August 2016, an application by the defendant to dismiss these proceedings for want of prosecution came before me for hearing. Since then the matter has come before me again on 26 September and 15 November 2016. The purpose of those adjournments was to give the plaintiff and his mother every opportunity to find a person, including a practising lawyer, who would be prepared to act as a tutor for the plaintiff who is a person under a legal incapacity. Unfortunately, the best endeavours of the plaintiff and his mother to find such a person have not borne fruit.
I am conscious of the consideration that in appropriate circumstances the Court has power to appoint a suitable tutor, as Mr Weinstein SC put it, "who would be immune from costs": Smith v NRMA Insurance Ltd [2016] NSWSC 250 per Gleeson JA. However, in that case, a solicitor had been identified who was prepared to act as tutor on that basis. The Court could not impose by conscription the status of tutor on a lawyer or anyone else who was unwilling to act in that capacity.
The Court does maintain a list of lawyers who are prepare to act as lawyers on a pro bono basis and referrals are sometimes made under R 7.36 of the Uniform Civil procedure Rules 2005. However, that is a different category of case from assuming the responsibilities of a tutor, even one who is immune from costs. A tutor has the onerous responsibility of making decisions about the progress of the litigation including decisions about whether the case should continue or should be discontinued, and it would be unfair to impose that obligation, which is not a usual incident of legal practice, on a lawyer who was not prepared willingly to assume it. I do not think it is appropriate for me to refer the matter out on that basis.
Included in the efforts made by Mrs Klewer on her son's behalf to find a tutor are approaches to the Law Society of New South Wales. Mrs Klewer has provided a copy of a letter from the Law Society's pro bono unit about the matter. It seems that there was initially some confusion. The Law Society seemed to have assumed that Mrs Klewer and Robert were seeking pro bono assistance but from what Mrs Klewer has told me today and from her written submission, the employed solicitor at the Law Society handling the application has spoken to Mrs Klewer and Mrs Klewer has informed her of the nature of the application.
It seems from the update that Mrs Klewer gave me today that the solicitor has informed her that she has made many inquiries but has been unable to identify anyone who is prepared to act in the capacity of a tutor. I infer even for the limited basis of making the decision about whether the proceedings should continue or be discontinued.
I should also say that it is quite clear to me that Mrs Klewer, who only has her son's best interests at heart, is of the view that proceedings should be at this time discontinued. She has made that clear to me on prior occasions; she has made it clear in her written submissions today; and she has made that clear in what she has said to me today. Her concern has been that Robert not be shut out from recommencing proceedings if the current difficulties in relation to finding an appropriate tutor can be overcome.
I think it appropriate at this time to record that on the review of the evidence that I have undertaken, brief as it has been, there is no doubt that Robert's case is a very difficult one. I could not say it was completely hopeless, however, from reading the joint report of the conclave of liability experts, I am left with the impression, bearing in mind that I have not had the advantage that a trial judge would have of hearing all the evidence in detail and receiving full argument, that the case will be extremely difficult for Robert to win. I think that is a factor which has to be weighed in the balance.
The difficulty in this case, as was fully and admirably summarised by my colleague Wilson J in her judgment of 12 October 2015 ([2015] NSWSC 1493) is that not only is Robert a person labouring under a legal disability but Ms Klewer is a person in respect of whom an order has been made under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW). This puts them in what might be referred to as a "catch 22".
Mrs Klewer has explained to me that Robert functions at a reasonably high level and I have heard him speak over the telephone during the hearings I have conducted. I have no doubt he has a high level of awareness of what is going on. Nonetheless I am in the position where orders have been made that he can only proceed by a tutor and I have not received any evidence which suggests to me that those orders should be dissolved. Indeed, I have not received any evidence which even suggests that that might be an appropriate course.
This brings me then to the application for the defendant for dismissal. The current situation is that since Wilson J gave Robert's brother, Ryan Klewer, leave to withdraw as a tutor, a stay has been in place in these proceedings, which concern events which occurred as long ago as 1992, since October 2015 and on the material before me there is no prospect currently obvious of them being in a position to advance any time soon. This is not due to any lack of effort on the part of Mrs Klewer. As I repeat, she seems to me to have taken every reasonable step to try and advance her son's case. The fact remains, however, that the defendant is at an unfair disadvantage in the sense that these proceedings which are stalled continue to hang over its head. It seems to me that it has a strong argument in favour of the dismissal of the proceedings.
Mrs Klewer, as I have said, has expressed a concern that Robert should not be shut out from recommencing if the present difficulties can be overcome and I do not think that is unreasonable. I have explained to her that under the provisions of s 91(1) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) an order for dismissal does not extinguish Robert's rights. Except in the circumstances set out in s 91(2), which are not applicable here, an order for dismissal does not prejudice the right of a party to recommence.
Mr Weinstein has very fairly pointed out in his written submissions that given there is no issue that Robert does have a disability, time is suspended under the provisions of s 52 of the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW). He also makes reference, however, to the decision of the High Court of Australia in Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales (2006) 226 CLR 256; [2006] HCA 27. That case is authority for the proposition that even where the Limitation Act does not apply, there comes a time when a plaintiff's cause of action is so stale by the great effluxion of time that a defendant cannot receive a fair trial, the interests of justice will require a court to dismiss or permanently stay the proceedings.
Mr Weinstein, again very fairly, concedes that in the particular circumstances of this case, that time has not yet come. However, it must be recognised by all concerned that inevitably it will come and the defendant will have that "defence", if at some future time, actual prejudice in defending Robert's case becomes apparent before any litigation is recommenced.
I am of the view that the time has come where the defendant can ask for the proceedings to be dismissed for want of prosecution. I acknowledge that in the particular circumstances, given that there is no tutor, the defendant has made clear it cannot and does not seek costs against Robert, or for that matter, against Mrs Klewer. Also, in answer to my inquiry, Mr Weinstein has indicated that the defendant would accept a term that it could not raise the principle in Batistatos without leave of the Court.
In all the circumstances, notwithstanding Mrs Klewer's best endeavours, I think the time has come where I should make an order dismissing the proceedings as I have indicated.
My orders are:
(1) The proceedings are dismissed.
(2) Each party bear his or its own costs.
(3) In the event of any recommencement of the proceedings, the defendant may not raise the principle discussed in Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority without the leave of the Court.
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Decision last updated: 16 February 2017