7 This is of course a bare denial and although no complaint is made about par 11 I would not have thought a bare denial is a sufficient plea to par 6B(1). It leaves unclear whether the defence is that whilst the plaintiffs made known to the defendant the particular purpose for which the drive shafts were required it did not do so in a way which showed that the plaintiffs' relied on the defendant's skill and judgment to supply drive shafts suitable for that particular purpose or whether the defence is that the plaintiffs did not make the particular purpose known to the defendant at all. This deficiency is not cured by par 10.2. The object of par 10.2 seems to be to add to the bare denial by merely adding a positive plea as to whose skill and judgment the plaintiffs did rely on and to what extent. This latter plea is open to two objections. In the first place, it does not matter (in the sense that it is not a material fact) whose skill and judgment the plaintiffs relied on if it was not the defendant's skill and judgment, so at best the plea in par 10.2 is a plea of evidence in support of the denial in par 11 and at worst it raises a false issue. Secondly and perhaps more importantly, par 10.2 does not of itself answer the allegation in par 6B(1). Taken as a whole par 10.2 does no more than plead that the plaintiffs relied on their own skill and judgment (that is, they did not rely on the defendant's skill and judgment) with respect to the particular matters enumerated in the pleading ie, "design", "materials specification", "mechanical properties", "interpreting the ultrasound test certificates" etc. The reason why this is not of itself an answer to par 6B(1) is that in a sale of goods case the buyer may succeed in a claim under s 14(i) even though he placed no reliance on the seller as to some matters. So, for example, the buyer may supply the design and materials specification thus showing that he did not rely on the seller's skill and judgment with respect to those matters. However, he may still rely on the seller's skill and judgment to procure and use suitable materials. He would succeed if the defect was within the scope of that reliance: Cammell Laird & Co Ltd v Manganese Bronze and Brass Ltd [1934] AC 402; Ashington Piggeries Ltd v Christopher Hill Ltd [1972] AC 441. In order for a plea of no reliance as to a particular matter such as design to be a good defence and to be not embarrassing it must be clear from the defence as a whole that the defence case is that the defect was in the design. That is not clear on the face of this defence read as a whole. While there is an allegation to that effect (par 19) there are other allegations tending to suggest that the defendant wishes to rely on latent defects in the steel (par 13.1), a defective forging process (par 13.3), inadequate ultrasonic inspection (par 13.6) and/or overloading ie, use beyond design capacity rather than defective design (par 14).