The interests of justice
20 On this aspect, the authorised applicants in both claims have advanced a range of reasons for claiming that it is not in the interests of justice for Ms Keating to be joined as a respondent party in these proceedings. In the first place, they claim that she is already a member of the Djabugay claim group and therefore should be treated as a dissentient member of that group. As such, they claim there are numerous authorities which stand against her being joined as a respondent party in these proceedings. This contention can be rejected at once. While the latter proposition is correct, I do not consider that the evidence set out above demonstrates that Ms Keating can be properly characterised as a dissentient member of either of the present claim groups. She is not seeking to challenge the actions of the authorised applicants in their pursuit of those claims. Instead, she is in a similar position to the Chongs in Alvoen on behalf of the Wakaman People #3 v State of Queensland [2019] FCA 1469 at [32]-[33] per Reeves J. That is, she is steadfastly opposed to being treated as a member of both claim groups and is fundamentally opposed to the claims they are presently pursuing.
21 However, the other contentions of the authorised applicants on this aspect cannot be dismissed so easily. The first is that Ms Keating is seeking to use her position as a respondent party in both proceedings to pursue a native title determination on behalf of the Muluridji People, or alternatively, she is seeking to act in a representative capacity on behalf of her family, clan, or estate group. It is well-established that a person cannot use his or her status as a respondent party to pursue a positive determination of native title, nor to act in a representative capacity on behalf of others (see, for example, Bonner on behalf of the Jagera People #2 v State of Queensland [2011] FCA 321 at [19] per Reeves J and Miller v State of South Australia (Far West Coast Sea Claim) (No 2) [2018] FCA 599 (Miller) at [107] and [110] per White J). They also point to the orders sought by Ms Keating in her interlocutory applications above and contend that they do not disclose a "clear and legitimate objective" for her becoming a respondent party in these proceedings (see Miller at [109]). Further, they contend that those orders provide evidence that she is likely to frustrate and delay these proceedings if she were to be joined as a respondent. Finally, they contend that Ms Keating has not provided a satisfactory explanation for her delay in making these applications.
22 There is much force in the first two of these contentions. Each of them provides a sufficient reason, in itself, to reject Ms Keating's applications in the interests of justice. As for the first, when Ms Keating was asked at the hearing of her applications whether she was pursuing a claim on behalf of, what she had described as, "our tribal group", she responded that she was. When she was then informed that she could not ordinarily pursue that course as a respondent party in a proceeding, she immediately resiled from that position and claimed: "I'm acting on behalf of my family. So Mick Shepherd [sic] and - I'm acting on myself. There's no native title claim at the moment. I'm just acting to protect that area for myself and my family". Later in the hearing, Ms Keating added further confusion by saying: "At this moment, we are not in a position to put any native title claim". These statements were at least implicitly confirmed in Ms Keating's affidavits where, as is already noted above, she said: "I wish to become a party to this claim and have my tribal area/clan estate area removed from this claim and placed in the care of those who rightfully belong to it to care and protect our cultural heritage for the future generations" (see at [11] above). Given the ambivalence displayed by these statements, I do not consider that Ms Keating has established that it is in the interests of justice that she be joined as a respondent party in these proceedings. That is so because I think it is likely that Ms Keating is seeking to use her status as a respondent party in these proceedings to act as a representative on behalf of her family, or clan group; or alternatively, she intends to use that status as a substitute for pursuing a native title determination application on behalf of her Muluridji "tribal group". As the authorities mentioned above demonstrate, neither of these courses provides a permissible basis for joinder in these proceedings.
23 Turning to the second contention of the authorised applicants above, it has to be said that the orders sought by Ms Keating in her interlocutory applications are, in many respects, quite irrational (see at [8] and [9] above). The re-opening of the "Logan, J decision (2011)" and the proposal to transfer an unspecified "lot in question" to a third party corporation provide two prime examples of this. They are the antithesis of the "clear and legitimate" objective mentioned in Miller at [109]. More importantly, I agree with the authorised applicants' contentions that those orders provide good evidence of the likely delays and expense that may eventuate if Ms Keating were to be joined as a respondent party in these proceedings. This provides a further reason for concluding that Ms Keating has not established that it is in the interests of justice that she be joined as a respondent party in these proceedings.
24 Finally, for completeness, I do not consider the authorised applicants' third contention can be accepted as a ground for rejecting these applications because, while I do not consider Ms Keating has provided a satisfactory explanation for her delay in making these applications, the authorised applicants have not claimed to suffer any prejudice as a consequence of that delay.