(b) the plaintiffs are corrupt people prepared to pay bribes to secure political advancement."
35 In each case, the second imputation was relied upon only as an alternative to the first.
36 Ms Evans, who appeared for the defendant, submitted that the defamatory sting of the three publications was an act or condition attributable, not to the plaintiffs, but to Mr Favale, who was described as "a swindler who occasionally enters Australia" and "who is supposed to have sold candidacies to the highest bidder". Ms Evans further submitted that, in the absence of any evidence in the proceedings as to how many candidates there were, and how many candidacies were allegedly sold by Mr Favale, the articles did not convey the imputations complained of. Finally, Ms Evans relied on the fact that the particular passage complained of was presented only as rumour, by use of the words translated as "who is supposed to" and "the latest suggestions are".
37 I do not accept those submissions. First, I think it follows inexorably that if a person in a position of authority is alleged to have sold candidacies to the highest bidder, the allegation extends to accusing those who became the candidates of, in effect, buying their candidacies. That, in my view, amounts to an allegation of bribery.
38 Further, I do not think the failure to identify the number of candidacies allegedly sold takes the matter any further. Plainly, being candidates, the plaintiffs were among the class of persons identified by that description. Finally, I do not think there is any force in the contention that Mr Pallotta should be relieved of liability on the basis that he was merely repeating a rumour for what it was worth. On that issue, Mr McClintock reminded me of the speech of Lord Devlin in Lewis v Daily Telegraph [1964] AC 234 at 283-284:
"I agree, of course, that you cannot escape liability for defamation by putting the libel behind a prefix such as "I have "been told that …" or "It is rumoured that …", and then asserting that it was true that you had been told or that it was in fact being rumoured."
39 As noted by the High Court in Mirror Newspapers v Harrison [1982] HCA 50; (1982) 149 CLR 293 at 300, the essence of the relevant principle is that, by passing on a rumour, the defendant gives it his imprimatur, implying that it is or may be well-founded.
40 In the present case, Mr Pallotta plainly gave his imprimatur to the rumour that the candidacies had been "sold". That emerges from the overall tone of the emails and his boastful claims that he had exposed a scandal. I am satisfied that each of the matters complained of conveyed the imputation that the plaintiffs had bribed an official of a political party in order to become endorsed candidates for election to the Italian Parliament. That imputation is plainly defamatory. It is accordingly unnecessary to consider the alternative imputation (b).
Defence of qualified privilege
41 As has been observed recently in a number of authorities, the principles relevant to the consideration of a defence of qualified privilege are well settled. The proper approach to the Court's task was considered by McHugh J in Bashford v Information Australia (Newsletters) Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 5; (2004) 218 CLR 366. His Honour stated at [53]:
"At common law, a defamatory statement receives qualified protection when it is made in discharge of a duty or the furtherance or protection of an interest of the maker of the statement or some person with whom the publisher has a direct, business or social connection, and the recipient of the statement has a corresponding duty to receive or interest in receiving it" (citations omitted).
42 His Honour emphasised that the task is not to consider whether the communication is for the common convenience and welfare of society, but rather to "consider all the circumstances and ask whether this publisher had a duty to publish or an interest in publishing this defamatory communication to this recipient" (emphasis in original) (at [63]).
43 The notion of the "common convenience and welfare of society" is accordingly to be understood as the result of conferring the protection of the defence but not the determinant of whether the occasion is privileged.
44 The Court is required to examine all of the circumstances of the case, including "the nature of the defamatory communication, the status or the position of the publisher, the number of recipients and the nature of any interest they had in receiving it, and the time, place and manner of, and reason for, the publication: Bashford at [54]; cited in Bennette v Cohen [2009] NSWCA 60 at [9] per Ipp JA, Campbell JA agreeing at [206].
45 The defence at common law is extended by s 30 of the Defamation Act 2005 in the following terms:
"(1) There is a defence of qualified privilege for the publication of defamatory matter to a person (the recipient ) if the defendant proves that:
(a) the recipient has an interest or apparent interest in having information on some subject, and
(b) the matter is published to the recipient in the course of giving to the recipient information on that subject, and
(c) the conduct of the defendant in publishing that matter is reasonable in the circumstances."
46 In either case (at common law or under s 30), it is an element of the defence that the recipient has an interest or an apparent interest in having information on the relevant subject. The word "interest" in reference to the recipient is used "in the broadest popular sense" but it is not enough to establish interest as a matter of gossip or curiosity. The recipients must have an interest in the information "as a matter of substance apart from its mere quality as news": Bashford at [148] per Gummow J, citing Howe & McColough v Lees [1910] HCA 67; (1910) 11 CLR 361 at 398.
47 In Bashford, the defence of qualified privilege at common law succeeded because the matter complained of was published only to the subscribers to a bulletin concerned with occupational health and safety who were, in the main, "individuals and corporations responsible for occupational health and safety in their respective workplaces": at [149].
48 The circumstances identified by Mr Pallotta in the present case to support the contention that the occasion of each publication was privileged relate primarily to the process for selection of the Australian-resident candidates for election to the Italian Parliament leading up to the 2006 election. In respect of that particular aspect of the election, Mr Pallotta identifies as matters of public interest the apparent lack of due process and transparency in the pre-selection process and the apparent interference in that process by officials in Italy, contrary to what would have been expected under Australian electoral law.
49 Mr Pallotta alleges that he had a duty, as the General Secretary of the Azzurri nel Mondo Association in Australia, to publish information on those subjects and that the recipients had an interest or an apparent interest in receiving that information, since Italia chiama Italia was a forum for the discussion of Italian politics including the appointment or nomination of Australian candidates to Italian Parliament.