11 Mahoney P, in Baker, noted that a series of decisions of the Court of Appeal (including Parker) had established that increasing a sentence imposed by a magistrate may involve a denial of natural justice and attract relief in the nature of certiorari. His Honour was referring to the absence of a warning that a more onerous sentence was being contemplated by a judge, especially when an appellant was unrepresented. Mahoney P said that it would be prudent for the judge to give a warning when he or she had determined to consider a higher sentence. See also Ho v DPP (1995) 37 NSWLR 393 and Hughes v DPP (Unreported, Court of Appeal, 15 March 1994).
12 Since Mr Baker was not warned of the possible consequences of breaching the recognisance, Mahoney P held that he had not been dealt with in accordance with the dictates of natural justice.
13 The President however referred to, but did not decide, the detriment of a supervised three year good behaviour bond, although he noted that if s 558 Crimes Act was applied in its terms, further imprisonment would be authorised. His Honour was at pains to say that Baker was 'at the limits of the relevant principle' and to leave a number of questions open, eg. when should a warning be given?
14 Although a judge has power under s 125 of the Justices Act to increase a sentence imposed by a magistrate, it is apparent from the transcript that his Honour did not warn Mrs Relic that he was contemplating imposing a recognisance in lieu of the fine. Thus she was not given the opportunity of considering her position and seek leave to withdraw her appeal if she saw fit.
15 Since it is plain that no warning was given by his Honour to Mrs Relic it remains to determine whether the sentence imposed was more onerous than the fine imposed by the magistrate. The Fines Act 1996 provides an elaborate code for the enforcement of fines imposed by a Court (Part 4). This involves fine enforcement orders, suspension or cancellation of a driver's licence, civil enforcement, community service orders and, as a last resort, imprisonment. However, for the very most part this would be served by way of periodic detention.
16 The order made by his Honour involved the deferral of sentence conditionally on the claimant entering into a s 558 recognisance.
17 The conditions of the recognisance included not to 'harass, approach, molest, abuse, speak to or otherwise interfere in any way whatsoever with Mr Hart'. Further, not to 'contact Mr Hart … by any means whatsoever …'. Also, 'not to enter in any way or trespass on by any means the property of 14B Ponderosa Avenue, Warriewood'. The recognisance was also conditional on the claimant accepting the supervision of the Probation and Parole Service.
18 Section 558 provides that a Court may defer passing sentence upon the person concerned entering into a recognisance to be of good behaviour for such period as the Court thinks proper and 'to come up for sentence if called upon'.
19 Subsection (6) provides that a person may be called up for sentence on the breach of any of the terms or conditions of a recognisance. Therefore, a breach of the recognisance or of a condition of it would have the potential to expose the claimant to a sentence of imprisonment.
20 I have no doubt that the recognisance in this case was a more onerous sentence than the fine imposed by the magistrate. I do not understand the opponent to really contest this. It follows that his Honour was obliged to give the complainant a warning of the sentence he was contemplating and the opportunity to seek leave to withdraw her appeal.
21 Under s 69B of the Supreme Court Act the Court has power to quash the sentence, see Whiteside v DPP [1999] NSWCA 454. As indicated earlier, no basis has been made out for quashing the order of his Honour confirming the conviction. As far as the sentence is concerned, the sentence imposed by his Honour should be quashed and the matter remitted to the District Court for re-sentence in accordance with law.
22 I would propose the following orders: