Registrar of Titles v Charles Spencer [1909] HCA 69

Registrar of Titles v Charles Spencer [1909] HCA 69 - HCA 1909 case summary — Zoe

[61]

The case of In re Hulse (1), cited by Mr. Pilkington is, 1 t in point. There the tenant for life granted a lease for 21 years of © a steam-mill and machinery. The lessee covenanted that he would at the end of his tenancy sell to the lessor all the machinery - then on the premises, other than the demised machinery, and the - lessor covenanted that he would pay for it. The tenant brought additional machinery into, and affixed it to, the mill. On the - expiration of the tenaney the tenant for life bought this machinery under the provisions of the lease. He died, and his executrix claimed the machinery thus bought. Buekley J. held that, as between tenant for life and remainderman, chattels" affixed to the soil by the tenant for life as accessory to purposes of trade did not become part of the freehold, and might be - removed by him. The question must be determined by the intention of the person by whom the chattels were attached; and ie in the absence of evidence to show that the tenant for li intended to make a present to the remainderman, his executrix - was entitled to the machinery. In the course of his judgment, after adverting to the general rule, that where the freehold affixes chattels and dies, his heir and not his executor takes them, he pointed out that the case is different when the two claimants are not alike persons deriving title under a previous owner of the - freehold who attached the chattels, as, for instance, where the ~ question is between tenant and landlord, or between tenant for | life and remainderman. He said (2): "The old maxim, Quicquid - plantatur solo solo cedit was as between tenant and landlord long since relaxed for the benefit of trade. . . . As between tenant for life and remainderman the same principle is applicable. Itis advantageous that the tenant for life should be in such a position - as to be able to improve the estate for his own enjoyment without being thereby compelled to make a present to the remainderman. The remainderman is not injured if the person deriving title under the tenant for life removes the fixtures, leaving the remainder with the freehold in the same state as it would have been if the chattels had never been affixed."

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entitled not only to the land and buildings, but also to all the plant and machinery thereon. That learned Judge assessed the land, buildings and stch portion of the plant as would not be removable under the heading of trade fixtures at £10,688, and the machinery, which would be removable as trade fixtures, at £1,855 in the case of the aerated water business, and at £25,000 in the case of the electric lighting business; but, holding that the plaintiff was entitled only to the value of the land, buildings and unremovable portions of the plant, entered judgment for £12,000, the amount paid into Court by the defendant. The plaintiff appealed to the Full Court. The question then to be determined was whether judgment for the plaintiff should stand in accordance with Mr. Justice Burnside's view, or whether it should be increased in accordance with the plaintiff's contention. The Supreme Court by a majority, Mr. Justice McMillan dissenting, held that the plaintiff was entitled toe have the value of the plant and machinery added to the other damages found. This Court has now to determine whether that decision is right. The guid- ing consideration in the assessment of these damages is that the plaintiff is entitled to compensation, and no more, for the loss he has sustained by being deprived of his title. He cannot get back the land, because the title has been indefeasably vested in another, but he is to be restored, as far as money can restore him, to the position in which he would have stood, if at the time when the prior life estate was determined in June 1903 his title was still subsisting. In other words, his claim to have the value of the machinery and plant awarded to him as part of the value of the land at that period can be no greater than that of a re- mainderman to retain as against the executor of the life tenant trade fixtures lawfully placed on the land by the life tenant during his occupancy. The principle on which a remainderman may sometimes be entitled to retain possession of trade fixtures as against the executor of the tenant for life has long been settled. It is unnecessary to go beyond the judgment of Mr.

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Justice Buckley in the case of In re Hulse(1) for a full and statement of the law on this point. The general maxim is qui quid plantatur solo solo cedit. But its operation may be exelud where the things affixed to the soil are such as have come to be known as trade fixtures. If they have been affixed by the tenant for life under cireumstances which indicate that they have been so affixed for the better enjoyment of the freehold and for its benefit, the maxim will not be excluded and the fixtures will become part of the soil. But where the circumstances indicate that the things have been affixed for the purposes of trade and for their more convenient and effective use in trade, the maxim - will not apply, the things affixed will become trade fixtures removable by the tenant for life, and will not go as part of the | soil to the remainderman. Mr. Haynes relied on the circum- stance that the machinery was in fact affixed to the soil for the benefit of the freehold. But that circumstance is quite irrelevant _ on this inquiry. The whole basis of the assessment is an assumption. he value of the land in June 1903 is used merely as measure of the amount of compensation on the assumption - that the plaintiff as remainderman had at that time title to the land. But the assumption must equally be made that the tenant for life could give no one the right to deal with the land asa holder in fee simple. Under these circumstances the assumption must, I think, be made that the fixtures were placed on the land by the tenant for life for the purpose of their use in trade and - not for the purpose of making them a present to the freehold. For a tenant for life does not unless under exceptional cireum- stances affix trade fixtures to land for any purpose other than their convenient and effective use in the carrying on of a business. Under these circumstances it is in my opinion clear that, in using the value of the land in June 1908 as a measure of the amount of compensation to which the plaintiff is entitled, the value to be brought into the calculation must be the value to him as a - remainderman, on the assumption that the trade fixtures had been lawfully affixed to the soil by the tenant for life in the ordinary way of business. For these reasons I agree that Mr. - Justice McMillan took the right view of the case, that the appeal

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Source

Judgment (97 paragraphs)