Registrar of Accident Compensation Tribunal v Commissioner of Taxation

Registrar of Accident Compensation Tribunal v Commissioner of Taxation - [1993] HCA 1 - HCA 1993 case summary — Zoe

[182]

[E]ven where the person to be benefited is a subject, the use of the expression "in trust" to describe the capacity in which the property is granted to an officer of State is not conclusive that a trust in private law was intended; for "trust" is not a term of art in public law and when used in relation to matters which lie within the field of public law the words "in trust" may do no more than indicate the existence of a duty owed to the Crown by the officer of State, as servant of the Crown, to deal with the property for the benefit of the subject for whom it is expressed to be held in trust, such duty being enforceable administratively by disciplinary sanctions and not otherwise. This approach to the construction of a statute may be valid even where the duty is imposed on an officer who is not an "officer of State". A statute which imposes a duty on a public authority charged with the performance of public functions and holding and administering property may not give rise to a trust for the benefit of the individuals who will profit from performance of the duty, whether or not the authority is an emanation of the Crown [63] . In the end, however, the question is one of statutory construction: if the statute vests property or provides for the vesting of property in one person and requires that person to apply the property for the benefit of another or for the benefit of a class, does the statute intend the property to be held in trust for the other or for the class? A statutorily created trust may not necessarily exhibit all the features of a trust for beneficiaries created by a settlor of property [64] , but the statutory intention to create a trust must nevertheless appear in the terms of the statute. In our opinion, the relevant statutory provisions in this case are inconsistent with the notion of a trust for the dependants as beneficiaries. There are several indicia which lead to this conclusion. 1. Kinloch v Secretary of State for India (1882), 7 App. Cas. 619; Tito v Waddell [No 2] [1977] Ch106, at pp. 211-237; New South Wales v The Commonwealth [No 3] (1932), 46 C.L.R. 246, at pp. 262, 268; Aboriginal Development Commission v Treka Aboriginal Arts & Crafts Ltd [1984] 3 NS.W.L.R. 502. 2. [1978] A.C. 359, at p. 382. 3. Skinners' Co v Irish Society (1845), 12 Cl. & F. 425, at pp. 488-489, 490 [8 E.R. 1474, at pp. 1500, 1501]; Swain v Law Society [1983] 1 AC. 598, at p. 618. 4. Ayerst v C & K (Construction) Ltd [1976] AC. 167, at p. 178.

[185]

If it were right to regard the Registrar as holding compensation payments in trust for beneficiaries being those entitled under the 1958 Act, a court of equity would control the investment of the compensation payments, requiring the Registrar to exercise his investment powers "in the best interests of the present and future beneficiaries of the trust, holding the scales impartially between different classes of beneficiaries" [66] . The limitations which equity would place on the exercise of a trustee's power to invest are inconsistent with the broad discretion conferred on the Registrar by s. 35(1) of the 1958 Act and s. 73(4) of the 1985 Act. If it were right to regard the Registrar as holding compensation payments in trust for those entitled under the 1958 Act, the jurisdiction of equity would extend to the enforcement of their respective entitlements. If the Registrar were a true trustee of a compensation payment, it would be the duty of the Registrar as trustee to pay or apply on demand the amount to which a dependant was or the dependants as a class were entitled provided the dependant was or all the dependants in the class were sui juris and all consented [67] . But that would nullify the effect of s. 34(1) which, as it now stands, contemplates that all compensation payments in respect of the death of a deceased worker will be administered by the Registrar. Presumably, if the Registrar were a true trustee, the powers of the Registrar under s. 36(2) and (3) would be construed as trust powers, so that the dependants would be entitled equally to the compensation payment in default of any exercise by the Registrar of the power to apply the compensation payment in some other way [68] . Or a dependant, complaining of a failure by the Registrar to exercise his discretion under s. 36(2) or (3), could apply to a court of equity for an order directing the Registrar to consider an exercise of the power or an order appointing a new trustee or, perhaps, an order directing the distribution of compensation payments among the dependants of the particular deceased worker according to the court's selection after inquiry [69] . The existence of such an equitable jurisdiction seems quite inconsistent with the creation of a right of appeal to the Tribunal from any determination made by the Registrar under s. 35 of the 1958 Act.

[211]

We do not think it necessary to consider the question whether the individual corporators were, in any sense or for any purpose, to be regarded as trustees. Nor do we think it relevant to inquire whether they owed any and what duty to the contributors to the fund, whom the learned Chief Justice regarded as beneficiaries under the trust. We do not think, indeed, that the contributors are beneficiaries in the proper sense: they have, of course, an interest in the trust fund which would probably give them standing in a court of equity, but they have not such a beneficial interest in the fund as has an ordinary cestui que trust. The trust is not a trust for persons but for statutory purposes. In using the term "trust for statutory purposes", their Honours were concerned to identify the terms on which the Board held the Superannuation Fund. The fiduciary duties of the Board were stated in reference to the Fund as an entirety but not in reference to the amounts received from or in respect of individual contributors and paid into the Fund. Although the contributors did not acquire the beneficial interest of a cestui que trust in the Fund, their Honours thought that the contributors' interest in its proper administration might give them standing to invoke the jurisdiction of equity if the Board misapplied the Fund by disbursing money from it without authority. The Board had a fiduciary duty to perform in administering the Fund, similar to the duty of a trustee. That duty was stated to be "a duty of reasonable care - the care which an ordinary prudent man of business would take" [7] . In the present case the Legislature, perhaps conscious of the decision in Fouche , released the Registrar in relation to the administration of "any amount of money under this Act" (that is, the 1958 Act) from the duties imposed by the law relating to the administration of trust funds and imposed on him merely a requirement to act in good faith: s. 39 of the 1958 Act, s. 35(2) of the 1958 Act as amended by the 1985 Act and s. 131 of the 1985 Act as amended by the 1987 Act. Whether or not this provision left the Registrar under a fiduciary duty in relation to the administration of the Tribunal Fund, it is clear from this provision and the other statutory provisions to which reference has already been made that the Registrar was under no fiduciary duty in relation to compensation moneys paid under s. 34(1) of the 1958 Act. The duty to invest and the duty to apply compensation moneys for the benefit of dependants were governed exhaustively by statute. 1. (1952) 88 C.L.R. 609, at p. 640. 2. (1952) 88 C.L.R., at p. 641.

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