Appeal
22 The only ground of appeal is that the sentence is manifestly excessive. Two arguments are put forward to support that ground - that insufficient attention was given by his Honour to the differing roles of the applicant and Mr German and that insufficient allowance was made for the applicant being the sole carer for five young children.
23 In relation to the first argument, it is submitted that it was Mr German who was primarily responsible for the length and nature of the detention and it was when he left the premises that the detention ceased. During the prolonged period of the victim's detention, the applicant's only contribution to the physical violence was a single kick to his back.
24 I have difficulty with the distinction sought to be drawn between the person who actually strikes the blow and the person who is present and at least implicitly, approves of, if not encourages, that action. On the other hand, I accept that there is a distinction between the situation just described and where although involved in a joint criminal enterprise, something occurs which is entirely unpredictable and unexpected.
25 What occurred here was entirely predictable. The arrival of Mr German with the baseball bat made his intentions clear. In addition the applicant initiated the incident, was a party to the joint interrogation, accompanied Mr German when he acquired the tape, deflected the inquiries made by the victim's mother and took steps to conceal the offence.
26 In the circumstances I am of the opinion that his Honour was more than generous to the applicant in the way he treated her offence in comparison with that of Mr German and I would not apply any further reduction, either to the head sentence or non-parole period, on that basis.
27 In relation to the hardship imposed on the children by the applicant's imprisonment, it is conceded on her behalf that a case has to qualify as exceptional before those circumstances should influence the ultimate sentence. Whereas hardship through separation from one, two, or perhaps even three children might not be exceptional, it is submitted on behalf of the applicant that separation from five children is quite different and brings this case into the category of "exceptional".
28 Reference is made to problems being experienced by the two eldest children which at least in the case of Cheree, would seem to be directly related to the applicant's imprisonment. In relation to the three younger children it is submitted that the separation from the applicant at such an age will have a considerable adverse impact.
29 In summary, it was submitted:
"This was not a case in which the circumstances were so exceptional that an alternative to full-time custody could be contemplated. However it was a matter which militated very strongly in favour of a significant reduction in the sentence which might otherwise be appropriate."
30 On behalf of the Crown it is submitted that circumstances have to be "highly exceptional" before those circumstances should be permitted to influence the ultimate sentence. Whether there is any difference between the concepts of "highly exceptional" and "truly exceptional" or "exceptional" is something of a moot point. The principle is clear, its application is less so.
31 The Crown submits that the question of exceptional circumstances should not depend upon the number of children involved, but rather the particular circumstance whether it relates to one child or more than one. I agree.
32 The offence for which the applicant was convicted is a serious one, as is clear from the fact that a maximum sentence of 20 years has been provided. Having weighed the circumstances, his Honour placed the offence "approximately in the middle of offences contrary to s90A of the Crimes Act". (ROS, p6.4) He was correct to do so. There were a number of aggravating factors. There was actual violence, a weapon was used (although not by the applicant), there was a record of previous convictions, the offence was committed in company, the offence was committed whilst the applicant was on a bond, it extended over nine hours and involved gratuitous cruelty. The objective seriousness of the offence, together with those aggravating features and the principle of general deterrence, required his Honour not only to impose a fulltime custodial sentence, but one which was substantial.
33 In that regard what this Court said in R v Dodd (1991) 57 A Crim R 349 at 354 remains apposite:
"As Jordan CJ pointed out in Geddes at 556, making due allowance for all relevant considerations there ought to be a reasonable proportionality between a sentence and the circumstances of the crime, and we consider that it is always important in seeking to determine the sentence appropriate to a particular crime to have regard to the gravity of the offence viewed objectively, for without this assessment the other factors requiring consideration in order to arrive at the proper sentence to be imposed cannot properly be given their place. Each crime, as Veen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465 at 472; stresses, has its own objective gravity meriting at the most a sentence proportionate to that gravity, a maximum sentence fixed by the legislature defining the limits of sentence for cases in the most grave category. The relative importance of the objective facts and subjective features of a case will vary: see for example, the passage from the judgment of Street CJ in Todd [1982] 2 NSWLR 517 quoted in Mill (1988) 166 CLR 59 at 64. Even so, there is sometimes a risk that attention to pervasive subject considerations may cause inadequate weight to be given to the objective circumstances of the case: Rushby [1977] 1 NSWLR 594."
34 It is also relevant that the applicant has shown no remorse or contrition. Although she is not to be punished more severely because she continued to deny that she was guilty of the s90A offence, she could not expect or receive any of the consideration that would have followed a plea of guilty and an acceptance of responsibility for what she had done. Thus she was to receive the full measure of the sentence that was appropriate to her crime with the aggravating features to which I have referred.
35 In those circumstances, it is difficult to see how his Honour could have awarded anything other than a head sentence in the order of 8 years.
36 Although one cannot help but be moved by the plight of the applicant's five children, his Honour took that into account and found special circumstances to such an extent that the non-parole period was significantly less than the statutory norm (ie 44% of the total term). In other words his Honour did grant in the applicant's favour a significant reduction in the non-parole period which would otherwise have been awarded. This was despite the fact that the pre-sentence reports were not favourable to the applicant as a parent.
37 It is only where this Court is of the view that some other sentence is warranted in law and should have been passed that the Court should interfere with the discretion exercised by the sentencing judge. There is nothing in the material before the Court which indicates that the sentence imposed by his Honour was anything other than a sound exercise of his Honour's sentencing discretion. His Honour took into account all of the relevant principles and facts in formulating his sentence. As indicated above, if anything he was favourable to the applicant in his characterisation of the part she played in the overall joint criminal enterprise.
38 Although his Honour did not refer to it, there are programs within the prison system for mothers in the applicant's situation. In that regard s26(2)(l) of the Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999 is relevant.
39 I would grant leave to appeal against sentence, but would dismiss the appeal.
40 WOOD CJ at CL: I agree
41 BARR J: I agree
42 WOOD CJ at CL: The order of the Court then will be as Hoeben J has proposed.