Consideration
22 In relation to ground 1, the primary statement made by the sentencing judge in relation to the course proposed to be followed in imposing cumulative sentences for counts 2 and 3 are contained in his statement which I have set out and referred to in paragraph 18.
23 I accept the Crown's submission that there was no error in his Honour adopting that course. Offences of perverting the course of justice are, in my opinion, rightly singled out as offences of the most serious kind for reasons identified and expressed by the learned sentencing judge and are deserving of a sentence that is cumulative to the primary offence, in this case, count 1. One rationale for that approach is the absolute importance of deterrence, particularly general deterrence.
24 In the present case, as the sentencing judge observed, the applicant's conduct in respect of counts 2 and 3, occurred over a substantial period of time. In particular, in relation to count 2, his conduct was persistent and extended over many months. In relation to counts 2 and 3, he sought to entice two different people to help him to achieve the same result.
25 I accept the Crown's submission that there was, in effect, no relevant relationship between counts 1 and counts 2 and 3 and that they did not arise out of the same factual circumstances. Counts 2 and 3, as the Crown submitted, arose out of quite different conduct and the offences of perverting the course of justice could not be classed as ancillary crimes. Additionally, the fact that the applicant's conduct was thwarted is also of no significance. As Badgery-Parker, J. stated in Regina v. Taouk (1992) 65 A. Crim. R. 387 at 392 in the context of an act intended to pervert the course of justice, the fact that the act did not succeed or even was doomed to failure is, as his Honour said, "of far less significance than in the case of sentencing for an attempt to commit a substantive crime and the potential seriousness of the consequences is of much greater weight".
26 I further accept the submission that has been made on behalf of the Crown that the applicant's conduct exhibited, not only persistence, but pressure on Ms. Bowman over many months and that the applicant was willing to induce people to lie on his behalf and provide false information to police. In this respect, he displayed a willingness to accuse an innocent person of the crime of malicious wounding and create evidence which would support such an accusation against her.
27 It is these aspects of the applicant's conduct that, in my opinion, called for condemnation and reflection in the approach required to be taken to sentencing him and that was in fact taken in this case.
28 It was suggested on behalf of the applicant that the sentences for perverting the course of justice were erroneous and that the sentencing judge initially imposed a five year sentence in respect of them and only three years and six months imprisonment was imposed at the outset for the malicious wounding charge.
29 However, I accept the Crown's submission that the remarks on sentence themselves do demonstrate that the sentencing judge had well in mind the requirements in relation to the two classes of offence when he said:-
"While malicious prosecution is extremely serious and the maximum penalty for that offence is seven years imprisonment, the maximum penalty for perverting the course of justice for an attempt to do so is twice that length. That is because Parliament considers that attempting to pervert the course of justice is extremely serious, not only because it makes the justice system unreliable and causes people to lose confidence in it, but also because, as in this case, if the attempt is successful it not only allows the guilty to go unpunished, but it may be, as was attempted in this case, implicate someone who is completely innocent." (Remarks on Sentence, pp.10 to 11)