Natalie's death - 4 August 1993
66 Natalie died on 4 August 1993. The accused reported finding the child on her back, apparently having difficulty breathing, cold, limp and making a wheezing sound. She alerted her neighbour, Mrs Stephens, who came to the house. Attempts were made at resuscitation. On this occasion Ken Skillin was at home. At the time when the accused first sought help from Mrs Stephens Mr Skillin was asleep having consumed a quantity of alcohol. He was roused and assisted in the attempts to resuscitate Natalie before she was taken to hospital. Natalie's death was attributed to SIDS.
67 Dr Bradhurst, Professor Byard and Dr Byron Collins would not be prepared, having regard to the family history, to affirmatively conclude that Natalie's death was from SIDS. Her death, like Benjamin's, is unexplained in the sense that no injury or disease process was identified.
68 As I have noted, the Crown accepts that there are explanations for the various admissions of Natalie to hospital. It accepts that explanations can be found in relation to the ALTEs experienced by Jack and Benjamin. The Crown acknowledges that Nathan's death does not fit within the pattern in a precise way. Nonetheless it is contended that, when one takes all these events into account, there exists no rational explanation but that they were brought about by the deliberate acts of the accused.
69 In commending a view that the whole of the evidence pressed by the Crown should be looked at with a view to determining whether a reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence had been excluded, the Crown referred me to the decision of the court in Sutton v The Queen (1984) 152 CLR 528 and particularly to the observations of Dawson J at 567. His Honour observed:
"It is not, I think, a case in which any one circumstance common to the various offences was sufficiently striking to eliminate any reasonable possibility of coincidence. Rather it was the accumulation of common circumstances which had that effect. It is, of course, possible to consider each similar fact in the context of other similar facts and conclude that, looked at together, mere coincidence is not a reasonable hypothesis but be unable to reach that conclusion viewing each set of similar facts separately."
70 The court in Sutton was concerned with the similar fact evidence rule at common law. It is to be noted that s 98 of the Act provides that evidence that two or more related events occurred is not admissible to prove that, because of the improbability of the events occurring coincidentally, a person did a particular act unless certain conditions are satisfied. Further, as noted above, two or more events are taken to be related if, and only if, they are substantially and relevantly similar and the circumstances in which they occurred are substantially similar.
71 In this case the Crown has sought to deal with the requirements of s 98 by specifying by way of points of substantial and relevant similarity four criteria of considerable generality (see paragraph 21 above).
72 Ms Lyons submits, with some force, that the fourth indicia of similarity is not established by the evidence. The Crown makes a case that the accused created medical emergencies when her partner was away. On the night Natalie died Mr Skillin was at home. Whether he was intoxicated or not seems to me to have little significance in this context. It is one thing to contend that when there were difficulties in the relationship and Mr Skillin absented himself the accused would make her children sick in order to get attention. Such a theory might, having regard to the various other episodes, have some credibility. It does not sit with the circumstances of Natalie's death. As Ms Lyons points out it does not sit entirely comfortably with the circumstances of Benjamin's death. True it is that there is a suggestion that the accused and Ken Skillen quarrelled earlier on that day about his decision to go to a rodeo. Despite this he went to the rodeo. Nonetheless he was returning home in the ordinary course at the time the accused sought help for Benjamin.
73 As to the second indicia, namely, the accused finding the children at a time when each child was experiencing breathing difficulties, I have some hesitation in seeing that as fairly embracing Natalie's admissions on 7 May or 24 July 1993. The evidence suggests that on the former occasion she had viral croup and on the latter occasion she had, among other problems, tonsillitis and a middle ear infection. I have considerable hesitation about accepting that indicia is made out with respect to the death of Nathan. In this sense I have some doubts that the Crown has established that the death of Nathan, and Natalie's admissions on 7 May and 24 July 1993 are "related events" within the meaning of s 98. In the light of the view that I take of this matter it is not necessary for me to decide the point.
74 It is common ground that if a rational hypothesis exists consistent with the innocence of the accused the evidence as to the ALTEs and the two other deaths is not admissible either as coincidence evidence under s 98 or as tendency evidence under s 97. I do not consider I can exclude such a possibility.
75 I should note that the Crown led some evidence from Dr Seton concerning the statistical chance of three children dying from failure of breathing in sleep. This was expressed as a chance of 1 in 614,000,000. I am not persuaded that I can reason towards the exclusion of a rational possibility consistent with innocence upon the basis of statistical material of that kind. This is illustrated pointedly by the evidence concerning Nathan's cause of death. Eminent forensic pathologists consider it probable the child died of natural causes.
76 It is to be borne in mind that the fact in issue is the cause of death of Benjamin. A vice to be avoided is to proceed upon an assumption that Benjamin's death was the result of induced asphyxia in order to strengthen the inference to be drawn from the other material as tending to the view that the various medical emergencies were all the result of the mother's deliberate acts.
77 In Perry v The Queen (1982) 150 CLR 580 Gibbs CJ, in explaining why evidence relating to the death of the accused's brother, Duncan, was inadmissible, observed:
"It was not established that Duncan had ingested any poison (except of course the barbiturates, with whose consumption the applicant was not shown to have had anything to do). It was necessary for the Crown to rely on the other instances of poisoning, including those the subject of the present charges, in an attempt to provide a basis for an inference that Duncan had suffered from arsenical poisoning. In other words, it was necessary to assume the guilt of the applicant of the offences of which she was charged in order to render admissible the evidence regarding the death of Duncan. Such a line of reasoning is obviously objectionable". (page 589/90)