6 The wound inflicted upon Mr Morgan was a 1 cm wound immediately to the right of the midline and just above the costovertebral angle. The skin had been cut, it would seem, cleanly down to the fatty layer, but the depth of the wound beyond that point could not be determined accurately. Scans performed on Mr Morgan excluded any deep chest damage. He sustained, as well, abrasions to his trunk. It seems that he has suffered no permanent disability as a result of these not inconsiderable wounds.
7 The wound inflicted upon the deceased penetrated his left lung, the aorta and left pulmonary artery. It was a fatal wound and it brought about the deceased's death at the scene of the attack.
8 It is perhaps convenient to commence the present consideration of the matter by setting clearly in place the relevant objective facts and their criminality.
9 It seems to me that an event of the kind previously described, which entails the fatal stabbing of one person and the not insignificant wounding by stabbing of another person, and that in the context of an affray in which the person doing the stabbing has joined voluntarily having previously armed himself with a knife in specific preparation for his joining the affray, is indicative of a high level of criminal culpability. It cannot be stressed too often that the taking of human life in circumstances of the kind described is a serious infraction of public order at the very least; and the Courts have made it clear, in terms which everybody of ordinary sense must be taken to understand, that offences of that kind cannot be tolerated, will not be tolerated, and when they occur will be punished with all proper severity.
10 In the present particular case it is contended that the objective criminality for which the applicant must properly answer is, to some extent, mitigated by the effect of some, at least, of the subjective features which are undoubtedly present in his case. It can be conceded that there is an area of overlap in the sense that the acts of the applicant can be explained, in part at least, by reference to disinhibition resulting from the ingestion of alcohol and drugs; and resulting, also, from the operation in a real way of a context of social disputation between people of islander descent, as the applicant is, and people who are Aboriginal Australians, as the competing group was. I think that those matters, although they explain to some extent at least what happened, certainly cannot excuse it. I say again that so far as I am concerned, the objective gravity of what happened on the occasion in question is of a very high order.
11 It is undeniable that there are substantial subjective matters that have then to be brought to proper account. It is not, I think, necessary to rehearse them in very fine detail, as that has been done by the learned sentencing Judge in terms which, at least broadly speaking, are not the subject of present challenge.
12 It is to be borne in mind that the offences now in question were committed at a time when the applicant was subject to a probation order which had been given to him in connection with, among other things, an offence of menacing another member of the public.
13 It is submitted that even allowing for the undeniable objective gravity of what happened, the proper bringing to account of the relevant subjective matters entails that the sentence imposed is, on its face, manifestly excessive. That it is a severe sentence I think can be allowed at once. That it is manifestly excessive I do not think has been demonstrated. When every allowance is made for the personal circumstances of the applicant, - and I say again: they are substantial, and to be given proper weight and not mere lip service, - the fact remains that somebody is dead, and that somebody else was not insignificantly wounded, as a result of the use, the deliberate use, of a knife in circumstances of a public affray. It appears to be the case, judging from things said in the Court below, judging by things said by the applicant in his record with the police, and judging by things said in submission to this Court, that there is abroad in the community in Sydney some continuing bad blood between Aboriginal Australians and people of Pacific Islander extraction. If, and to the extent to which, that is the fact, it needs to be affirmed clearly and with every proper resolve that the Courts, of all the institutions of society, cannot, and will not, stand supinely by while members of those conflicting groups work out their social clashes in the form of street fights where people involved are using either a knife, as was the case with the present applicant; or steel bars and offensive weapons of the kind, which appears to have been the case with some, at least, of the other combatants on the occasion in question. Crime of this kind, as the present matter shows all too vividly, can have devastating consequences. It must be put down with every proper resolve.
14 In my opinion cause has not been shown to interfere with the sentence imposed below. I would grant leave to appeal but dismiss the substantive appeal.
15 IRELAND J: I agree.
16 HIDDEN J: I am unable to agree with the orders proposed. Sully J has rightly emphasised the grave seriousness of this incident. The learned and experienced sentencing Judge expressly had regard to all relevant matters in his comprehensive remarks on sentence. Nevertheless, I am of the view that the effective sentence passed is manifestly excessive, particularly in the light of the applicant's age.
17 In my view, that sentence affords inadequate weight to his youth, to his tragic and profoundly disturbed background and to the social setting in which the offences occurred. His youth and his background afford him claims of leniency in their own right, quite apart from the extent to which they provide some explanation for his involvement in this dreadful affair.
18 Having regard to the totality of his criminality, I would allow the sentence on the malicious wounding charge to stand but I would reduce the sentence on the manslaughter charge to penal servitude for ten years, comprising a minimum term of six years and an additional term of four years.
19 SULLY J: The Court orders: