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[2001] NSWCCA 244
Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW)
2001-06-27
Barr J, Howie J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Rare cases involving exceptional complexity and trial duration may justify a higher discount. In some cases no discount is appropriate at all. In some cases the "discount" will be reflected in a step down in the hierarchy of sentencing options." 24 Judge Bellear seems to have determined that a discount of 5 per cent should apply notwithstanding that the pleas were entered at the first opportunity and resulted in a real saving in time and money to the state, because of the overwhelming strength of the Crown case resulting from the taped conversations between the applicant and the undercover officers. But that was not a relevant consideration in determining the extent of the discount on a purely utilitarian basis. In Thompson and Houlton, the Chief Justice said at 416 para 137-138: "Separation of the elements of contrition and utilitarian value in the plea of guilty requires a consideration of whether or not the element of strength of the Crown case, to which reference is frequently made as limiting the value of a plea, should be attributed to both of the elements. The Attorney General submitted that the strength of the Crown case should not have any bearing upon the weight to be attributed to that aspect of the discount which is attributed to purely utilitarian considerations. The authorities support this submission. (See R v Slater supra at 525-526; R v Bond supra at 7; R v Winchester supra at 350; R v Bishop (New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, 23 September 1996, unreported); R v Bulger [1990] 2 Qd R 559 at 564. In Winchester v The Queen , Hunt CJ at CL related the strength of the Crown case only to the contrition element of the leniency in sentencing which a plea of guilty affords an accused: cf R v Beavan (at 12). As his Honour put it (at 350): "… The extent to which leniency will be afforded upon this ground will depend to a large degree upon whether or not the plea resulted from a recognition of the inevitable." In my opinion his Honour was correct to link the question of the strength of the Crown case only to the issue of contrition or remorse. A "recognition of the inevitable" may qualify the extent of genuine contrition. It does not qualify the utilitarian value of a plea. 25 In my opinion there was no ground upon which the applicant should have been deprived of the full measure of the discount for his early pleas. This ground of appeal has been made out. 26 The other grounds of appeal have been argued together and in effect contend that by accumulating the sentence for the fourth and sixth counts his Honour imposed a sentence which was more severe than was appropriate to reflect the totality of the criminality and, further, by taking that course his Honour failed to set an appropriate ratio between the full term of the sentences and the period to be served by the applicant before being eligible for release to parole. It is submitted on behalf of the applicant that an overall non-parole period of 5 years 7 months in a total sentence of 6 years 2 months is manifestly excessive. 27 In my opinion there are errors in the way his Honour determined and structured the sentences. There were three separate, though related, acts of criminality arising from the facts before his Honour: the course of supplying amphetamine, the applicant's involvement in the manufacture of that drug, and the sale of the firearm. His Honour perceived that the first and third of those matters needed to be dealt with separately but not the second. The manufacturing of amphetamine was quite separate from the supply offences because it related to amphetamine for future distribution whether by the applicant or some other person. Each of those three areas of criminality required separate and distinct punishment which should have resulted in cumulative sentences for each of the fourth, fifth and sixth counts. The offence of taking part in the manufacture of amphetamine was dealt with by a sentence of 3 years and 2 months made concurrent with the offences of supply amphetamine. This was in my opinion an inappropriate way of dealing with that matter. 28 Further, the starting sentence chosen by his Honour to reflect the commercial supply of amphetamine and the matters on the Form 1 was 6½ years which his Honour discounted by 5 percent. The sentence of 6 years and 2 months thereby obtained was in my view barely appropriate to reflect the objective seriousness of the totality of the supplies of amphetamine and the manufacture of the amphetamine but it was so only because his Honour discounted it by such a small amount. If a 25 per cent discount were now applied to the sentence which his Honour initially chose for the offences in the first five counts before discount, a sentence of 4 years and 10 months would result. Having regard to the criminality involved, such a sentence needs only to be stated for it to be seen as inadequate. 29 The sentence chosen by his Honour to reflect the firearm offence was 17 months after the application for the 5 per cent discount, so that the obvious starting sentence was 18 months. If a 25 per cent discount were given off that sentence the result would be just over 13 months. Such a sentence would in my view be inadequate to deal with a case of a person selling a firearm to another who the seller believed to be a drug supplier. 30 Further, it seems clear to me that his Honour did not achieve the result he intended by the accumulation of that sentence. I believe that, with respect, His Honour must have overlooked the fact that the total term as well as the non-parole period would commence at the expiration of the non-parole period on the fourth count. Otherwise there seems to have been no point of going through the exercise of creating parole periods in accordance with the Act for each of the sentences and then imposing a cumulative sentence which all but obliterated the parole period earlier specified. 31 If his Honour intended, as I believe he did, to lengthen both the total term of the sentence and the period the applicant was to serve in custody before being eligible to release to parole by accumulating a sentence for the firearm offence in the sixth count, the only way he could achieve that result was to impose that sentence before the sentence for the fourth count and accumulate that count on the sentence for the sixth. 32 The Crown has argued that his Honour was entitled to fix sentences and non-parole periods giving the result achieved by the sentences he imposed. There is no doubt that submission is correct, see R v GDR (1994) 35 NSWLR 376. Further, s 44 of the Act refers only to the relationship between the non-parole period and the term of a particular sentence: it says nothing about the result of the cumulation of sentences. But the general policy relating to the specification of parole periods is that there should be a due relationship between the non-parole period and the total term and that this relationship will generally be in accordance with that specified in s 44. 33 It is difficult to see what is to be achieved by a 7 month parole period after the prisoner, who has no prior convictions, has served a sentence of 5 years and 7 months. Although there may be no need for supervision or assistance at the present time, it could not confidently be predicted that the same situation would apply after so long in custody. Such a short parole period after such a lengthy period in gaol gives the applicant little incentive to earn parole or little time for the parole service to provide him with assistance to re-establish himself once released. 34 Although there was no requirement for his Honour to give reasons for fixing such a proportion between the non-parole period and the total term, it is so exceptional, particularly in the case of a person with no prior convictions and who would not be considered a danger to society, that I would have thought some explanation or justification for such a sentence would be found in his Honour's reasons if he intended that result. This is particularly so in light of the fact that his Honour set non-parole periods bearing the usual relationship to the term of the sentence in respect of each sentence imposed. 35 Unfortunately the sentencing exercise seems to have miscarried by reason of the failure to give an appropriate discount and in the way the sentences were structured. But to rectify the situation would require a re-sentencing of the applicant which would require longer sentences to be imposed in order that the proper sentencing principles could be applied and an appropriate sentence achieved. That cannot be done on the applicant's appeal. The sentence I propose is not the sentence that should have been imposed but seems to me to do some justice to the applicant and the community. 36 I propose that the sentence for the sixth count be quashed and in lieu the applicant be sentenced to a fixed term of 18 months to commence on 17 March 2000 and to expire 16 September 2001. The sentence is to be a fixed term because of the sentence to be imposed on the fourth count. The sentence for the fourth count should be quashed and in lieu the applicant be sentenced to 5 years and 8 months to commence on 16 September 2000 with a non-parole of 4 years and 2 months which is to expire on 15 November 2004 the date upon which the applicant is to be eligible for release to parole. 37 I wish to make it clear that the total sentence which I have proposed is unduly lenient and verging on the inadequate, but has been brought about in order to permit the applicant to see that he has received some benefit for his pleas and to encourage him to work for parole and to assist him when he is released. He has not received the full measure of the benefit he should have received in terms of the percentage discount because to do so would result in a grossly inadequate sentence if this Court did not substantially increase the sentences imposed by Judge Bellear. But in effect he has received the full benefit of the pleas before the magistrate because the sentence now imposed is the very least that could have been imposed even giving him the fullest measure of discount for his pleas of guilty. 38 BARR J: I agree. The orders of the Court are therefore as proposed by Justice Howie.
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Regina
Parkinson
CITATION : Regina v Parkinson [2001] NSWCCA 244 revised - 5/07/2001 FILE NUMBER(S) : CCA 60061/01 HEARING DATE(S) : 27/06/01 JUDGMENT DATE : 27 June 2001
(2000) 49 NSWLR 383
(1994) 35 NSWLR 376