(d) The strength of the Crown case, whilst not irrelevant to an evaluation of remorse, is not to be taken into account in determining the utilitarian value of the plea.
20 The applicant's submissions cite in support the decision of this Court in Regina v. Drew [2000] NSWCCA 384 per Bryson, JA. (Barr and Hoeben, JJ. concurring at [15]).
21 It is contended that the discount should have been 25%. This would result in a reduction of the head sentence of five months and two weeks, namely, a head sentence of four years, one month and two weeks.
22 The Crown has submitted that the strength of the Crown case was not taken into account in assessing the utilitarian value of the applicant's pleas for the reasons expressed in paragraphs [12]-[14] of its written submissions.
23 The Crown also says that his Honour had in mind the structure of the sentences and totality and that the question of concurrence is of more significance than the precise discounts afforded for the various pleas.
24 I consider that there is a basis for the conclusion that the sentencing judge took into account the strength of the Crown case in determining the discount for what his Honour found to be an early plea. Whilst referring to the utilitarian benefit of the plea, "it was no doubt helpful for the administration of justice" (remarks on sentence, p.11), a little later, he states:-
"… On the other hand, that he would have been proved beyond reasonable doubt, at the very least on the most serious charge relating to cannabis, and also the charge in relation to the obtaining of a motor vehicle, could hardly be doubted." (remarks on sentence, pp.11-12)
25 The submission that his Honour differentiated between discounts on the basis of the strength of the Crown case in respect of the cannabis offence I consider to be well-founded.
26 However, the determination of the appropriate discount within the accepted range of 15 to 25% is, of course, a matter of evaluation involving a discretionary element and it was not mandatory in this case for a discount of 25% to be determined. I do not consider that a less severe sentence is warranted in law: s.6(3), Criminal Appeal Act 1912.
27 I accordingly do not consider that it has been shown that the error asserted would have or should have resulted in a different sentence that that imposed by the sentencing judge.