15 It is significant that the Chief Judge found it necessary to refer to the prevalence with which matters similar to the present matter come before the courts. It is of course a matter of grave public concern that standover tactics with threats of violence be used in order to seek to obtain protection money from institutions and, accordingly, such offences should be the subject of deterrent sentences.
16 The prior criminal record of the applicant, which was before the Chief Judge, demonstrates a clear manifestation of a refusal on his part to abide by the law, despite leniency consistently afforded to him. Specifically, his criminal record includes a sentence of three and a half years which was imposed on 2 September 1993 in relation to the offence of attempted armed robbery. Also of significance is that the present offence was committed on 21 February 1997 whilst the applicant was on a two year recognisance which had been granted to him on 12 July 1995.
17 Basically, there are three grounds of appeal. The first ground is that of an alleged lack of parity between the applicant's sentence and those which were subsequently imposed upon two or possibly three of his co-offenders.
18 The two co-offenders of particular significance for the parity argument are Kiet Ho Nguyen, to whom I shall refer as Nguyen, and Johannes Karauwan, to whom I shall refer as Karauwan. Nguyen is of Vietnamese descent and Karauwan is of Indonesian descent. These two offenders, unlike the applicant, pleaded not guilty, Nguyen to one count under s 99 in the same terms as that to which the applicant pleaded guilty. Karauwan pleaded not guilty to a similar count under s 99. He also pleaded not guilty to one count of possession of a loaded pistol contrary to s 7 of the Firearms Act, 1989.
19 After a trial lasting some days, both Nguyen and Karauwan were convicted of the s 99 charges and Karauwan was also convicted of the firearms charge. The trial took place before Naughton DCJ in the Sydney District Court and a jury of twelve. This Court has the benefit of the remarks on sentence when both Nguyen and Karauwan were sentenced.
20 I do not propose to descend into a great deal of particularity so far as the factual matrix upon which each of Nguyen and Karauwan were sentenced, or indeed their relative subjective circumstances. Some matters, however, do call for comment.
21 The evidence before Naughton DCJ established to his satisfaction beyond reasonable doubt that when the co-offenders accompanied the applicant to the massage parlour Karauwan was in possession of a loaded automatic pistol, as indeed, was the fourth co-offender Minh Han Ly. During the course of his remarks on sentence Naughton DCJ observed with regard to both Nguyen and Karauwan that they demonstrated no contrition, and that in the case of Karauwan he is liable to deportation to Indonesia upon completion of his sentence. As to prior criminal records, Nguyen had a lesser criminal record than that of the applicant. However, Karauwan had no prior criminal record and was held by Naughton DCJ to be a person of good character.
22 Minh Han Ly, to whom I shall refer as Ly, was tried before Gibson DCJ on an identical count under s 99 to the other co-offenders and an identical count under s 7 of the Firearms Act to Karauwan. For reasons which it is not necessary for this Court to concern itself, there was a verdict by direction with regard to the s 99 count, and Ly pleaded guilty to the charge under s 7 of the Firearms Act. Ly had a substantial criminal record. Gibson DCJ sentenced him to a minimum term of three years and an additional term of one year. The maximum sentence for the firearms offence is ten years.
23 During the course of his remarks on sentence, Naughton DCJ carefully compared the factual and the subjective circumstances so far as the applicant Nguyen and Karauwan were concerned. This was an extremely difficult task because the objective circumstances in respect of the three men were different, as, indeed, as has probably already been made clear, so were their subjective circumstances.
24 One matter of particular interest is that the Crown led no evidence on the sentencing proceedings before the Chief Judge, in relation to the applicant, to the fact that at the time the demands with menaces were being made by the applicant, Karauwan and Ly were on the premises each in possession of the loaded pistols to which I have already referred. The evidence before Naughton DCJ was to the effect that at no stage were those pistols produced and perhaps the Crown in the subject case took the view that in those circumstances it was appropriate that evidence that they possessed those pistols should not be presented before the Chief Judge.
25 An interesting question has arisen as to whether on a parity argument this Court is entitled to take into consideration the distinct possibility that if this evidence had been before the Chief Judge there would have been a significant increase in the sentence which he imposed upon the applicant. However, I respectfully agree with the submission which was ultimately put to this Court by Mr Ellis on behalf of the Crown that at the end of the day this is not a matter with which this Court need concern itself. I rather suspect, however, that it is a problem which will arise more acutely in some future case.
26 Having, so far as he could, compared the respective cases, Naughton DCJ resolved that both Nguyen and Karauwan should receive the same sentences as the applicant. In Karauwan's case, this was the same overall sentence because the sentence which his Honour imposed in relation to the possession of the loaded pistol offence was fixed to run concurrently with the sentence which he imposed on the s 99 offence.
27 By way of general comment, may I say that Lowe's case (1984) 154 CLR 606 contemplates that a prisoner, when sentenced in relation to a joint criminal enterprise with one or more co-offenders, may have a sense of grievance if the sentences which are imposed on a co-offender or co-offenders are relatively less severe than that imposed upon him or her if the circumstances (both subjective and objective) are such that it is possible for the relevant court to determine that there was a lack of parity between the sentences. It is not generally possible to reach such a conclusion if there are distinct differences between both the objective and the subjective features associated with each offender.
28 Thus in the present case there were a number of unequal characteristics by way of prior criminal records. The applicant had by far the worst prior criminal record and it was a bad criminal record at that. Karauwan had no prior criminal record. As to the three convicted of the s 99 offence, the applicant played by far the most significant role. He was the spokesperson and apparently the ringleader.
29 Thirdly, the applicant pleaded guilty which might be thought to have been an acknowledgment of the inevitable, bearing in mind the elaborate precautions that had been taken beforehand by the investigating police officers to ensure that any incriminating evidence would be recorded.
30 Nguyen and Karauwan on the other hand had pleaded not guilty. Ly was dealt with only in relation to the firearms offence. The evidence against Nguyen and Karauwan included the possession by them of concealed weapons. That evidence was not led with regard to the present applicant.
31 This Court in Hodges (1997) 95 A Crim R 85, pointed out the difficulties associated with parity arguments when co-offenders are sentenced in relation to different factual matrixes. If I may respectfully say so, Naughton DCJ carefully attempted, bearing in mind the difficulties with which he was confronted, to achieve parity between the three persons convicted under s 99 and, in my respectful view, achieved the highest degree of parity that the circumstances permitted. It is true that the parity argument is not denied to the applicant by reason of the fact that he was sentenced prior to Nguyen and Karauwan. However, when one considers the approach of Naughton DCJ and the regime of parity which he attempted to achieve, then it seems to me that together with the general problems to which I have adverted that there is no substance insofar as the applicant's arguments on parity before this Court are concerned.
32 The remaining two matters might be dealt with more shortly. It was submitted, secondly, that there was an insufficient discount for the plea of guilty. The Chief Judge specifically mentioned the fact that there had been a plea of guilty and that it was being taken into account. Obviously, this was not a case which called for a significant discount bearing in mind the factors to which I have referred. However, the applicant was entitled to some discount consistently with cases such as Winchester (1992) 58 A Crim R 345, and I am satisfied that he got such a discount.
33 Finally, it was argued, mainly by reference to Judicial Commission statistics, that the sentence was manifestly excessive. There is in my view no substance in this argument. This was a particularly serious offence in a climate where a strong deterrent element was necessary so far as the calculation of the appropriate sentence was concerned. The applicant had very little by way of subjective circumstances to assist him and the sentence imposed by his Honour both insofar as the minimum term and the additional term are concerned was within the discretion available to him.
34 For these reasons, although I would in the circumstances, bearing in mind that the applicant was sentenced prior to the other offenders and some of the other matters which this Court has been called upon to consider, that leave to appeal should be granted but that the appeal should be dismissed.
35 LEVINE J: I agree and the orders will be as proposed by Carruthers AJ.
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