Resolution of the issues
27 I have taken some little trouble to set out the background and submissions made in this matter. The principal issue, however, is a very simple one: will the granting of access to the confidential material, under any circumstances, be likely to endanger national security? If it will, is there any further scope, according to the dictates of procedural fairness, for disclosure of some kind or in some manner?
28 These questions pose a tension between two well-known concepts in the law: fairness in litigation and the protection of national security interests. The principles involving these concepts are well established and are not in issue in this motion. .
29 As to the rights of a person to know the case against him: see Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 582, 584-5 per Mason J. As to limitations on disclosure of documents under claim of public interest immunity: see Alister v The Queen at 469; Commonwealth of Australia v Northern Land Council (1993) 176 CLR 604 at 620; Seymour v Price; Fitzgerald & Anor v Price BC 9805031 and Regina v Lodhi [2006] NSWSC 596
30 In my view, the resolution of the principal issue commands only one answer. Overwhelmingly, the need for the protection of confidential and highly sensitive national security material compel the result that access, in the present matter, must be denied. I shall briefly state my reasons.
31 The starting point is the clear recognition that the confidential affidavits makes it quite clear that much of the material in the Warrant Affidavit relates to national security information that is highly sensitive. The open affidavits disclose that the material relates to sensitive sources of intelligence and to counter terrorism strategies and activities. Secondly, the material in the confidential affidavits themselves is of the same general nature but it is sensitive to an even higher degree. The protection of sensitive sources, the suppression of details relating to the police and the security agency's ongoing strategy to defeat and frustrate terrorist activities in this country must be of paramount importance to national security. As Brennan J stated in Church of Scientology v Woodward (1982) 43 ALR 587 at 615: -
"Discovery would not be given against the Director General save in a most exceptional case. The secrecy of the work of an intelligence organisation which is to counter espionage, sabotage, etc is essential to national security, and the public interest in national security will seldom yield to the public interest in the administration of civil justice (R v Lewes Justices; Ex Parte Home Secretary (1973) AC 388 at 407)".
32 These statements, made nearly 25 years ago, have a more emphatic content in the present world climate. The interests of national security and the need for effective counter-terrorism operations today are plainly of very great importance (see Wood CJ at CL in R v Mallah (unreported) 11 February 2005 at para 23).
33 Thirdly, the confidential material, in general terms, is so significant in terms of national security sensitivity, that the better view is that it should not be disclosed to the legal representatives of the applicants, even though undertakings have been proffered on behalf of those persons in an endeavour to protect the material from any form of public dissemination. In relation to this point, I need to address a number of subsidiary remarks.
34 The first is that there is no suggestion that experienced junior and senior counsel involved in the principal motion will, or would be likely, to disclose the material in degradation of their undertakings. Although none of the legal representatives has a Security Clearance in relation to national security legislation, that is not to the point here. The second subsidiary matter is this: although I have absolute confidence in the individual legal representatives who will be appearing on the principal motion, there are three matters of qualification that need to be mentioned. First, there is the possibility of inadvertent disclosure. This has been commented on in a wide range of cases. For example, in Carbotech-Australia v Yates [2006] NSWSC 269 Campbell J stated at para [13]: -
"Even if documents are only shown to nominated officers of the litigant, and even if those officers are informed of the restrictions on use of the information…those officers are subject to the same risk of inadvertent disclosure as a solicitor to whom access is restricted is subject. As well, even if the officers are being punctiliously careful, the workings of the human mind are such that, once something is known, sometimes it cannot be completely obliterated. Use can sometimes be made unconsciously of information one has learned. Those considerations need to be balanced against the importance of the issues in the proceedings".
35 See also Traljesic v Attorney General for the Commonwealth [2006] FCA 125 per Rares J at para 22-23; Jackson v Wells (1985) 5 FCR 296 at 307-308; D & J Constructions Pty Limited v Head (1987) NSWLR 118 per Bryson J at 122-123.
36 Mr Kirk argued that this aspect of inadvertent disclosure is of limited relevance in the present matter because the applicants had themselves, to one degree or another, read the Warrant information. Mr Kirk, however, acknowledged that the same point could not be made concerning the confidential affidavits sworn by Mr O'Sullivan and Acting Superintendent Lawler. The question as to the information actually gleaned by either Mr Lange or Mr Houda will undoubtedly be an issue in the principal motion. It cannot necessarily be assumed that either of those gentleman absorbed, during the relatively brief inspection of the Warrant Affidavit, the entirety of the material that I have had to examine with considerable care and circumspection. There is a world of difference between a hurried inspection in the Registry office for the purposes of preparing an urgent written submission required by senior counsel (as I understand the circumstances to have been) and the detailed analysis I have undertaken of the same material. The consequence is that there may be many aspects of the Warrant Affidavit that are not known to Mr Lange or Mr Houda or which, certainly, would not have been retained in their respective memories. Mr Kirk's concession, however, regarding the confidential affidavits exhibits "A", "B" and "C" is properly made.
37 But there is a more important point to be made, beyond simply trying to isolate those aspects of the Warrant Affidavit that may have been seen and remembered by the applicants. Disclosure of the material to the legal representatives of the applicants for the purposes of the principal motion poses a wider risk of inadvertent disclosure than simply disclosure to the applicants themselves. Some of the material in the Warrant Affidavit (and almost all of the material in the confidential affidavits) is material that simply should not be disclosed at all, if it is at all possible to avoid that situation. The risk to national security flowing from inadvertent disclosure in any area of the public forum is simply too high. It may be thought by some that the insistence on non-disclosure by ASIO and the Australian Federal Police is some type of over reaction on their part. In my view, however, it is not overly dramatic to say that the protection of this type of information is, or at least may be, in general terms, a matter of life and death for the citizens of this country. It is all too easy to dismiss the risk of a terrorist attack in Australia as unlikely. The reality is that, in the present political and ideological climate, Australia may face real prospects of being subject to a serious terrorist attack or attacks within the confines of its shores. One protection from such a danger (and I do not suggest that it is the only protection) is the promotion of the efficient and ongoing work of our police enforcement agencies and, in particular, our national security intelligence agency. It is for this reason that I consider that, wherever it is at all possible, there should be a restriction on disclosure of this kind of material so as to prevent inadvertent disclosure not merely to the parties themselves but to the world at large.
38 In making this assessment, I am conscious of the fact that it is not possible to prevent disclosure of some kind. Absolute non-disclosure is an ideal that cannot be achieved. For example, the Judge who is required to form an opinion about aspects of national security and confidentiality in documents knows, in detail, the nature of the sensitive material. The lawyers for the Commonwealth, to one degree or another, are in possession of this information. The material itself is stored in brief cases and safes to prevent inadvertent disclosure. But in all these circumstances, there still arises the risk of inadvertent disclosure. Even though it is not commonly thought so, judges are human too, just as barristers and solicitors are. There is always the risk of "loose talk" in a social setting where something which is otherwise confidential may be disclosed and then inadvertently passed on to a wider audience. The recognition of this possibility does not make it any less important to restrict disclosure as much as possible and wherever it is, consistently with fairness, possible.
39 The final aspect on disclosure is the need to recognise the reality that, quite apart from inadvertent disclosure, there are, in the international sphere and perhaps in this country, intelligence gathering operations designed to block counter-terrorism strategies. Those operations are likely to seek out, often in a sophisticated way, information which would be likely to weaken those counter-terrorism strategies and methods. The reality of this situation reinforces the need to prevent, or at least, limit disclosure of sensitive information wherever that is possible.
40 I realise that I have digressed somewhat from my principal statement of reasons to make these subsidiary points about disclosure. May I now return to those reasons and address the evaluation of perhaps the most important point for the purposes of this decision. This is the evaluation of the question as to whether procedural fairness will be denied to the applicants if access be denied to their legal representatives. It is obvious enough, as Mr Kirk's submissions made clear, that the legal representatives for the applicants must be in a better position to make submissions on behalf of their clients were they to be given access to the material. That, as I have also said earlier, is not the criterion where national security risks are concerned. I have come to the conclusion, however, on this fourth point, that the position of the applicants is by no means as dire as Mr Kirk has submitted. There are a number of matters to be mentioned in this regard.
41 The first matter is that the applicant's legal representatives have been given a limited amount of information in the form of the redacted material I have earlier identified. There are also the open affidavits to which I have made reference. True it is that this material will provide the legal representatives little in the way of detail. But they will know the general nature of the claims for public interest immunity and the structure of those claims. The second matter is the point made in argument by Mr Fagan SC who advanced submissions on behalf of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions. This was to the effect that the principal matter at issue in the Commonwealth's application will be the question as to whether the applicants, or either of them, were guilty of, at one end of the scale, professional wrong doing or, at the other, a mere error of judgment. Senior counsel submitted that an analysis of the professional level of behaviour of Mr Lange and Mr Houda does not, except in a general sense, involve a detailed consideration of the confidential material. The risk to national security arising out of disclosure of the Warrant Affidavit material to the applicants arises only in the context of the Commonwealth's second argument, namely whether the applicants are in a position of conflict with their client's interests; or might otherwise be prohibited from continuing to appear.
42 The third matter is this: although the applicant's legal representatives will not have access to the confidential material, the Court will have examined it in considerable detail. If I may say so, the documentary material is of no great magnitude; its nature is easily and clearly understood; and the reasons for non-disclosure are articulated comprehensively and succinctly in the confidential affidavits. In particular, the affidavit of Acting Superintendent Lawler broaches a considerable number of topics in a plain and ambiguous manner. This is not a case in which I consider that the Court needs any further assistance in the form of submissions from opposing counsel.
43 The final matter is that this is a case, perhaps unlike some others, where the applicants can take considerable comfort in the fact that the presiding judge will know and understand the nature of the confidential information. Moreover, unlike the situation that can sometimes arise in a criminal trial, the Court will know precisely those matters that are important to the position of the applicants when the principal motion is heard. In particular, the Court will have been able to assess for itself the gradation of the confidential material. Clearly enough, there are some topics that are more sensitive than others in the confidential Warrant Affidavit material. Equally, the Court will be able to know whether there are any matters that are likely to arise as raising questions of conflict between the applicants and their client in the trial. It may be that some more information will be necessary to be placed before the Court as to the nature of the charges and the defence position likely to arise. This is, however, unlikely to be a complicated aspect of the principal motion.
44 The Crown placed particular reliance on a decision of Acting Justice Smart in Nicopoulos v Commissioner for Corrective Services [2004] NSWSC 562. This is a case in which the plaintiff was a solicitor practicing mainly in the criminal law area. The defendant had given directions under clause 105 of the Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Regulation 2001 that the plaintiff and certain of his staff be prevented from entering any Correctional Centre on the basis that any visit to an inmate at such centre would prejudice the good order and security of a Correctional Centre. This decision followed a prison visit by the plaintiff during which an inmate/client directly handed notes to the plaintiff's paralegal in contravention of the regulations. The decision was also based on confidential intelligence information concerning certain other alleged misconduct by the solicitor. The plaintiff however was not told what the misconduct was nor was he given access to the confidential intelligence information. The plaintiff claimed a denial of procedural fairness and, at the hearing, the Commissioner sought to have three confidential affidavits admitted without disclosing their content to the plaintiff. The case turned upon consideration of the matters contained in s 130 of the Evidence Act 1995.
45 At the hearing, the Commissioner submitted that s 130(1) created a discretion allowing, but not mandating, the Court to refuse to admit evidence where the public interest in confidentiality outweighed disclosure. The defendant asked the Court to admit the evidence but to preclude the plaintiff having access to it.
46 Smart AJ admitted the evidence but came to the view that it would be against the public interest and the ongoing protection of crime and the maintenance of security and order in prisons if the information admitted into evidence were revealed to the plaintiff. Secondly, his Honour held that the rules of procedural fairness were not breached in respect of the non-disclosure of the intelligence information. His Honour held that the situation was one where the content of the rules of procedural fairness were "elided to nothing" due to the fact that to do otherwise would frustrate the Commissioner's need to protect confidentiality and secrecy (Paras 103 and 104).
47 It will be seen that Nicopoulos's case is very different in a number of respects from the situation I am dealing with here. The parties are agreed, for example, that s 130 of the Evidence Act 1995 is not relevant to my determination of the notice of motion for access to confidential documents. Moreover, it is difficult to know with any precision the nature of the confidential information placed before Smart AJ in Nicopoulos's case. One can make an educated guess at the nature of the public interest involved (for example, there is a reference in para 99 to the detection and prevent of crimes and breaches of prison regulations and rules) but the position is not clear.
48 Another difference is this: the point at issue there was that it was the conduct of Mr Nicopoulos (or at least material about his former conduct) that was itself the confidential material in issue. In that respect, Nicopoulos is markedly different from the present matter.
49 Nicopoulos's case, however, was raised particularly in relation to a proposition I mentioned during argument to Mr Willie QC. I remarked that it seemed unusual in the present matter, where an adverse finding could impact markedly on the professional careers of the applicants, that neither they, their legal representatives or anyone else would know what the material is that was to determine, in effect, the outcome of the application. In putting that proposition to Mr Willie QC, I had in mind the possibility that special counsel might be appointed. Senior counsel responded by giving Nicopoulos as an illustration of an extreme, but justifiable position.
50 It might be observed however, that the issue of the appointment of special counsel was not raised before Smart AJ in Nicopoulos. In any event, it may be convenient if I turn to the issue of special counsel at this point.