The Subjective Case of Mr Keir
32 At the time of these events, Mr Keir had a number of convictions, in respect of which he received fines. Adams J approached the matter on the basis that he had prior good character, and was therefore entitled to a measure of leniency. Whilst that was unquestionably a generous approach, I will adopt the same approach when re-sentencing. There was also evidence that Mr Keir behaved well towards his mother and had been generous financially to her. Mr Keir enjoyed, and enjoys, a good relationship with his family and with his son.
33 Mr Keir maintains his innocence. He has shown no contrition whatever. Dr Westmore, who examined him in November 1999 after the first trial, said this, having referred to the evidence concerning Mr Keir's attempts to control his wife's dress and behaviour: (report 28.4.99)
"With that information it is probably reasonable to assume that he does not represent a risk to the general population when future dangerousness is being considered. His risks within intimate relationships must be considered to be reasonably high. The history indicates that he became quite obsessed in this particular relationship, he may have even developed a degree of morbid jealousy although I cannot confirm that. The history however does indicate that his concerns about certain aspects of his wife's behaviour were unhealthy and probably at an extreme."
34 It was suggested, on behalf of Mr Keir, that I should take account of the delay in prosecution. Delay in prosecution can be relevant to the sentence imposed (R v Rose [2002] NSWSC 26 at para 29). A measure of leniency may be appropriate where the offender is not responsible for delay and can point to a specific detriment arising from delay.
35 Detriment may arise in many ways. Evidence relevant on sentence, which may have been available had the prosecution been brought in a timely way, may cease to be available (Regina v V (unreported, CCA, 24.2.98)). The offender, on the other hand, may be left in a state of uncertain suspense (R v Todd (1982) 2 NSWLR 517, per Street CJ at 519), or may have spent years in an emotional hell (R v Holyoak (1995) 82 A Crim R 502, per Allen J at 508). On the other hand, delay may work to the offender's advantage. It may, as Wood J said in Regina v V (supra), provide "an opportunity ... for the offender to establish a new life and to positively demonstrate his rehabilitation".
36 Here the delay before May 1991 was caused by Mr Keir and his pretence that Jean had disappeared. The delay from 1991 until 1998 was caused by the time consuming process of DNA testing, both in Australia and overseas. Mr Keir was not responsible for that delay. However, there is no evidence that he lived in a state of uncertain suspense or in some private hell, or was otherwise disadvantaged. The delay has, in one respect, operated to his advantage. Mr Keir can now point to a conviction free period since 1988, which is relevant to his prospects for rehabilitation.
37 On the issue of rehabilitation, I accept that, given his age, 45 years, and the likely time at which he will be released to parole, his prospects of rehabilitation are better than reasonable.
38 Mrs Christine Strachan, the mother of Jean, has prepared two documents which describe the effect upon her of Jean's disappearance and death and the effect upon the family. Each is a moving account of the family's relationship with Jean. Each describes Jean's character. Jean was young, beautiful, and full of joy. She was a devoted mother. Each statement describes the anguish and the puzzlement upon her disappearance. They describe the torment of having to endure the trial and the appellate process. One can only have sympathy for Mrs Strachan and her family. However, I must, of course, deal with such material in a manner consistent with the principles identified in R v Previtera (1997) 94 A Crim R 76 at 85.
39 Mr Keir has been in custody since 20 February 1998. His sentence should commence from that date.
40 After the first trial, Adams J imposed a sentence of 24 years with a minimum term of 18 years. His Honour said this (R v Keir [2000] NSWSC 111): (para 16)
"The only substantial factor which takes this crime out of the worst class of case is that I am not satisfied that the prisoner intended to kill Jean Keir. Though causing the death of someone when intending to inflict serious bodily injury is a very grave crime, it is necessary (unless the circumstances are exceptional) to confine the most serious class of case to those, at least, where the killing results from an intention to cause death."
41 I, with respect, view the matter somewhat differently. Without in any way diminishing the awful and brutal nature of this crime, it could not, in my view, be included in the worst class of case (as that term has been interpreted), even had there been present an intent to kill (cf R v Twala (unreported, CCA, 4.11.94) per Badgery Parker J; R v Alexander (1999) 107 A Crim R 449 at 454; R v Adam [1999] NSWSC 144 per Wood CJ at CL, at para 39 to 52). I believe that the appropriate sentence, recognising the objective gravity of the crime, and the subjective features of Mr Keir's case, including the absence of serious criminal convictions, is 22 years with a non-parole period of 16 years (cf s21A Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999). Such a sentence departs to a minor degree from the proportion suggested by s44(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, 1999. I make a finding of special circumstance to permit that departure, believing that Mr Keir will benefit from supervision for that period.
42 Thomas Andrew Keir, I sentence you to imprisonment for 22 years commencing on 20 February 1998 and expiring on 19 February 2020, with a non parole period of 16 years. You will therefore be eligible for release on parole on 20 February 2014.