16 His Honour then went on to say that he found special circumstances relating to the applicant's need for on going rehabilitation in the community on his release from prison. He imposed a sentence to which I have made earlier reference. During the course of his decision his Honour made mention of the report of Dr Nielssen. It is relevant if I just briefly mention some portions of it in relation to the offence and the circumstances surrounding it. Dr Nielssen obtained a history from the applicant. Dr Nielssen said:
"Mr Hunter said that four days. before the offence he was discharged from Foley House, a drug rehabilitation centre in Surry Hills, where he had spent a month withdrawing from Methadone. He said he was initially taken down from his previous dose 50 mg per day to 20 mg and then for two weeks prior to his discharge the drug was stopped altogether. He said that the regime at the rehabilitation centre was fairly loose, and that it was possible to leave the unit and buy drugs and also to return in an intoxicated state without being reprimanded by the staff. He said that he had used about a half a gram of heroin over several days whilst at the centre, but said that he left the centre with the intention of ceasing drugs. He said that he had not received heroin for three days before the offence.
Mr Hunter said that he had nowhere to stay after leaving Foley House, and spent the night before the offence, in a park behind the Bondi Junction Community Health Centre (BJCHC). He said that he had attended the BJCHC the two days before and saw an experienced psychiatrist, Dr Hume, who had known him for the four years he had been treated at Prince of Wales Hospital for schizophrenia. He said that Dr Hume told him that he had to deal with his drug problem before he could receive psychiatric treatment.
He said that about eight o'clock in the morning of the offence he went to the mall in Bondi Junction where he spent the next four hours experiencing withdrawal symptoms and a strong craving to use drugs. He said that the offence occurred on the spur of the moment after he reached the conclusion that he had to have some heroin.
Mr Hunter said that he held the child around the chest with the hand holding the knife. He said that he did not hold the knife to the child's throat, but instead wanted to show the knife to the child's mother. He said the offence was committed as an "act of desperation" and he had not intended any physical harm to the victims.
Mr Hunter said that he had suffered from episodes of mental illness, schizophrenia for twenty years, and had not received treatment for about ten months prior to the offence. He said that in addition to withdrawing from heroin he was experiencing symptoms of mental illness, including auditory hallucinations of voices commenting on his actions, and ideas of reference from his surroundings."
17 Dr Nielssen also set out at length the tragic and long psychiatric history of the applicant. At the conclusion of his report on page 6 he said when referring to the applicant:
"The relationship between schizophrenia, drug dependence and abuse and criminal responsibility is complex, and it has been argued that it hinges on the degree of disability arising from the mental illness. In Mr Hunter's case, it appears that despite the frequency of admissions to hospital, he had relatively little residual disability, as he reports being able to work as a journalist until as recently as 1997. His inability to work since then seems to be as much due to drug abuse as to active psychotic illness. Moreover, he reported committing the offence to obtain money for heroin because he was distressed by withdrawal symptoms, and gave largely coherent responses to the police in the ERISP. He did not report symptoms of mental illness amounting to a defect of reason affecting his knowledge of moral wrong, and does not have the defence of mental illness open to him.
However, there is clear that Mr Hunter was suffering from an acute relapse of illness at the time of the offence, of which the main symptom was critical auditor hallucinations and persecutory beliefs. People with schizophrenia frequently report using heroin as a way of controlling both acute and chronic symptoms of the disorder. People with schizophrenia are also more likely to act impulsively, without considering the likely outcome, as the disease effects parts of the brain controlling planning and impulse control."
18 As to the first point, s 22(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 requires that in passing sentence for an offence on an offender who has pleaded guilty to the offence, the court must take into account the fact that the offender has pleaded guilty. It must also take into account when the offender has pleaded guilty and indicated an intent to plead guilty. The gravamen of the first argument as is has been debated between the Crown and the applicant in this appeal turns on the interpretation of Solomon DCJ's remarks on sentence. If his Honour intended to convey that he limited the discount for early plea because of its utilitarian value, had to be offset by a recognition of the strength of the Crown case, then error would have been shown (see Thompson & Houlton (2000) 49 NSWLR 383; see also R v Carter (2001) NSWCCA 245 and R v Lo (2001) NSWCCA 271). If on the other hand his Honour's decision meant that insofar as the element of contrition was concerned, the strength of the Crown case might have had a bearing on the value of the plea in this regard only, no error would have been shown. How then is his Honour's decision to be interpreted?
19 Fairly read, it seems to me that the remarks on page 4 do not affect the principles I have stated. His Honour is a very experienced criminal Judge and I do not consider it at all likely that his Honour would have been unaware of the relevant distinction recognised in Thompson. The passage in the reasons when read in its entirety are, in context, not susceptible to the narrow construction urged on behalf of the applicant. I am also unpersuaded by the transcript reference to the discussion that occurred before the sentencing decision was given. I do not think that is helpful to have regard to an ambiguous and uncorrected transcript in that way. I do not consider that any error has been shown in relation to the first ground of appeal.
20 As to the second matter it seems to me clear that his Honour expressly applied the correct principles to the circumstances of the applicant's unfortunate history in relation to his mental illness. This appears in the passages I have already set out and it appears specifically at page 5. His Honour said that he would take that into consideration - that is the schizophrenic condition - when considering general deterrence, and that the application of general deterrence had to be given little weight when sentencing a person who suffers from a serious mental condition. Further his Honour said that in relation to the schizophrenia he was aware of the sentencing principles that are set out in Engert.
21 Although his Honour referred in this context to the need to consider the protection of society, it does not appear that his Honour allowed this factor to overbear his consideration of the applicant's mental condition. Further although it be correct that his Honour expressly concluded, as he was entitled to do, that he was not satisfied the offender committed the offence in direct consequence of the schizophrenia, and he found that the offence was committed for the express purpose of obtaining money to feed his heroin addiction, his Honour did not allow these findings to dissuade him from applying the correct principles he identified. These findings were plainly relevant to an assessment of culpability.
22 In Engert Gleeson CJ, recognised the complexity of the sentencing task and the multiplicity of objects it must serve. His Honour concluded at page 68:
"It is therefore erroneous in principle to approach the law of sentencing as though automatic consequences follow from the presence or absence of particular factual circumstances. In every case what is called for is the making of a discretionary decision in light of the circumstances of the individual case, and in the light of the purposes to be served by the sentencing exercise".